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ABSTRACT 
 
Research has broadly shown that Inhibitory Control and drawing skills are directly 
associated in early childhood development. The current study extends this in three studies 
investigating the role of Motor Control in this relationship, and the differences between three 
different drawing skills in their relationships with Inhibitory Control, Fine and Gross Motor 
Control, IQ, age and gender.  
Study 1 found strong positive correlations in 3- and 4-year-old children (n=100) between 
Inhibitory Control, Fine Motor Control, age and two drawing skills (Figurative Representation 
and Detail). Mediation analyses however demonstrated that Fine Motor Control fully mediated 
the relationship between Inhibitory Control and these drawing measures. In contrast, the 
association of Inhibitory Control with Visual Realism of drawing was not mediated by Fine 
Motor Control, meaning that Inhibitory Control directly influenced Visual Realism (which is 
children’s tendency to draw what they see, rather than what they know is there). The relationship 
of Visual Realism with age was, however, surprisingly negative. 
Study 2 (n=100) tested further the relationship between Inhibitory Control and Fine Motor 
Control to reveal any additional role played by Gross Motor Control or verbal IQ. The strong 
association between Inhibitory Control and Fine Motor Control in early childhood was 
confirmed: Inhibitory Control and Gross Motor Control were not directly linked, but Fine Motor 
Control mediated the relationship between Inhibitory Control and Gross Motor Control, while IQ 
played no major role. 
Study 3 investigated whether the development with age of Visual Realism in fact follows a 
U-shaped pattern in children (n=233), accounting for the negative correlation between these 
among preschoolers. Such a pattern would indicate that children start drawing with visual 
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realism, then move to intellectual realism and then back to visual realism. Some support was 
found for this hitherto unreported pattern of development.  
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Definitions of Key Terms 
 
Drawing:  This can be defined as the production of graphic shapes (other than those associated 
with written language), using a pencil or the like, not paint, which for a variety of reasons 
represent meaningful pictures or diagrams for people (Hope, 2008). 
 
Executive functioning (EF): This is a person’s level of higher order thinking, which is usually 
seen as having a number of components including: 1) working memory, 2) planning, and 3) 
response inhibition, also known as IC (Gross & Grossman, 2010). It is the last of these which the 
current study is mainly concerned with. 
 
Fine motor control (FMC): Motor control (and associated skills) is subdivided into gross motor 
control and fine motor control (Gallahue and Ozmun, 2006). Fine motor control requires the 
skilful use of small muscles (e.g. in hands and fingers) to produce precise and refined 
movements required for daily activities, such as feeding oneself, dressing, and writing and 
drawing (Cools, De Martelaer, Samaey & Andries, 2009; Summers, Larkin, & Dewey, 2008). 
According to Diamond (2000) fine motor control relies on the prefrontal cortex and the 
cerebellum. It also involves incorporating visual stimuli from the environment (Korkman, Kirk 
& Kemp, 2007). Its development continues throughout a person’s lifetime and includes not only 
physical growth, but also development of the motor and nervous systems (Gallahue & Ozmun, 
2006). Children need to use visual information from their environment alongside their refined 
muscle control to complete complex tasks such as reproducing an image or figure (Sorter & Kulp, 
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2003). To measure fine motor skills, activities used in classroom setting are often measured, such 
as drawing, copying and block-building. 
 
Gross motor control (GMC): This requires the use of large muscle groups (arms, legs and neck) 
and the involvement of bodily movements (Payne & Issacs, 2008) and is developed in early 
childhood for stability and control of the body to assist exploration (Cools et al., 2009; Gallahue 
& Ozmun, 2006; Haywood & Getchell, 2009; Schmidt & Lee, 2005). It is subdivided into 
locomotor skills and object control. Whilst locomotor skills involve movement from one place to 
another (walking, running, jumping etc.), object control skills involve the movement and 
coordination of body parts with objects – to either take action or receive a response from an 
object. 
  
Inhibitory control (IC): This is the ability to stop an inappropriate response, especially a pre-
potent one, or to ignore distracting information. 
 
Human figure drawing: This can be defined as a task that requires someone (in the present case 
a child) to draw a whole person on a piece of paper. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
Executive Functions (EFs) are the cognitive abilities which coordinate information to 
produce goal-directed actions (Anderson, 2002; Fuster, 1997; Miller & Cohen, 2001). These 
functions are important for planning, reasoning, and integrating thoughts and actions (Shallice, 
Burgess & Robertson, 1996). EFs, at a fine-grained level, include the cognitive processes of 
working memory, inhibitory control, and mental set shifting or mental flexibility (Garon, Bryson 
& Smith, 2008), as first revealed by the factor analysis of Miyake, Friedman, and colleagues 
(2000). It is argued that EFs are crucial in just about every area of people’s lives (Diamond, 
2013), from school readiness as a child (Cameron, Brock, Murrah et al., 2012), to marital 
harmony as an adult (Eakin, Minde, Hetchtman et al., 2004). EFs have become an important 
subject of study in young children due to their influence on learning and social cognition: hence 
studying their development in childhood and adolescence provides a better understanding of the 
development of crucial mechanisms involved in controlling and organising behaviour. 
Currently, developmental research is showing that one of the EFs, inhibitory control (IC), 
has a special part to play in a number of intellectual and academic abilities. According to 
Simpson and Riggs (2006), IC is the ability to stop an inappropriate response or ignore 
distracting information and suppress thinking. This EF is important to support other cognitive 
abilities which are needed in order for individuals to demonstrate flexible goal driven thinking 
and behaviour (Montgomery & Koeltzow, 2010; Chevalier, Sheffield, Nelson, Clark, Wiebe & 
Epsy, 2012). These include children’s self-regulation and their understanding of others’ minds, 
the physical world, text, and mathematics.  
 
 
3 
The development of IC in early childhood is of particular interest for two reasons. The first 
reason is that, although there is evidence to suggest that IC develops from infancy to early 
adulthood, the most dramatic change occurs in early childhood. According to several researchers, 
accuracy of 3-year-olds on a variety of inhibitory tasks is poor, but improves dramatically over 
the next year (Gerstadt, Hong & Diamond, 1994; Jones, Rothbart & Posner, 2003; Simpson & 
Riggs, 2005a; Wiebe, Sheffield & Espy, 2012; Willoughby, Wirth & Blair, 2011). The second 
reason for focusing on the development of IC in early childhood is that there is evidence to 
suggest that this dramatic improvement of IC is linked to other changes in young children’s 
cognition (Apperly & Carroll, 2009; Beck, Carroll, Brunsdon, & Gryg, 2011; Benson, Sabbagh, 
Carlson & Zelazo, 2013). Carlson and Moses (2001) found a strong correlation between a battery 
of theory of mind tests and a set of IC tasks, even when other factors were controlled for (age, 
vocabulary and gender). Beginning with this study, correlational evidence has further suggested 
that improvement in IC is linked to the development of a wide range of important reasoning 
abilities (Apperly & Carroll, 2009; Beck, Carroll, Brunsdon et al., 2011; Benson, Sabbagh, 
Carlson & Zelazo, 2013; Sabbagh, Moses & Shiverick, 2006), as well as to the development of 
academic abilities more generally (Gilmore, Attridge, Clayton, Cragg et al., 2013). Relationships 
even extend to areas such as health (Moffitt, Arseneault, Belsky, Dickson et al., 2011), school 
readiness (Blair, 2002), and psychopathology (Dale & Baumeister, 1999). 
For the remainder of chapter 1, I follow up on these themes in depth, drawing on relevant 
literature. I consider in more detail the nature of IC and how it can be measured, I describe its 
relationship with various childhood skills and abilities, including drawing, and I briefly examine 
how it may connect with motor control. I conclude with an account of the research focus of my 
thesis, and its three related areas of interest (covered in Chapters 2, 3, 4). 
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1.2 What is Inhibitory Control? 
IC is seen as a key component of the executive function. It embraces control of visual 
attention (Frank, 2006) as well as control of manual and locomotor behaviour. Diamond (2013) 
in fact distinguishes these two components of IC (Figure 1.1): IC which controls attention, 
sometimes called ‘interference control’; and IC which controls behaviour, sometimes called 
‘response inhibition’. Of these, the present study is concerned more with IC in the latter sense. 
IC is also regarded as an important component of the human ability for self-regulation 
(Kochanska, Murray, Jacques, Koenig & Vandegeest, 1996). Self-regulation, in turn is a rather 
wider construct with the role of promoting goal-directed or adaptive behaviour (Berger, 2011; 
Calkins & Fox, 2002). It embraces self-regulation not only of cognitive but also of physiological, 
attentional, behavioural and emotional processes.  
 
Figure 1.1. Summary of the relationship between attention, inhibitory control and 
executive function (based on the analysis of Diamond, 2013). 
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Studies of IC often use a battery of behavioural tasks which are believed to require the 
exercise of IC, in a way that excludes excessive dependence on other abilities. I will pursue the 
kind of measures used for IC in more detail in section 1.3. A key issue in child development 
research is that of when in fact IC first develops. This will be pursued in section 1.4. Measures of 
IC are also found to relate to many important aspects of child development, as noted in 1.1. 
These will be pursued in more detail specifically for IC in section 1.5. 
Finally, it is worth noting that IC, or some very similar construct, is often referred to by 
other names such as self-control, executive control, effortful control, behavioural regulation (all 
broad terms), and response inhibition, executive attention and interference control (more specific 
terms). It is argued, however, that such different terms, used for what are often similar measures, 
should be seen as more the product of differences in research tradition rather than reflecting real 
construct differences (Zhou, Chen & Main, 2012). I will follow Petersen and colleagues (2016) 
in adopting the term IC, regarded as a key component of self-regulation in longitudinal research 
in many research traditions, and as one of the distinct cognitive processes seen as part of the EF 
construct. It remains possible, however, that IC does have distinctive internal components, with 
response inhibition and interference control constituting the most likely candidates (Bunge, 
Dudukovic, Thomason, Vaidya & Gabrieli, 2002; Caughy, Mills, Owen & Hurst, 2013; Gandolfi, 
Viterbori, Traberso & Usia, 2014). However, at present I consider there to be insufficient 
evidence to justify the use of these more specific terms, particularly as it is unclear at what age 
these potential components become distinct. 
1.3 The Measurement of IC through Response-Given and Open Tasks 
 Since IC is the key concept in my thesis, I look more closely here at how it is measured. 
All tasks used to measure IC in young children rely on the existence of what are called ‘pre-
potent’ responses. These are responses that children will spontaneously choose or prefer when 
performing a task. For example, if children are presented with a task that involves the option of 
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eating a sweet or not eating a sweet, the pre-potent response is to eat the sweet. Inhibitory tasks 
require children to resist the pre-potent response in some way so as to demonstrate their IC.  
According to Simpson, Simon and Riggs (2004), there are two types of developmental task 
that require IC: these they term ‘response-given’ tasks and ‘open’ tasks (Figure 1.2). In response 
given tasks, children are directed simply to choose from a limited number of specific responses 
usually by following simple rules (e.g., ‘if the stimulus is A, then respond B’). The exercise of 
IC is inherent in following the task’s rule. By contrast, in open tasks children are allowed to 
respond in any way that they choose, while still following the task’s constraints. Usually open 
tasks require children to answer a question (e.g., ‘where does character A think object B is?’). 
Open tasks may seem to offer a limited number of choices, just like response-given tasks, but 
they differ in that they often require the exercise of some quite sophisticated kind of reasoning in 
order to make that choice, while also exercising IC. Any such tasks of course measure the child’s 
ability to understand the task instructions as well as their ability to actually perform the required 
task itself.  
 
Figure 1.2. Classification of developmental tasks that require IC. 
 
 
 
 
Inhibitory tasks 
Open 
tasks 
Response-given tasks 
Stimulus-response 
compatibility tasks  
Go/no-go 
tasks 
Simple-
delay tasks 
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I suggest that there are three main types of response-given task: stimulus-response 
compatibility (SRC) tasks, go/no-go tasks, and simple delay tasks (Figure 1.2). SRC tasks 
require children to withhold a pre-potent response while making an alternative, less obvious, 
response (sometimes called a ‘conflicting’ response – e.g. Carlson & Moses, 2001). In go/no-go 
tasks children are required to give the pre-potent response on the go trials, and withhold it on the 
no-go trials. Here IC is needed only on no-go trials, and, unlike in SRC tasks, a pre-potent 
response must be inhibited without an alternative response being produced. In simple delay 
tasks, the child is required to delay their pre-potent response for a set period. SRC and go/no-go 
tasks involve multiple trials, whereas simple delay tasks usually involve just a single trial. It is 
assumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that these three types of response-given task 
measure the same inhibitory process. There is, however, some recent evidence to suggest that 
responses may be pre-potent in different ways in these tasks (Simpson, Upson & Carroll, 2017). 
However, the question of what makes responses pre-potent is outside the scope of this thesis. 
The grass/snow task is an example of an SRC task, where children are shown two coloured 
cards, one white and one green (Carlson & Moses, 2001). The objective of the task is for 
children to point to the opposite coloured card in comparison to what is said. For example, when 
the researcher says grass, the child is required to point to the white card. According to Simpson 
and Riggs (2009), 3-year-old children perform poorly on this task due to their weak IC, and point 
to the green card if the researcher says grass. A recent meta-analysis suggests that this type of 
task is ideal for testing 3- to 5-year-olds (Petersen, Hoyniak, McQuillian, Bates & Staples, 2016). 
Since the parts of this thesis that investigate IC (Chapters 2 and 3) tested this age range, this type 
of task has been used.  
The box-search task is an example of the go/no-go task. Children are asked to open boxes 
that have a certain cue on the lid, and leave other boxes unopened if another cue is shown. 
According to Simpson and Riggs (2007), opening a box is considered a pre-potent response and 
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therefore young children will find it hard to inhibit. As for the simple delay task, an example of 
this is the delayed gratification task (Mischel, Shoda & Peake, 1988). A sweet is placed in front 
of a child and they are told that they can eat it now if they want, but if they wait they could have 
two sweeties instead of one. Once again, young children find waiting difficult since it is a pre-
potent response to take a sweet at once. In all IC tasks, then, inhibitory demands are created 
because children are told, through the task rules, to do things counter to their normal behaviour. 
Response-given tasks have good internal validity, having been specifically designed to 
measure IC in a direct way, and the results of several studies provide evidence for this (Congdon, 
Mumford, Cohen et al., 2012). Furthermore, the simplicity of the tasks allows them to be easily 
manipulated to demonstrate the IC of children. These advantages of response-given IC tasks 
have allowed direct investigation of the development of IC and how inhibitory demands can be 
created. 
One way in which some studies have directly demonstrated the validity of SRC tasks, as 
measures of IC, has been through the comparison of performance in the standard inhibitory 
condition with that in a control condition (Gerstadt, Hong & Diamond, 1994). Some examples of 
SRC tasks in which children perform well in control conditions can be found in Table 1.1. The 
control conditions require children to remember two rules, but not to inhibit pre-potent 
responses, as the stimuli used have no prior associations. Young children perform substantially 
better on the control condition than the inhibitory version of such a task (Gerstadt et al., 1994; 
Simpson & Riggs, 2005a, 2009; Simpson et al., 2006). Such results strongly suggest that 
children are able to remember associations between particular stimuli and particular responses in 
the control condition, so their poor performance in the inhibitory condition must be due to the 
additional requirement for inhibition, making that condition a good measure of IC. This is one of 
the reasons that SRC tasks are used as the measure of IC in this thesis. 
 
 
9 
In contrast to response-given IC tasks, open tasks require the child to respond not just by 
selecting a response, but first by exercising some reasoning in order to determine how to go 
about selecting it. An example of such a task is the reverse contingency task, where children are 
presented with two windowed boxes, where they can see that one box has a treat in it, whilst the 
other is empty. Russel, Jarrod and Potel (1994) instructed children that they were to try to win 
the treat, but that the contents of the box which they chose would be given to an opponent. 
Children had to infer that, in order to obtain the sweet, they had to resist the pre-potent response, 
which was to point to the box containing the sweet, and point instead to the box that was empty. 
Three-year-old children had the opportunity to win treats across a number of trials (Apperly & 
Carroll, 2009; Carlson, Davis & Leach, 2005), but performed poorly, consistent with weak IC 
(i.e., a failure to inhibit pointing to the desired treat). Better performance usually develops by the 
age of five years (Russell et al., 1994).  
Table 1.1. Examples of SRC tasks in which children perform well on the control condition. 
 
Tasks    Experimental condition       Control condition     References 
Day/night  See day picture, say ‘night’ 
See night picture, say ‘day’ 
See abstract picture 1, say ‘night’ 
See abstract picture 2, say ‘day’ 
Gerstadt et al., 1994; 
Simpson & Riggs, 2005 
Grass/snow  Hear green, point to white card 
Hear white, point to green card 
Hear green, point to abstract picture 1 
Hear white, point to abstract picture 2 
Simpson & Riggs, 2009 
 
Hand game See finger picture, make a fist 
See fist picture, point a finger 
See abstract picture 1, make a fist 
See abstract picture 2, point a finger 
Simpson et al., 2006 
 
 
 Whilst response-given tasks have strong internal validity, open tasks are argued to have 
stronger external, ecological, validity. Open tasks more closely resemble real world activities, 
where IC usually comes into play in situations which require everyday reasoning, rather than in 
the context of arbitrary rules such as those used in response-given tasks. Open tasks involve 
theory of mind reasoning (Carlson & Moses, 2001), strategic reasoning (Apperly & Carroll, 
2009), counterfactual reasoning (Beck, Carroll, Brundson & Gry, 2011) and also reasoning with 
symbolic understanding (Sabbagh, Moses & Shiverick, 2006; Bialystok & Senman, 2004). 
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Correlational analyses between response-given tasks and open tasks do however provide 
evidence for a link between such reasoning abilities and IC (see section 1.5 – Beck, Riggs & 
Gorniak, 2009; Bialystok & Senman, 2004; Benson, Sabbagh, Carlson et al., 2013; Carlson & 
Moses, 2001). 
1.4 When does Inhibitory Control Develop? 
Next, I consider what the literature tells us about the development of IC in typical children. 
It is suggested that IC develops in a roughly linear fashion, or at least monotonically, during 
early childhood (Willoughby, Blair, Wirth et al., 2012). There is however no clear consensus as 
to the age at which IC reaches full maturity. Initial research (Passler, Isaac & Hynd, 1985;  
Becker, Isaac & Hynd, 1987) suggested that the development of IC is ongoing between the ages 
of six and 12 years, while research by Welsh, Pennington and Groisser (1991) suggested that IC 
reaches maturity at the ages of either nine or ten years. Other early research (Levin, Culhane, 
Hartmann, & colleagues, 1991) suggested that IC does not reach maturation until the age of 12.  
It is of course possible that the different measures used in each of these studies caused the 
differences in findings, suggesting that it is appropriate to use several measures to quantify IC 
(Bedard, Nichols, Barbosa et al., 2002; Christ, White, Mandernach & Keys, 2001). Indeed, 
Willoughby and colleagues (2012) later demonstrated that the test-retest reliability of a battery of 
EF tasks was much better than that of an individual task, especially in the three to five year 
range. For this reason, the current study employs more than one task wherever IC is measured 
(two in Chapter 2 and three in Chapter 3). 
The first study to design a task to investigate the development of IC in young children was 
Gerstadt and colleagues (1994). This was the day/night task, which, as described in 1.3, follows 
the SRC paradigm. Children are instructed to say night when shown a picture of day time with 
the sun, and to say day if shown a picture of night with the moon. This study found that most 
young 3-year-olds either would not play, or failed a pre-test (being unable to respond correctly 
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on any practice trials). Development was however clearly demonstrated in older age groups, 
through both increasing accuracy and decreasing response time. Several variants of this task 
have been devised to investigate IC in children (Carlson & Moses, 2001), as well as in adults 
(Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschlager & Prinz, 2000), including the grass/snow task, and both are 
employed in my thesis. The SRC paradigm can be viewed as a variant of the colour-conflict 
Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), which involves participants reading a list of words written in 
different coloured ink from their names (e.g. the word blue is written in the colour red). The 
colour-conflict Stroop task however is a measure of interference control (as the task has an 
attentional component), while SRC tasks are the most popular measure of response inhibition, 
which is the kind of IC targeted in my study. 
 Another SRC task used to measure IC is the tapping task, which has demonstrated similar 
results to the day/night task (Diamond & Taylor, 1996). Children are required to tap once with a 
rod when the tester tapped twice, and to tap twice if the tester tapped once. These studies showed 
that, between the ages of three and five years, young children increased their response accuracy 
and approximately halved their response times. Following this initial research, using an 
improved version of the day/night task, Simpson and Riggs (2005b) showed that the most 
dramatic development occurs between the age of 3½ years and 5 years. This is another reason 
why SRC tasks were deemed the most suitable for use in this thesis, given my target age group. 
 Montgomery and Koeltzow (2010) reviewed evidence for the improvement of IC in 3- to 
7-year-olds. Not all studies found that IC improved with age. Out of 21 studies, only 12 studies 
showed a correlation between IC and age. The reason for the inconsistency may be explained by 
differences in the precise age ranges tested. Most studies which included young 3-year-olds in 
their sample showed a correlation between IC and age (83%), but when an older age range was 
examined only 22% of studies showed a correlation between IC and age. It seems again, 
therefore, that correlation between IC and age is seen with younger children rather than older 
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children. This further supports the finding of previous studies which suggest that IC dramatically 
improves at the beginning of the fourth year, but after that the improvement is more modest 
(Diamond & Taylor, 1996; Gerstadt et al, 1994; Simpson & Riggs, 2005a). The same pattern of 
improvement appears in more recent studies such as Wiebe, Sheffield and Espy (2012), 
Willoughby and colleagues (2012), and Garon, Smith and Bryson (2014). 
 Aside from the precise task used to measure IC and the precise age group targeted, there 
are numerous other details of how IC is measured which may have an impact on the results 
obtained, and so on the age at which IC appears to develop most strongly. Earlier studies, for 
instance, used pre-tests to exclude those who could not produce any accurate responses (e.g., say 
night to a day picture) in practice trials (Diamond & Taylor, 1996; Gerstadt et al, 1994; Simpson 
& Riggs, 2005a), and relied more on reaction times of those who were able to respond relatively 
accurately, rather than just their overall accuracy, to measure IC. The majority of more recent 
research however has not employed such pre-tests, and has relied only on accuracy (hence no 
exclusion of participants has occurred). This option is clearly best for correlational studies, since 
there is no loss of data, and hence it was adopted in the research presented here. However, it is 
still unknown which methodology provides the most accurate measure of IC (e.g. pre-test pass-
rate, accuracy of all participants, or reaction time of those who respond correctly). 
Other differences of methodology used in SRC tasks measuring IC include the type of 
stimuli used, the number of practice trials, number of test trials and how instructions are given, 
as well as the use or not of reminders/feedback during test trials. Some researchers have 
observed that performance on SRC tasks deteriorates over 10 to 20 test trials (e.g., Gerstadt et 
al., 1994; Diamond et al., 2002). However, there was no observed deterioration in performance 
across 16 test trials of the day/night task, according to Simpson and Riggs (2005a, 2011). The 
reason for this result could be that Simpson and Riggs gave feedback to the participants during 
the test trials, whereas other studies did not correct the errors of the participants during the test 
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itself. It is possible therefore that such feedback, when provided, may help children to remember 
the rules better throughout the duration of the task, and so maintain their performance.  
Despite the variations in performance found in relation to the detailed way in which tasks 
are implemented, such as those described above, SRC tasks do generally provide strong evidence 
for considerable improvement of IC in early childhood. Clearly however there still needs to be 
more research conducted to define which task properties produce the best possible measure of IC 
(Vendetti, Kamawar, Podjarny et al., 2015). Based on the above findings, and in the absence of 
definitive research resolving all these issues, I did not exclude participants based on a pre-test, 
but aimed to explain the rules as clearly as possible in the introductory phase of each SRC task. 
After that no further feedback was given during the test itself, and accuracy alone was used as 
the measure of IC (See further 2.2.5.2). 
 Most recently Petersen and colleagues (2016) conducted a meta-analysis of 198 child 
development studies of IC. They focused not on the age at which IC develops, but on the 
question of which tasks were most appropriate to test children of different ages (from 20 to 100 
months). If a measure is not age appropriate, it may lead to an over or under estimate of how 
strong a child’s IC is, and, as seen above, the estimate may not agree with that derived from 
other measures. While the study did not consider possible effects of the precise instructions, 
procedures and conditions accompanying each task, it showed in broad terms the age range 
appropriate for the use of 14 widely employed tasks (of the SRC and go/no-go types). Petersen 
and colleagues (2016) suggest that the suitable age range for any one task is usually not more 
than three years – meaning that multiple tasks must be used if the whole of childhood is to be 
studied. 
The approach of Petersen and colleagues (2016) does to some extent question the whole 
enterprise of establishing any particular age when IC could be said to have ‘matured’. They 
make the valid point that IC is, in a sense, not quite the same thing for a young child as for an 
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older one, since what constitutes a pre-potent response may differ, and the kinds of situation in 
which IC is employed in everyday life are different at different ages. Nevertheless, it is necessary 
to make some assumption about what is called ‘heterotypic continuity’ meaning “the 
manifestation of the same underlying process through different behavioural presentations at 
different developmental periods” (Cicchetti & Rogosch, 2002, p. 13). Petersen and colleagues 
then outline the statistical procedures by which results from different tests, each applicable to a 
different age range, may be synthesised into one scale covering a very wide age range (1 to 9 
years). Such a scale, however, while suitable to track change in IC very accurately, and indeed to 
detect whether development speeds up or slows down at any age, does not admit of any absolute 
answer to the question, ‘When has IC matured?’  As Asato, Sweeney and Luna (2006) note, 
inhibitory control improves not only through the teenage years, but into adulthood as well, so it 
would require a scale to be established founded upon tasks with overlapping ranges of 
applicability all the way from age 1 to 20 years in order to comprehensively map inhibitory 
development. 
In the present study, however, only IC development within a restricted age range needed to 
be considered (from 3 to 5 years). The use of SRC tasks is consistent with Petersen and 
colleagues’ suggestions for tasks appropriate for this age range. 
1.5 The role of Inhibitory Control in Child Development 
In this section I pursue in more detail the different kinds of ability with which IC has been 
found to be related during child development, so as to contextualize the current study which 
specifically researches the relationship between IC and drawing skills. Although there is clear 
evidence to support the improvement of IC in early childhood, researchers are less certain about 
how this improvement relates to the development of other abilities (Montgomery & Koeltzow, 
2010). 
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1.5.1 Theory of mind reasoning  
Since the ground-breaking studies of Adele Diamond (starting with Diamond & Taylor, 
1996), researchers have investigated the impact of maturing executive function on cognitive 
development. Within this large literature there has been a particular focus on the developmental 
relationship between IC and ‘theory of mind’. Theory of mind is a complex set of skills and 
knowledge. It includes the understanding that others have internal mental states such as 
emotions, desires and beliefs, and that these mental states drive human behaviour. Evidence for 
the link between IC and theory of mind has been found in a wide range of studies in different 
disciplines within psychology.  
First, early brain-imaging studies provided evidence that the frontal lobes are involved in 
both theory of mind and IC (Baron-Cohen et al., 1994; Fletcher et al., 1995; Goel, Grafman, 
Sadato, & Hallett, 1995; Sabbagh & Taylor, 2000), although these studies were conducted on 
adults. The left frontal lobe, however, has been shown to relate to preschool children’s social 
competence, which may be considered in part a product of theory of mind (Fox, Schmidt, 
Calkins, Rubin & Coplan 1996). Furthermore, it has been known for some time that autistic 
individuals, who have theory of mind deficits, also show impairments in tasks involving EFs and 
particularly IC (Hughes & Russell, 1993; Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991).  
Furthermore, there is evidence that IC is particularly important for the development of 
children’s understanding of others’ beliefs, which constitute a key aspect of theory of mind. This 
research began with the realisation that both understanding of beliefs (for a review see Wellman, 
Cross & Watson, 2001), and IC (Gerstadt et al., 1994), appear to improve dramatically between 
the ages of three and five years. Beliefs are ‘symbolic’ or ‘representational’ mental states: they 
symbolise or represent a relationship between the mind and the world, an expectation about how 
the world is, and thus to an extent bear a distant resemblance to more concrete non-mental 
representations of the world such as drawings. In consequence, it is possible to recognise that 
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beliefs can be true or false (unlike most other types of mental state which cannot be false – so 
long as the individual holding the mental state is authentic). For example, if a child has seen his 
mother place smarties in a cupboard, he may falsely believe that another child, who did not see 
that action, will also think that there are smarties in that cupboard. 
In order to perform successfully on tasks that test understanding of others’ beliefs, there is 
evidence that typically-developing children need to have effective IC. It is suggested that, in 
order to demonstrate understanding of another’s beliefs, children often need to inhibit their own 
knowledge of current reality, which is more salient than another’s belief. According to Carlson 
and Moses (2001), as children’s IC develops, they are better able to inhibit this kind of pre-
potent response (such as reporting their own beliefs, rather than those of others), and so their 
performance on representational theory of mind tasks improves. 
The procedures used in theory of mind studies are therefore sometimes adapted to reduce 
the inhibitory burden on children, so as to measure theory of mind independently of IC 
(Freeman, Lewis, & Doherty, 1991; Mitchell & Lacohée, 1991; Moses, 1993; Robinson & 
Mitchell, 1995; Wellman & Bartsch, 1988). Russell, Mauthner, Sharpe and Tidswell (1991), for 
example, showed that 3-year-olds performed badly when they had to deceive by means of 
pointing with their finger to an empty location. It could be that this act of pointing to an object’s 
true location constitutes a pre-potent behaviour; hence it is difficult for young children with their 
weak IC to resist (Carlson, Moses & Hix, 1998). Children using a novel method of deception, 
pointing with an arrow rather than their finger, were however able to deceive at moderately high 
levels (Carlson et al, 1998), arguably because this method imposed fewer inhibitory demands.  
Carlson and Moses (2001) were the first to perform a correlational study to investigate the 
relationship between IC and theory of mind. Their first study tested 10 response-given tasks 
which were divided into two groups by a factor analysis. One group, which they called ‘conflict 
tasks’, contained SRC tasks (e.g., the day/night task) and go/no-go tasks (e.g., the bear/dragon 
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task), while the other group contained simple-delay tasks (e.g., the gift delay task). Performance 
on the conflict tasks correlated with several measures of representational reasoning. These tasks, 
such as the false belief task (Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001) and the appearance-reality task 
(Flavell, 1986), can all be classified as open tasks (that is, they involve both high reasoning and 
high inhibitory demands). For instance, in a typical false belief task, the participant observes a 
character seeing a coin placed in a blue box. This character then leaves, and a second character 
arrives and moves the coin to a red box. The first character returns and the participant has to 
indicate which box that character will look in to find the coin. The participant must inhibit their 
own knowledge of the current location of the coin, while engaging in theory of mind reasoning. 
In a typical appearance-reality task, the child is shown a picture of red car. The researcher then 
places a filter over the picture so that the colour appears black, and asks the child what colour the 
car really is. The participant must inhibit their knowledge of the current colour of the card, while 
engaging in representational change reasoning. 
Since false belief tasks are today widely accepted as unambiguously a test of theory of 
mind understanding, I will refer to studies using it below. In contrast, the appearance-reality task 
is not generally regarded as a test of theory of mind, but of the wider domain of ‘symbolic 
understanding’. I address that kind of task in the following section.  
Since Carlson and Moses’ original study, attempts to replicate the relationship between IC 
and theory of mind with various tasks have not always been successful (for a review see 
Montgomery & Koeltzow, 2010). Nevertheless, some carefully conducted longitudinal research 
does suggest that response-given task performance predicts later theory of mind ability (Carlson, 
Mandell & Williams, 2004; Flynn, O’Malley & Wood, 2004; Hughes & Ensor, 2007). More 
recently, a training study has found that individual differences in response-given task 
performance predict theory of mind learning (Benson, et al., 2013). These data provide the most 
convincing evidence to date that effective IC promotes theory of mind development.  
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While a relationship between IC and children’s false belief task performance has often 
been found, the precise mechanism which produces the relationship has been the subject of 
considerable debate. Two prominent accounts which have been suggested are the Expression and 
the Emergence accounts (Moses, 2001). The former suggests that children require a threshold 
level of IC in order to solve such tasks, because of the high demands that those tasks place on IC. 
In this view, children may in fact possess an understanding of false belief, but are unable to 
demonstrate it due to the demands on IC. Evidence for this comes, for example, from the fact 
that 3-year-olds fail false belief tasks not by responding at chance levels, but by consistently 
reporting their own knowledge (i.e., the current location of the object). That is, the Expression 
account proposes that children with poor IC simply cannot resist the urge to refer to what they 
know to be true (Carlson & Moses, 2001). The false belief task thus requires the child to 
suppress a pre-potent response, which is exactly what SRC measures of IC involve. 
By contrast, the Emergence account proposes that the child cannot acquire the concept of 
another’s’ false beliefs until a certain level of IC has already emerged. In this view, EFs such as 
IC actually contribute to the development of theory of mind knowledge, and children first need a 
certain level of inhibition in order to then consider any form of representational relation (Carlson 
& Moses, 2001). IC then plays a role not just in helping children to inhibit pre-potent responses 
in specific tasks (as described above), but in a more general way, by enabling children to 
suppress their own perspectives and so better consider the mental states of others, and so develop 
theory of mind in the first place (Carlson & Moses, 2001). Benson and colleagues’ (2013) data 
support the view that IC influences theory of mind in an indirect way, consistent with an 
Emergence account. Good IC helps pre-schoolers to develop the reasoning ability they need to 
succeed in the open tasks that are used to test theory of mind.  
The Emergence account explains results from some studies where IC correlates with 
performance on false belief tasks that do not require the inhibition of a pre-potent response. Such 
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a task is that of Perner, Lang, and Kloo (2002), who presented children with a false belief task of 
the type described above, which ended with the other person searching for the object in the 
wrong place. Children however were then asked to explain the person’s actions, a task which did 
not require them to resist any pre-potent response, but just explain what happened, after the event. 
Although demands upon IC were therefore reduced, scores were still strongly correlated with IC. 
This therefore suggests that the relationship between IC and false belief performance is not due 
simply to the fact that standard false belief tasks involve a pre-potent response which must be 
inhibited.  
Summing up, it may be said that simple correlations between IC and theory of mind 
measures are consistent with both those accounts. They are also consistent with yet other 
proposals, such as that theory of mind development leads to better IC. However, more recent 
research tends to support the Emergence account more than the Expression account (Benson et 
al., 2013; Perner et al., 2002), and suggest that efficient IC supports learning. 
1.5.2 Symbolic reasoning  
As I noted in the previous section, others’ beliefs are symbolic or representational in that 
they encode a relationship between the mind and the world. Besides others’ beliefs, however, 
there are many other kinds of non-mental representation used by humans: spoken and written 
words, photographs, figurative and non-figurative art, maps, clocks and calendars, and a wide 
range of signage and symbols. Since my study is concerned with children’s drawing, rather than 
understanding of others’ beliefs, research involving such non-mental kinds of representation is 
especially relevant. Interest has particularly focused on whether the relationship between 
children’s developing understanding of beliefs and improved IC is restricted to mental 
representations, or extends to non-mental representations as well. That is to say, is the role of IC 
specific to the development of belief understanding, or does it have a more domain-general role, 
which also affects children’s understanding of non-mental representations? 
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Such questions essentially involve the concept of ‘domain-specificity’ which has long been 
central to theorising about human development (for a review see Karmiloff-Smith, 2015). Are 
the cognitive processes which underpin development specialised to enable children to learn 
about specific ‘domains’ – such as language, theory of mind, and mathematics – or are these 
cognitive processes more domain-general, so that they equally benefit learning across domains?  
The question of domain-specificity has also long been applied to theory of mind development. 
Broadly the argument goes that we have excellent theory of mind skills, so there must be specific 
learning mechanisms, or even innate knowledge, to support development in this domain. This 
then extends to the question of what kinds of representations are subject to these domain-specific 
processes, ‘Does the ability to understand mental and non-mental representations develop 
together, or is theory of mind development in some way unique?’  In particular the further 
question, ‘What is the relationship between IC and representation?’ is relevant to my thesis. IC 
could be specifically related to the development of belief understanding (a domain-specific 
position), or IC could be associated with the development of non-mental representations as well 
(a more domain-general position). 
Unfortunately, the literature is quite ambiguous on the question of whether the role of IC in 
representational development is domain-specific or domain-general. Carlson and her colleagues 
(Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson, Moses & Breton, 2002) treated both the false belief task and 
the appearance-reality task (described in the previous section) as ‘tests of theory of mind’. Both 
the false belief and appearance-reality tasks ‘look like’ tests of children’s representational 
understanding, but the appearance-reality task does not seem to test mental state understanding 
in the same clear-cut way that the false belief task does. As noted previously, these are both open 
tasks. In open tasks the participant is free to approach the task in whichever way they wish, and 
so it can be difficult to determine what kind of reasoning is being used. It seems likely that a 
false belief task can only be tackled with mental state reasoning (which is why I focused 
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attention on it in the section above concerned with development of theory of mind 
understanding). Notwithstanding, it has been questioned whether children performing such tasks 
actually need to understand others’ false beliefs. That is to say, it is less clear whether those 
children actually need to understand that beliefs are representational.  
Fabricius, Boyer, Welmer and Carroll (2010), for example, propose that children may pass 
the false belief task using a simple kind of mental state reasoning, which they call ‘perceptual 
access reasoning’. This strategy assumes that, when a person cannot see something concerning 
an event, their judgement about that event is bound to be wrong. Thus, when children first pass 
the false belief task, they may do so by assuming that the character in the task simply does not 
know where the object is, and so picks the wrong location, rather than that this character thinks 
that they do know its location, but are wrong because of their false belief. In contrast, it seems 
unlikely that mental state understanding of any kind is central to passing the appearance-reality 
task. Indeed, it can also be questioned whether children need symbolic understanding in order to 
succeed in that task. It may be that good performance depends more on their understanding of 
the language and discourse conventions involved in the task (See Deák, 2006, for discussion).  
Overall, evidence that performance on inhibitory tasks correlates with performance on the 
false belief and appearance-reality task does support the proposal that IC’s association with 
reasoning is domain-general. Effective IC aids the development of both mental state and non-
mental state reasoning. The exact role of IC in the development of symbolic reasoning, domain-
general or otherwise, is however still unclear. 
Carlson and other researchers may not have distinguished between mental and non-mental 
representations, but one line of developmental research has aimed to do this. This concerns 
studies using non-mental state versions of the false belief task. In particular, an early attempt was 
made to replicate the standard false belief task with a version that involved visual representation, 
rather than others’ beliefs. This study (Zaitchik, 1990) used a photograph in place of the 
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character who sees where something is placed, before leaving, only to return after it has been 
moved. Where, in the standard task, the child is asked where the other character thinks the object 
is located, in a false photo task the child is asked where the object is located in the photograph. It 
was found that young children performed poorly on both the false photo and false belief tasks. 
However, no correlation was found between children’s performance on the false photo task 
and false belief task. Perner and Leekam (2008), in a comprehensive review of these tasks, 
suggests that this lack of correlation occurs because the two tasks are not in fact comparable. In 
the false belief task, the character has a false belief because they think the object is currently in a 
certain location, when it has in fact been moved. By contrast, when a photo shows an object in its 
original location, after it has been moved, it cannot be said to be false. It is in the nature of a 
photograph to record the world at the time when the photo is taken, not at the later time when the 
photograph is viewed, and the photo does not become false because the world changes. It would 
only be false if, at the time it was taken, through some failure of its lens or mechanism, it 
somehow made the object appear to be somewhere where it was not. Photos are true 
representations of the past. 
In place of the false photo task, a false sign task has therefore later been used (Parkin, 
1994). The latter, by its nature, does correctly parallel the false belief task, but uses non-mental 
representations. The person with the belief in the false belief task is replaced by a signpost which 
initially points to a hidden object, and then fails to move when that object’s location is changed. 
The false signpost is truly false, in the same way as a false belief, since signposts are expected to 
reflect current reality and not the location of things only when they were first erected. The 
difference is, however, that signposts are non-mental while beliefs are mental. Later studies, such 
as Sabbagh, Moses and Shiverick (2006), then went on to show that performance on the false 
belief and false sign tasks correlated, while performance on neither of these tasks correlated with 
that on the false photo task. Finally, and crucially for the issue of the domain-specificity of IC’s 
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role in representational development, Sabbagh and colleagues (2006) further showed that IC was 
linked both to the false sign and false belief tasks, but not the false photo task.  
Overall then, there is an indication that IC is involved in symbolic understanding in a 
domain-general way, spanning both mental (belief) and non-mental (sign-post) representations, 
which can be genuinely false. At the same time, IC does not appear to be involved in the 
understanding of all kinds of representation – as the lack of correlation between IC and the false 
photo task shows. 
1.5.3 Other kinds of reasoning – counterfactual, deductive and strategic 
In addition to symbolic reasoning, IC has been implicated in other kinds of reasoning. For 
example, when an individual misses their bus, they might imagine what could have happened if 
they had got to the stop on time. This is considered to be counterfactual thinking, where people 
put aside what they know is true about the current world, so as to imagine how it might have 
been (Roese & Summerville, 2005). According to Epstude and Roese (2008), counterfactual 
thinking assists people in learning from their mistakes in order to avoid negative situations in the 
future. It has been suggested that, from a very young age, children are able to entertain and even 
create fictional worlds (Kavanaugh & Harris, 1999; Leslie, 1987). However, according to several 
studies, it is only around the age of four years that children begin to think counterfactually, and 
this ability continues to develop through childhood (Kuczaj & Daly, 1979; Riggs, Peterson, 
Robinson, & Mitchell, 1998; Beck, Robinson, Carroll, & Apperly, 2006; Rafetseder, Cristi-
Vargas, & Perner, 2010; Weisberg & Beck, 2010).  
Riggs and colleagues (1998) tested 3- to 5-year-olds on stories similar to those used to test 
false belief. For example they were told a story of a mother making a cake. In the story, the 
mother took some chocolate from the drawer and moved it to a different location: the cupboard. 
Later, the children were asked, “What if Mum hadn’t made a cake, where would the chocolate 
be?” Children of five years of age usually gave the correct counterfactual answer (in the drawer), 
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whereas younger children often responded with their own understanding of the current situation 
(in the cupboard). This study is further supported by other researchers such as Harris, German 
and Mills (1996) and Guajardo and Turley-Ames (2004). 
EFs, especially IC, may play a role in children’s performance on counterfactual reasoning 
tasks because they find it difficult to suppress reporting the world as it is (their pre-potent 
response), rather than as it could have been. One may need the capacity to suppress what one 
knows to be true about the world, in order to give a counterfactual answer. This need to ignore 
what they know to be true about how the world is what potentially creates demands on children’s 
IC.  
As with false belief understanding, it has been established that IC develops over preschool 
years alongside the improvement in children’s performance on a range of counterfactual tasks 
(Davidson, Amso, Anderson & Diamond, 2006), although such parallel development does not in 
itself demonstrate a link between them. More convincingly, brain-imaging evidence from adults 
has suggested that the orbito-frontal cortex is involved in counterfactual thinking as well as IC 
(Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli et al., 2005; Ursu & Carter, 2005). Furthermore, there have been 
correlational studies which show that effective IC, along with other skills such as vocabulary 
ability and working memory, is associated with the development of counterfactual thought. 
Beck, Riggs and Gorniak (2009), for example, tested 3- and 4-year-olds on a battery of 
counterfactual tasks, and that found IC, along with vocabulary knowledge, was associated with 
counterfactual thinking. Along with IC, effective working memory may also have a role in 
counterfactual reasoning: thinking about alternative states of affairs requires children to generate 
new information about the counterfactual world, while retaining information about the real world 
(Drayton, Turley-Ames, & Guajardo, 2011).  
Similar effects are found with deductive reasoning tasks which contain counterfactual 
premises. In these, instead of having to imagine what the world would be like if something 
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different from reality had occurred, children are told, as if it is a fact, something which is 
empirically false, and are required to make a deduction from it. For example, in Hawkins, Pea, 
Glick and Scribner (1984), 4- and 5-year-olds were given premises which were incongruent with 
their world knowledge, such as that certain birds have wheels. They did very poorly on reasoning 
tasks using such premises, tending simply to report the truth about the world (e.g., by saying, 
“No, birds have wings”). On the other hand, they did very well when premises were congruent 
with their real-world knowledge or with fantasy worlds. Both Dias and Harris (1988, 1990), and 
Richards and Sanderson (1999), also reported such findings. Once again, the findings are 
consistent with the child participants having immature executive functions, especially IC. The 
pre-potent response which has to be inhibited is again that of resorting to reality (Riggs & Beck, 
2007). IC, and working memory, have been further found to play important roles in deductive 
reasoning in late childhood and in adults (Markovits & Doyon, 2004; De Neys & Everaerts, 
2008).  
Other evidence for the role of effective IC in reasoning development comes from studies 
which involve strategic reasoning. This differs from the kinds of reasoning described above in 
that the reasoning is focused on what others might be thinking, with the strategic aim of 
deceiving or outmanoeuvring them. Hence it may also involve theory of mind understanding 
(1.5.1), as seen for example in one of the tasks used by Sher, Koenig and Rustichini (2014). In 
this study, children aged between three and nine years had to play a stickers game, in which the 
child and researcher simultaneously chose between one and five stickers without seeing each 
other’s choice until after it was made. The player who chose fewer stickers got to keep their 
stickers, while the other player received none. If there was a tie between the numbers of stickers 
chosen, neither player kept any. Each player needed to use a mixture of reasoning and 
counterfactual thinking of a more imaginative type in order to win the most stickers. For instance, 
a child might judge, based on past choices, that the researcher might on the current turn choose 
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three stickers. In that case she should reason that, in order to get the most stickers herself, she 
must undercut the researcher by as little as possible and choose two. The strategic reasoning 
required is clearly more demanding than the theory of mind task which I described in 1.5.1 
which required simple deception. Once again, however, there are pre-potent responses that need 
to be inhibited, such as that of simply choosing the largest number of stickers, which was the 
pattern of behaviour seen in the youngest participants.  
Indeed, the link between strategic reasoning and IC has been supported by studies such as 
Hala and Russell (2001). Hala and Russell (2001) additionally suggested that alternative 
response modes, such as playing with a partner, allow ‘cognitive distancing’ which enables 
children to separate the task goal from the means of responding. This in turn can prevent children 
with low IC from responding impulsively with the pre-potent response, and enable them to come 
up with an alternative response strategy (Apperly & Carroll, 2009). In other words, a different 
response mode may result in the same core task making different demands on IC.  
1.5.4 Academic abilities 
There have also been a number of studies which have considered the role of EFs in relation 
to academic learning. It has been found that EFs contribute to a child’s performance in both 
mathematics and reading tests (Steele, Karmiloff-Smith, Cornish, et al., 2012; Thorell, 2007; 
Welsh, Nix, Blair, Bierman & Nelson, 2010). Indeed, it is very possible that EFs are important 
for learning and performance across all academic subjects. Importantly with my focus on IC, 
Blair and Razza (2007), in a study of nursery children, report separate results for IC: significant 
positive associations were found with math ability (r=.44), phonemic awareness (r=.35), and 
letter knowledge (r=.25). 
Moreover, both IC and working memory predict examination performances in English, 
mathematics and science later at the age of eleven years (St Claire-Thompson & Gathercole, 
2006) and fourteen years (Nunes, Bryant, Barros & Sylva, 2012). They also predict both 
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mathematics and reading scores across a range of developmental ages (Yeniad, Malda, Mesman 
et al., 2013). Geary (2011), on the other hand, found differences in the relationships between 
working memory and mathematics and reading over time. This study tracked performance every 
year from kindergarten to grade five (ages five to ten years), and found that the link between 
working memory and reading decreased with age, whilst it increased with age for mathematical 
ability. Such a study has not been undertaken for IC, however, so although it seems important for 
academic achievement across a range of academic domains, we cannot be sure if the precise 
relationship of IC with each domain over time is the same.  
It is perhaps particularly important to understand in detail the importance of IC and other 
processes involved in the learning and performing of mathematics because of the impact this has 
on success in Western societies. It is suggested that poor mathematical skills have an even 
greater effect on life chances than poor literacy (Parsons & Bynner, 2005). Furthermore, 21% of 
UK 11-year-olds leave primary school without sufficient knowledge of mathematics, and 5% 
even fail to achieve the mathematical skill levels expected of 7-year-olds (Gross, 2007). This 
problem follows through into adulthood and, according to Williams, Clemens, Oleinikova, and 
colleagues (2003), a fifth of UK adults have numeracy skills below the basic level needed for 
everyday situations. 
There are, of course, many factors that play a part in mathematics achievement, such as 
attitudes (Ma, 1999), motivation (Steinmayr & Spinath, 2009), general intelligence (Mayes, 
Calhoun, Bixler & Zimmerman, 2009), and educational factors (Nunes, Bryant, Sylva & Barros, 
2009), quite apart from a child’s underlying cognition. Within cognition, IC plays a key role 
(Bull & Scerif, 2001; Gilmore, Attridge, Clayton et al., 2013; Kroesbergen, Van Luit, Van 
Lieshout et al., 2009; St Clair-Thompson & Gathercole, 2006). However, it is not the only 
relevant EF, since working memory (Raghubar, Barnes & Hecht, 2010) and shifting (the ability 
to switch attention from one task to another – Yeniad et al., 2013) are also important. Although 
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there are some inconsistent findings, the majority of studies do demonstrate that IC predicts 
mathematical performance (Brock, Rimm-Kaufman, Nathanson, & Grimm, 2009; Bull & Scerif, 
2001; Espy, McDiarmid,  Cwik, et al., 2004; Gilmore et al., 2013; Kroesbergen et al., 2009; Lee, 
Ng, Pe, Ang, et al., 2010; St Clair-Thompson & Gathercole, 2006). Nevertheless, it is still not 
fully understood exactly why IC might play a special role in the development of math ability, 
compared with that of other academic skills (Keller & Libertus, 2015).  
It might well be considered that mathematical skills appear to be somewhat distant from 
drawing skills, which are the main focus of my thesis. Nevertheless, I would argue that, at a 
fundamental level, both drawing and mathematics involve children operating with symbolic 
representations of real objects in place of the real objects themselves (Bruner, 1966). At least at a 
basic level, for young children aged two, for example, a number stands symbolically for a 
quantity of real objects, somewhat in the way that a picture stands for its subject matter (Piaget’s 
sensorimotor stage: Ojose, 2008). Indeed, the connection is clear in studies where very young 
children are asked to represent the quantity of a number of objects. Often the children use 
drawings of the objects for this purpose (Hughes, 1986). Young children are also found to be 
able to make simple mathematical computations using non-canonical representations of number 
quantity, which resemble drawings rather than numbers, such as unstructured arrays of dots, 
before mastering the conventional number symbols (Mussolin, Mejias & Noël, 2010). For such 
reasons, although I have not found this precise connection made in the literature, I would suggest 
that if IC has an impact on young children’s achievement in mathematics, it might be expected 
also to have an impact on their drawing skills, which is what I directly examine next. 
 1.5.5 Drawing skills 
From about the age of 12-18 months, the typical child will be making marks on paper (Cox, 
1993). At first children may not intend their scribbles to represent anything, but this changes 
with age. As the child becomes older, the marks become more meaningful and often more 
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‘figurative’ (i.e., readily interpretable by an adult as resembling their subject matter). It should be 
noted that figurative representation which my study is largely concerned with is one subtype of 
the symbolic representation which we have widely referred to above. As Simeonsson and 
Rosenthal state (2001, p. 87), symbolic representation is "the ability to mentally represent an 
object or experience distant in time or space", and such representation may either be figurative, 
where "meaning and knowing are based on a correspondence of features or characters, the 
signifier (e.g. outline of a cat) and the signified object (cat)" or it may take other forms, termed 
"operative", such as the representation of a cat by the word cat. In the domain of children's 
drawing skills, therefore, we are concerned with symbols which are both non-mental (i.e. not 
purely mental representations like beliefs), and figurative (i.e. look like what they represent). 
Drawing, in the widest sense, plays a valuable role in child development because it helps 
improve their cognitive abilities when they discuss and reflect on what they have drawn. This is 
supported by Brooks (2003), who showed that talking with children aged five and six years as 
they drew, encouraging them to give meaning to their creations, helped promote their mental 
functions, such as their ability to identify geometric shapes in what they had drawn, or to realise 
that a standing figure threw a larger shadow than a sitting one. This therefore suggests that when 
children are given the opportunity to think deeply and reflect on their drawings and share their 
understanding of them, their intellectual abilities are enhanced. Hence, such drawing activities 
are considered to be intimately connected with their cognitive abilities, as first suggested by 
Piaget and Inhelder (1956). 
While some cognitive abilities may be affected by drawing, for many researchers a key 
issue is rather whether drawing skill may itself be considered to be a product of the EF. Indeed a 
number of EFs have been implicated in figurative drawing development. Empirical research 
however has tended to focus either on the role of the EFs in general, or on working memory in 
particular, without singling out IC (e.g. Kibby, Cohen & Hynd, 2002; Panesi & Morra, 2016). 
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Indeed, the degree of connection which has come to be accepted by researchers between 
executive function in general and drawing skill is such that drawing tasks (either productive or 
interpretational) are sometimes included in batteries of tests used to measure EFs (e.g. Fuhs, 
Nesbitt, Farran & Dong, 2014; Traverso, Viterbori & Usai, 2015). It could be argued, perhaps, 
that the tendency to include drawing tasks among measures of EF has discouraged research on 
the relationship between components of EF and drawing skill, by taking attention away from the 
fine grained differences between the separate constructs involved.  
With reference to IC in particular, it has been suggested that ‘suppression’ (in a broad 
sense) is indeed needed for drawing skill to develop, but this suggestion has not typically been 
accompanied by empirical studies, performed to confirm this specific relationship. Miyake and 
colleagues (2000) for example proposed that when children learn to draw, a number of individual 
EFs play a role, including IC, working memory and attention shifting. Barlow, Jolley, White and 
Galbraith (2003) further suggested how IC might play a role in drawing development alongside 
working memory. They proposed that, in order to improve the figurative realism of their 
drawing, children need to inhibit their habitual way of drawing the target, such as a human 
figure, as well as to continually monitor the process of making changes in their habitual way of 
representing that target. Essentially children need to inhibit their immature drawing style, in 
order to advance to more sophisticated forms of drawing. Hence, working memory and IC need 
to work together to yield development in measured drawing skill.  
Morra (2005, 2008) present similar ideas using somewhat different, neo-Piagetian, 
terminology. Initially Morra highlighted the role of young children’s ‘M operator’ (his term for 
working memory), which only allows them to activate a few ‘graphic schemes’ at a time. By the 
term graphic schemes, he refers to children’s stored representations of pictures or parts of 
pictures which they have previously drawn. That is “…the visual aspect of a previously attained 
solution to a graphic problem…” (Morra, 2005, p319). As children age, their M capacity 
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increases, which allows for development of drawing skill, due to the simultaneous activation of 
more schemes while drawing a new picture. Morra then later suggested an ‘I operator’ (his term 
for IC), which again develops with age, and enables children to gain more drawing knowledge 
and skills. Consistent with Barlow and colleagues (2003), in Morra's terms, the I operator 
enables the child to develop new schemes and not simply to continue to draw based on existing 
ones.  
At first sight, some studies which we discussed earlier which use non-mental symbolic 
representations suggest an empirical link between the development of IC and such non-mental 
representations. One such is Sabbagh and colleagues (2006), described in 1.5.2. This revealed an 
association between effective IC and performance on the signpost task, which involves a non-
mental representation broadly similar to a drawing (i.e., a street sign). However, I suggest that 
there are many differences which mean that we cannot take this study as providing evidence of 
an association between IC and drawing in the sense discussed in the current section. First, we are 
concerned here primarily with the possible impact of IC on the process of a child creating a 
drawing product, not on the child's interpretation of a drawing product made by others. 
Furthermore, we are concerned with the development of children’s figurative drawing skill, in 
the sense of how well their drawing accords with the subject matter which they are asked to 
draw. We are not concerned with their understanding of any form of ‘false representation’ like 
that in the study of Sabbagh, and colleagues (2006). Finally, a signpost is not in fact fully 
comparable with a drawing because it is not figuratively symbolic: it does not look like what it 
points to. The false photo task is in that respect closer, but that did not yield a relationship with 
IC.  
Overall, with respect to the role of IC in drawing skill development, studies such as those above 
only make proposals based primarily on plausible arguments, or offer empirical work conducted 
with different aims, which has uncertain implications for the relationship between IC and 
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drawing skill development. A study which comes closer to directly researching the relationship 
between EFs and drawing skill, however, is that of Panesi and Morra (2016). This considered the 
relationship in 3- to 5-year olds between age, working memory, and what they termed EFs, on 
the one hand, and drawing a dog on the other. Working memory was measured from the Mr 
Cucumber, backward word span and direction following tasks. (In the Mr Cucumber test the 
child is shown an outline shape of a strange person with between 1 and 8 stickers placed on it in 
various positions. That is then removed and the child has to place stickers from memory in the 
correct places on a new blank outline shape.)    
 
However, the measure of EF was close to being a measure of IC, since it was derived from 
performance on four tasks, three of which were inhibitory tasks (the day/night task, bear/dragon 
task and a dimensional change card sort task). Only one, the magic house task, was a measure of 
something else, ‘updating’, the ability to constantly update the contents of working memory 
(concerning what animals were in a house).  
Notably also, in this study, the dependent measure of drawing skill for the dog differed 
from being a simple measure of figurative representation or detail such as I, like many 
researchers, use. Panesi and Morra (2016) aimed to utilize the proposal (e.g. Silk & Thomas, 
1986) that young children (3–6 years old), after acquiring a schematic way to represent a person 
(their human figure scheme), develop a graphic scheme for a dog simply by differentiation from 
the human figure. Hence children in the study were asked to draw a man first, before the dog, 
and were scored for inclusion of 13 features of a dog, chosen to exclude any that would be the 
same for drawing a man. The researchers thus conceptualised the study as being focused on 
drawing 'flexibility', in the light of the fact that children are found in other studies to have well 
established schemes for drawing human figures, which affect their drawing of animals (Silk & 
Thomas, 1986). Correlation and regression analysis, controlled for the effect of age, showed that 
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while working memory had the stronger correlation with the drawing measure, it was closely 
followed by the measure of EFs. The same was the case for drawing a man with the effects of 
age, motor coordination and score all partialled out. This therefore provides quite strong 
evidence for an independent effect of IC on drawing skill in young children, which cannot be 
explained away as simply due to its correlation with working memory capacity.  
It could be argued, however, that due to the chosen nature of the drawing task and the way 
it was scored, an influence of IC was especially favoured in this study. Panesi and Morra (2016) 
were arguably not so much measuring effects of various EFs and other variables on ability to 
draw a dog, as on ability to resist the temptation to draw a dog like a man (i.e. the ability to 
inhibit the man drawing scheme). The fact that the children had to draw a man just before 
drawing the dog could have increased the inhibitory demands of the task, so favoured the 
likelihood of an association emerging between a measure of, EF which was close to being a 
measure of IC, and drawing skill. The researchers in effect primed the pre-potent response of 
drawing a human, thus making its inhibition even harder than usual when drawing the dog. 
Panesi and Morra’s (2016) study does however suggest that drawing flexibility depends on the 
development of a variety of components of the cognitive system, including IC, which provides 
support to both Barlow et al.’s (2003) and Morra’s (2005) suggestions. Nevertheless, for my 
purposes in the present study I will instead use a clearly distinct measure of IC, separate from 
other components of the EF, and measures of drawing skill based simply on the qualities of the 
drawings per se, not in contrast with drawing of anything else, so as not to specially favour an 
effect of IC. 
Although Panesi and Morra come close to investigating the separate effect of IC on 
children's drawing skill, to my knowledge, the specific relationship between IC and drawing skill 
has only been tested separately and explicitly in just one study: Riggs, Jolley and Simpson 
(2013). This study investigated the associated of IC and human figure drawing in 3½- to 5½-
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year-olds. The bear/dragon task was used to measure IC, and the classification system of Cox 
and Parkin (1986) was employed to measure quality of human figure drawing. Regression 
analysis showed that IC predicted development in human figure drawing even with the effect of 
age excluded, and, in reverse, ANOVA showed that the ability to draw recognisable figurative 
pictures was associated with higher IC scores. Thus, although this study was limited in using a 
single measure of IC and of drawing, it did support the proposal that IC, considered separately 
from other components of EF, plays a role in the development of the representational realism of 
children’s drawing.  
Riggs and colleagues (2013) also importantly mentioned two alternative ideas about how 
IC might enter into the relationship which they found, which I will refer to as the ‘Symbolic 
Competence’ and the ‘Behavioural Inhibition’ accounts. The former draws attention to the 
obvious visual similarities in figurative drawings between the drawing itself and the subject 
matter it depicts in the world. In order for a child to draw figuratively, it is therefore argued that 
an understanding of this representational relationship, i.e. symbolic competence, needs to be 
present.  
Symbolic competence or understanding is an understanding of symbolic representation, 
which is essentially a link between a mental entity (e.g., the category |dog|) and an entity in the 
real world (a physical dog). This ability can be measured in children through, for example, the 
use of a model of a room along with a real room. Children first observe the researcher hiding a 
model of a toy in the model room, and are subsequently required to find the real toy in the real 
room. If children achieve this, they display symbolic understanding (Kuhlmeier, 2005). As we 
saw earlier (1.5.2), studies have shown that IC in children is correlated with the ability to 
perform tasks which require such understanding (Benson et al., 2013; Sabbagh et al., 2006). 
There is a possibility therefore that the development of figurative drawing can be underpinned by 
understanding of symbolic representation, which in turn is associated with good IC (Benson et 
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al., 2013). According to Riggs and colleagues (2013), if IC is connected to the development of 
symbolic understanding, then that can possibly explain the correlation between IC and figurative 
drawing. 
The ‘Symbolic Competence account’ is therefore based on findings that the development 
of such understanding is connected with the development of IC, around the age of three years 
(e.g., Apperly & Carroll, 2009; Beck et al., 2011; Benson et al., 2013; Sabbagh, et al., 2006). 
When producing a figurative drawing, clearly a child must exploit symbolic understanding so as 
to generate visual similarity between the drawing they envisage in their mind and the object in 
the world that the drawing is expected to depict. Since IC is associated with the development of 
symbolic understanding, then this connection may explain the relationship observed between IC 
and figurative drawing skill (Riggs et al., 2013). In short, following this account, the effect of IC 
on drawing skills would be partially or wholly mediated by symbolic insight/understanding.  
The second idea of Riggs and colleagues (2013), which I term the 'Behavioural Inhibition 
account', relies on the indirect evidence that IC plays a role in drawing development arising from 
the fact that these abilities develop side-by-side during preschool years. This is combined with 
the suggestion that a number of improvements in the early development of children’s drawing 
skills can readily be interpreted as requiring inhibition of earlier behaviours.  
In order to draw a picture and continue to improve in drawing, a child must inhibit 
immature drawing behaviour (Cox, 1993; Ebersbach, Stiehler & Asmus, 2011; Morra, 2008; 
Panesi & Morra, 2016; Riggs et al., 2013). For example, scribbling may need to be inhibited in 
order to draw enclosed shapes, which help to improve figurative drawing (Golomb, 1992; 
Barlow et al., 2003). The young child’s open-ended lines and shapes must be inhibited to 
produce enclosed shapes and these must in turn come to represent a recognizable contour of the 
referent. This is most easily seen in children’s outline drawings of a human figure. It could be 
that the development from drawing distinct forms to figurative forms (e.g., the tadpole shape – 
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see Figure 1.3) entails children inhibiting drawing disjointed lines and shapes. Furthermore, 
when drawing human figures, at three years of age, they tend to draw a ‘tadpole’ representation 
and then, by the age of five, begin to draw ‘conventional’ human forms (Cox, 1993) – again IC 
may be required to suppress the tadpole representation. Finally, in order to be ‘visually’ rather 
than ‘intellectually’ realistic, drawings of more than one object need to depict depth and partial 
occlusion of one object by another, when real objects are presented to the child overlapping or 
partly hidden. This requires ‘hidden line elimination’ (Freeman, 1980), and again the earlier 
tendency to draw complete objects at all times (intellectual realism) has to be inhibited so as to 
draw only what is actually visible. 
 
 
Figure 1.3. Illustration of how children need to inhibit prior immature drawing schemata 
(those marked X, and to the left of X), so that they can move on to a more mature drawing 
style (Riggs et al., 2013). 
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IC also develops within the same age range as previously mentioned (e.g., Carlson, 2005; 
Simpson & Riggs, 2005). This then provides a rationale for how a child’s ability to draw their 
first human figure representation may actually be aided by IC development, rather than just 
develop alongside it, without a connection. Inhibition may play a facilitative role in the graphic 
transition of children’s depiction from earliest drawing behaviours up to age seven at least 
(Lange-Küttner, Kerzmann & Heckhausen 2002). Riggs and colleagues (2013) rely on the above 
reasoning as the basis for their second idea as to why IC and drawing skill might be correlated, 
which I refer to as the ‘Behavioural Inhibition account’: a direct relationship between IC and 
drawing skill not involving symbolic competence as an intermediary. Thus, following the 
Behavioural Inhibition account, IC and drawing skill would be associated directly, rather than 
mediated through other variables, because drawing skill develops straightforwardly through the 
suppression of immature drawing behaviour.  
1.6 The Current Study 
The current study, which embraces three separate studies, aims to build on existing work in 
several ways, not all of which have yet been fully introduced above. The literature relevant to 
certain parts of my study will instead be considered in detail in the separate chapters devoted to 
each study (chapters 2, 3 and 4).  
The focus of the first study may be summed up in the following question: What is the 
relationship between IC and fine motor control  (the coordination of muscles, nerves and bones 
to make small, precise movements), along with age and gender, on the one hand, and drawing 
skills during preschool development on the other?  As I mentioned in 1.5.5, Riggs and colleagues 
(2013) offered two accounts for how IC and picture drawing skills could be associated – 
Symbolic Representation and Behavioural Inhibition. In Study 1 I will not only test how well the 
data gathered fits these accounts, but also consider a third possibility, termed the 'Motor 
Development account'. This has only very recently been formulated along with the current PhD 
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research, and is being published in Simpson, Al Ruwaili, Jolley, Leonard, Geeraert & Riggs (in 
press). This takes into consideration that, in order to draw skilfully, a child also requires good 
fine motor control (FMC), as has previously been demonstrated in preschool children (Lange-
Küttner, 2008; Toomela, 2002). If IC is then shown to affect FMC, this suggests that IC might 
impact on drawing skill not only directly, but also mediated via FMC. Evidence of such a 
relationship is limited in early childhood, but there is, on the other hand, a known relationship 
between the EFs and FMC in older children and adolescents (Riggs et al., 2013). 
Since IC involves slowing down and monitoring performance, it is reasonable to propose 
that the development of IC may involve the reduction of impulsivity, which in turn improves 
FMC. This again would be expected to occur especially during the preschool years when IC is 
developing particularly strongly. Much remains uncertain, however, especially at the young age 
which Study 1 addresses. It could be the case that IC and FMC are associated simply due to them 
both developing strongly alongside each other within individuals over the age range 3 to 5 years 
(Thelen et al., 2001). Alternatively it could be that IC is indeed essential to the progress of FMC, 
and that the latter even mediates the effect of IC on drawing skill development (as predicted by 
the Motor Development account). The full literature and argumentation with respect to this will 
be presented in chapter 2.  
Besides adding a third account of the relationship between IC and drawing skills to the 
other two accounts to be considered, Study 1 will also deal with drawing skill in a more refined 
way than has often been the case in previous studies. While considering the literature reviewed 
above in this chapter, it came to my attention that, although 'drawing skill' is sometimes referred 
to as if it was a unitary phenomenon, clearly it is not. In 1.5.5 I showed that its development goes 
through various stages, as described by Luquet (1927/2001). Hence, a number of different 
measures of drawing skill exist, quantifying different aspects of drawing, such as whether it 
represents something (i.e. is in fact figurative) rather than being a meaningless scribble, the 
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degree of figurative detail present in the drawing, and the extent to which visual rather than 
intellectual realism is evidenced in a figurative drawing: again, this will be tested in more detail 
in chapter 2. For this reason, it was considered important in Study 1 not just to pick one of these 
measures, nor combine them into one overall measure, but to consider how the three accounts of 
the relationship between IC and drawing played out for each of them separately. In this way 
again I hoped to add significantly to knowledge in this research area.  
In particular I wanted to know whether IC is linked to the development of visual realism in 
the same way as to the development of figurative skill more generally. As we noted in 1.5.5,  
visual realism is the term used for drawing aspects of an item as actually seen, in contrast with 
intellectual realism which refers to drawing features which are not seen at the time of drawing  
but known to exist (like the handle of a mug where the handle is turned away from view). These 
two types of figurative drawing realism (intellectual and visual), originally noted by Clark (1897, 
cited in Freeman & Janikoun, 1972), have been extensively described by Luquet (1927/2001) 
and more recently summarised by Jolley (2010). Luquet (1927, 2001) put forward a theory of 
drawing development that includes stages the child goes through in their depiction, and many 
researchers are interested in the shift between two of these stages, intellectual realism and visual 
realism.  
Studies 2 and 3 (in chapters 3 and 4) to a considerable extent constitute follow-up studies 
of different aspects of the findings from Study 1. Hence it is not appropriate here to detail their 
scope, nor to review all the relevant literature. Briefly, Study 2 follows on from evidence 
obtained in Study 1 that IC and motor control are tightly linked in early childhood, regardless of 
their specific relationship with drawing skill. Study 2 attempts to disentangle the relationship 
between FMC, gross motor control (the coordination of muscles, nerves and bones to make 
larger movements with the arms, legs, feet, or entire body) and IC, controlling for both age and 
general intelligence. Study 3 follows up on an intriguing finding which emerged in Study 1, 
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concerning the pattern of development of visual realism. I obtained an unexpected result which 
potentially challenges the accepted view that children start drawing with intellectual realism and 
simply progressive to visual realism. Hence it investigates the precise nature of the relationship 
(linear or quadratic) between age and the development of visual realism in drawings between the 
ages of two and eight years. 
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Chapter 2.   How are Inhibitory Control and 
Fine Motor Control related to the 
Development of Preschool Children’s 
Drawing Skills? 
2.1 Introduction 
As highlighted in the previous chapter (1.5.5, 1.6), it has already been shown that 
inhibitory development is related to the development of drawing skill in children. Many details 
of this relationship, however, remain unclear. It has long been known (since Luquet, 1927/2001) 
that drawing skill progresses through a number of stages, including the onset of drawing distinct 
forms, in contrast with scribbling, then the move to drawing more conventional forms with less 
or greater detail, and then, within figurative or representational drawing, the progression from 
intellectual to visual realism, when attempting to draw specific objects or people directly seen in 
the environment (as against drawing entirely from memory). Intellectual realism shows itself 
when children draw features which they know the object possesses, even though they cannot be 
seen at the time, such as the handle of a mug when in fact the handle is turned away from view. 
Visual realism is demonstrated by drawing just what can be seen at the time of drawing. While 
there is some research that considers the relationship between IC and the emergence of figurative 
drawing (Riggs et al., 2013), to date there is no research examining the relation between IC and 
the transition from intellectual to visual realism. One possibility is that the inhibition of 
intellectual realism is required to produce a visually realistic drawing (Crook, 1985; Freeman, 
1980; Luquet, 2001): this possibility has been raised but not previously empirically tested 
(Ebersbach et al., 2011; Riggs et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, there are a number of possible mechanisms by which IC might be related to 
drawing skill during development. As outlined in section 1.5.5, two accounts have been proposed, 
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to which I added a third. These I refer to as the Symbolic Competence, Behavioural Inhibition, 
and Motor Development accounts. The first two of these were proposed by Riggs and colleagues 
(2013), though not explicitly named in that study. The third is a new proposal made by a research 
group of which I am a member, and it is a specific aim of the present study to assess it.  
Under the first of these accounts, it is argued that IC is primarily related to the domain-
general understanding of symbolic representation, as shown for example by research in the field 
of theory of mind and false signs (e.g., Apperly & Carroll, 2009; Benson et al., 2013; Sabbagh et 
al., 2006). Extending this argument, it is proposed that symbolic understanding would also play a 
role in the production of figurative drawings. The symbolic understanding that children require 
in order to draw a figurative picture is essentially an understanding of the relationship between a 
mental construct (e.g., the category |house|) and something in the world (an actual house). If IC 
is associated with the development of this symbolic understanding, then it can explain the 
observed association between improvement in IC and the emergence of figurative drawing from 
scribbling, and the subsequent development of its elaborative detail (Riggs et al., 2013). The 
claim of the Symbolic Competence account then is that the link between IC and figurative 
drawing skill is indirect, occurring through the mediating variable of symbolic understanding, 
which is the ability which is directly associated with IC.  
An account could in principle be true or not at any stage of drawing development, whether 
that of moving from scribbles to distinct forms, from distinct forms to figuratively 
representational forms, or, within the latter, from intellectual to visual representations. If it is 
shown to apply at certain stages, however, I argue that cannot be taken as confirmation that it 
applies at all stages of drawing skill development: each must be separately tested. In fact, when it 
comes to the Symbolic Competence account, one would not expect it to explain the third 
transition (intellectual to visual), since this is not a transition from non-figurative to figurative, 
but just between two versions of figurative representation. The findings of Riggs and colleagues 
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(2013) are consistent with this account applying at the first two of those transitions (the third was 
not measured). However, these findings are also consistent with the predictions of the other two 
accounts, as symbolic competence was not included as a measured variable in their study. 
Under the Behavioural Inhibition account, IC is seen as having a simpler and more direct 
role in drawing development. This account holds that many advances in drawing skill require the 
direct intervention of IC to suppress a previous, less mature drawing behaviour. Scribbling, for 
example, must be inhibited in order for children to produce enclosed shapes, and to move from 
those to fully figurative drawing (Riggs et al., 2013). The oversimplistic drawing of these shapes 
must in turn be inhibited, so that pictures which represent detailed outlines and other features of 
objects or people can be produced (Lange-Küttner, Kerzmann, & Heckausen, 2002).  
Finally, when asked to draw a specific object in view while they are drawing, children may 
have to inhibit their earlier habit of drawing a part of that object which is occluded (Freeman & 
Cox, 1985). It seems likely that intellectual realism must in some sense be ‘rejected’ in order to 
produce a visually realistic drawing (Crook, 1985; Freeman, 1980; Luquet, 2001). Indeed, 
although I have not found this argument in the literature, it might even be suggested that a close 
parallel exists here with the role of IC in the development of counterfactual reasoning (see 1.5.3). 
Glick and Scribner (1984) found that IC was needed to enable 4- and 5-year olds to successfully 
inhibit reasoning based on the reality that birds always have wings and instead to entertain the 
idea presented to them that some birds have wheels. Analogously, when drawing, we might 
expect children with low IC to have difficulty inhibiting what for them is the ‘reality’ that a mug 
always has a handle, and manage to draw a mug without a handle where that handle is not visible 
in a particular exemplar presented to them in the immediate context. However, any role of IC in 
suppressing intellectual realism in order to enable visually realistic drawings to emerge has not 
been investigated empirically. 
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In this account, therefore, the relationship between IC and drawing skill is direct, and not 
mediated through any other ability. The results of Riggs and colleagues (2013) are consistent 
with this view as much as with the prediction of the Symbolic Competence account, at least for 
earlier stages of drawing skill development. As stated above, the authors however did not include 
the transition from intellectual to visual realism in their study. Hence the present study extended 
the Behavioural Inhibition account to test the relationship between IC and drawing skill at this 
level. 
The ideas behind the above two accounts are not new (Riggs et al., 2013). The current 
study however investigates an additional account, the Motor Development account, as outlined 
in section 1.6, which proposes that the relationship between IC and drawing skill is mediated by 
fine motor control. In other words, it sees well developed fine motor control as a prerequisite for 
drawing development, especially for the emergence of figurative drawing from scribbling, and 
for increasing use of figurative detail in these drawings. IC in turn is seen as associated with the 
development of fine motor control, which involves controlling smaller muscles in order to grasp 
and manipulate objects (Wells, 2006) and requires precise visuomotor coordination, especially in 
movement of the hands. Hence it is required for skilled drawing (e.g., Lange-Küttner, 2008; 
Toomela, 2002). There also exists some evidence linking IC and motor control in development 
more generally (Diamond, 2000; Koziol, Budding & Chedekel, 2012). There is, however, less 
evidence for an association between IC and motor control in young children, especially 3-and 4-
year-olds, although this age group is of particular interest because IC improves most rapidly at 
this age (see section 1.4). 
In the current study, I will not only consider the power of the Motor Development account 
in explaining the emergence of figurative representation from scribbling, and in the increase of 
representational detail in children’s drawing, but also in the shift from intellectual to visual 
realism. It is possible that, even if the relationship between IC and figurative drawing skill 
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development is mediated by FMC at earlier stages, as suggested in the Motor Development 
account, it could still also be the case that IC acts directly to suppress a specific drawing 
behaviour at other transitions, such as the shift from intellectual realism to visual realism, as 
suggested in the Behavioural Inhibition account. After all, it is unclear whether there are 
differences in motor control demands between drawing intellectually and visually realistically, in 
the way that there appear to exist such differences in demand between scribbling and figurative 
drawing. While IC and symbolic understanding have already been extensively reviewed in 
chapter 1, I did not give the same attention to motor control, which I therefore review next. 
2.1.1 Motor control and its relationship with IC  
The development of motor skill in general is a process which continues throughout a 
person’s lifetime. This not only includes physical growth, but also development of the motor and 
nervous system (Gallahue & Ozmun, 2006). Overall motor skills are conventionally further 
subdivided into gross motor skills and fine motor skills, each with their own control mechanism. 
Gross motor control (GMC) manages skills which require the use of large muscle groups 
(arms, legs and neck) and the involvement of large scale bodily movements (Payne & Issacs, 
2008). GMC is developed in early childhood for stability and control of the body in order to 
facilitate exploration (Cools, de Martelaer et al., 2009; Gallahue & Ozmun, 2006; Haywood & 
Getchell, 2009; Schmidt & Lee, 2005). These skills are subdivided into locomotor skills and 
object control. Whilst locomotor skills involve the movement from one place to another (e.g., 
walking, running, jumping), object control skills involve the movement and coordination of body 
parts with objects – to either take action or receive a response from the object (e.g., throwing a 
ball, climbing on a climbing frame). 
Fine motor control (FMC) manages fine motor skills which require the use of small 
muscles (e.g. hands and fingers) to produce precise and refined movements, required for daily 
activities, such as feeding oneself, dressing, writing and drawing (Cools, De Martelaer, Samaey 
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& Andries, 2009; Summers, Larkin & Dewey, 2008). FMC also involves incorporating visual 
stimuli from the environment (Korkman, Kirk & Kemp, 2007). Children need to use visual 
information from their environment alongside their refined muscle control to complete complex 
tasks such as placing jigsaw pieces in the right position with others or cutting and gluing paper 
(Sorter & Kulp, 2003). According to Diamond (2000), fine motor skills, like gross motor skills, 
rely for their control on the prefrontal cortex and the cerebellum. 
FMC is especially relevant to the present study because, according to Toomela (2002), 
greater FMC improves drawing skills. Thelen, Corbetta and Spencer (1996, p.1074) stated that 
good motor control requires “learning to maintain a smooth, straight reach under various speed 
and load conditions and from many locations in the reaching space”. Furthermore, von Hofsten 
(1993) and Jeannerod (1997) described development of this skill as progressing from movement 
that was less continuous and less straight, to straighter, more controlled and more direct 
movement. In fact, children’s drawing skill involves more sub-movements, referred to as 
‘movement units’, than do many other motor activities (von Hofsten, 1979). Movement units are 
actions, such as reaching for something with the hand, or drawing  a line on paper, which are 
distinct from other previous or later movement units by having their own separate acceleration 
and deceleration phases: each one is seen as being separately planned or ‘prospectively 
controlled’ (von Hofsten, 1979). Hence for my study, which is focused on factors affecting 
development of children’s drawing skills, FMC is of more central concern than GMC.  
Drawing places heavy cognitive demands on young children, to control their fine motor 
skills, both because of the inherent complexity of the task and also because their limited 
experience at performing it. Indeed, according to Toomela (2002), drawing is also considered 
one of the best ways to study children’s sensorimotor skill. Furthermore, just as it was remarked 
in Chapter 1 that drawing tasks are sometimes used as measures of IC, so also we find them used 
in standardised measures of young children’s FMC. For example, the Peabody Developmental 
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Motor Scales – second edition (PDMS-2) battery of tests includes, in its Visual-Motor 
Integration subsection, drawing tasks (e.g. copying a circle). Once again, in my study, however, I 
will not use such tasks to measure FMC, so as not to confound my measures of drawing skills 
with those of FMC. 
 As noted in section 1.5, previous research has shown that development of IC in early 
childhood is linked to the development of a whole range of other cognitive skills, including the 
understanding of symbolic representation (Apperly & Carroll, 2009; Beck et al., 2011; Benson et 
al., 2013; Sabbagh et al., 2006). The evidence below further shows some, albeit fragmentary, 
evidence of an association between IC and motor control. IC and FMC are usually studied 
separately in young children, but there is an increasing awareness and understanding of the close 
relationship between these abilities in the process of child development. Something that remains 
unclear, however, as the rest of this section will show, is the precise underlying mechanism of 
the connection. Does FMC lead to IC? Or is the reverse true? Or do both simply develop 
together dependent upon some third ability? There are then at least three possible positions 
which may be adopted concerning the precise relationship between IC (or EFs in general) and 
FMC (or other forms of motor control).  
One kind of evidence which lends support to the possibility of a link between motor 
control and EF is neuroscientific, often based on studies of adolescents with Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). Barkley (2012), for example, shows that there exist large 
overlaps in neural structures, mainly in the cerebellum and prefrontal cortex, both of which are 
linked to controlling action and to EFs (including IC). Wang, Kloth and Badura (2014) further 
claim a strong association between motor skill, cognitive skill and cerebellum development. 
Davis, Pitchford, Jaspan and colleagues (2010) also found a correlation between motor and 
cognitive skills in children with cerebellar tumors. Thus, there is support for the proposal that 
abilities such as FMC and IC occupy a similar location in the brain, and so are intimately 
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connected. Moreover, there is an association between increased grey-matter density in the frontal 
lobes and cerebellum and the early onset of walking and standing in infancy and executive 
functions in adults (Murray, Jones, Kuh & Richards, 2007).  
While this evidence of location in the same parts of the brain is consistent with the 
proposal that IC and FMC simply develop together, work by Duque, Mazzocchio and colleagues 
(2005) suggest a key role for IC in relation to lateralization of brain functions which could 
provide an explanation of why IC and FMC are intimately connected in the brain, and even be 
taken to suggest that IC leads to FMC. Many successful actions require communication between 
the hemispheres, and this in turn involves a mechanism of functional inhibition as well as 
facilitation: inhibitory involvement is believed to be critical in the preparation of unilateral 
actions so as to counteract the production of default mirror movements.  
Turning now to developmental psychological studies of typical children, there are only a 
few relevant studies of infants. Gottwald, Achermann, Marciszko and colleagues (2016) for 
example found an association between IC and motor planning (though not wider aspects of 
motor control) in 18-month-old children. There also exists one study that found a link between 
IC and FMC in 12-month-old children, and a link between IC and both FMC and GMC in 24-
month-old children (St. John, Estes, Dager et al., 2016). In 5- and 6-year-olds, Livesey, Keen, 
Rouse, and White (2006) measured both FMC and IC (using Stroop and stop-signal tasks). They 
found that motor performance significantly correlated with Stroop performance. The relationship 
with the stop-signal task scores was in the expected direction, but did not reach significance. 
However, Roebers, Röthlisberger, and colleagues (2014) also found significant correlations 
between FMC, IQ and EF (in which IC was included) in typical 5- and 6-year-olds. While 
evidence suggesting that IC is related to FMC is limited in early childhood, it is more strongly 
evidenced in older children and adolescents. Rigoli, Piek, Kane and Oosterlaan (2012), for 
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instance, found a significant positive correlation between an IC measure and FMC in 12- to 16-
year-olds.  
It is notable that most evidence for the relationship between IC and FMC in fact comes 
from individuals diagnosed with conditions such as Developmental Coordination Disorder 
(DCD) (Leonard and Hills, 2015), Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), and Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD – Sugden, Kirby & Dunford, 2008). These all tend to exhibit 
deficits both of motor and inhibitory functions, thus implying a connection between the two, 
though not what kind of connection. 
DCD is diagnosed specifically on the basis of difficulties found in acquiring and executing 
motor skills which affect daily living as well as academic achievement, difficulties which cannot 
be explained by other medical conditions. The motor characteristics of DCD are however almost 
always accompanied by behavioural and attention problems, reflecting poor development of IC, 
according to Henderson, Rose and Henderson (1992). Hence, there is a large body of evidence 
demonstrating that poor EFs are associated with this disorder (Leonard, Bernardi, Hill & Henry, 
in press; Mandich, Buckolz & Polarajko, 2002; Piek, Dyck, Francis & Conwell, 2007).  
The three main components of executive function with which individuals with DCD have 
difficulties are IC, working memory and switching (Mandich et al., 2002; Alloway & Archibald, 
2008; Michel, Roethlisberger et al., 2011), the same being true in individuals with ASD and 
ADHD (Miyake, Friedman, Emerson et al., 2000). Such difficulties can be seen in children as 
young as three years (McEvoy, Rogers & Pennington, 1993), though not all studies support this 
finding (Griffith, Pennington, Wehner & Rogers, 1999). On-going development of EFs with age 
is also not guaranteed in individuals with these disorders. For example, whilst typically 
developing individuals did improve on a computerized task measuring working memory, an 
ASD group did not (Luna, Doll, Hegedus, Minshew & Sweeney, 2007). Similar findings were 
found in a study by Solomon, Ozonoff, Carter and Caplan (2008), who even observed a slight 
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decrease in performance over time in individuals with ASD. This pattern of deficits may well 
further extend to IC. There is however not much information on EFs before the unfolding of 
ASD symptoms, since studies are usually undertaken on individuals who already have ASD.  
Furthermore, motor difficulties in children with ADHD are now widely documented in the 
literature (Barkley, DuPaul & McMurray, 1990; Piek, Pitcher & Hay, 1999; Pitcher, Piek, & 
Hay, 2003). By comparing motor performance between children with ADHD and non-clinical 
control children, Piek and colleagues (1999) found a link between motor ability and inattention, 
which can be interpreted as a relationship between FMC and IC (although the kind of inhibition 
which my thesis is concerned with is in fact the behavioural rather than the attentional type, see 
section 1.2). This was further supported by a follow-up study, which compared children with 
ADHD with non-clinical controls using the Movement Assessment Battery for Children (a 
standardized assessment of motor ability to identify children with motor coordination deficits). A 
relationship between motor ability and inattention was again found (Pitcher et al., 2003).  
Although empirical evidence for a relationship between IC and FMC, and for the 
directionality of any relationship, is limited in early childhood for typical children, there are a 
number of evolving theories which support an association between EFs and motor control, such 
as the Embodied Cognition and Dynamic Systems theories. Embodied Cognition is defined by 
Thelen and colleagues (2001) as a cognition which emerges from the interaction of the body with 
the world, as well as depending on the body with its specific perceptual and motor abilities. This 
means that this approach does not consider the body and its physical actions as being somehow 
distinct from the mind and its cognitive processes, as do some approaches to psychology 
(Wilson, 2002). Consequently, a link between a human capability that is more manifest 
physically, such as FMC, and one that is more mental, such as IC and other EFs, is seen as 
entirely natural and to be expected.  
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According to the Dynamic Systems theory of development, on the other hand, all aspects 
of a human being develop together and mutually affect each other bi-directionally, within a 
scenario in which a vast number of factors at many levels are at work. In such a view, the EFs, 
including IC, can emerge from what is called prospective motor control, the ability to plan motor 
activities and adapt them to different goals, which itself arises through exploratory actions and 
cycles of perception and action which are the defining characteristics of motor control itself 
(Thelen et al., 1996; Thelen & Smith, 1994; Thelen, 1992). Von Hofsten (2014) in fact 
considered prospective motor control to involve implicit knowledge concerning fundamental 
physical principles, and so to be, in effect, embodied action control. This therefore provides a 
potential way in which the development of aspects of motor control such as FMC could lead to 
development of EFs such as IC. Indeed, according to several researchers (Van der Meer, Van der 
Weel, Lee et al., 1995; Von Hofsten, 2004; Zoia, Blason, D’Ottavio, et al., 2007), prospective 
motor control develops during the first few months of life, but EFs emerge later on in infancy 
(Diamond, 2000), implying perhaps that it is the former that leads to the latter. Whilst the 
executive functions involve multiple processes and act upon ideas, they also, like motor skills, 
act upon the outside world (Willingham, 1998). Hence, it is entirely possible that EFs can be 
derived from prospective motor control as described above.  
Further evidence for the idea that EFs develop from motor processes comes from a study 
by Murray and colleagues (2007), which showed correlations between the onset of standing and 
walking in infancy and EFs in adulthood. This study, as well as previous work by Thelen and 
colleagues (1996, 2001), again suggests that prospective motor control is important in the 
development of EFs. Infants who develop motor control abilities such as standing, walking and 
reaching early, develop better executive function skills.  
Gottwald and colleagues (2016) also found that, at 18 months, simple inhibition (in tasks 
with low working memory demand such as the day/night task), together with working memory, 
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emerged as positively related to prospective motor control. By contrast, complex inhibition (in 
tasks with higher working memory demand, such as a Stroop task) and control variables were 
not. Gottwald and colleagues however argued from this that in infancy, with simple inhibition 
tasks such as are used in the present study, both prospective motor control and EFs including IC 
could develop from the one need to control action, with neither having priority. This contrasts 
with studies cited above which suggested that the EFs might actually be the product of 
prospective motor control.  
In short, we may conclude that while available studies and relevant theories are often 
interpreted as supporting the idea that motor control skills (such as FMC) and EFs (including IC) 
simply develop together, or that the former lead to the latter, there has been little attention to the 
possibility that the latter might in some sense lead to the former, especially in typical children in 
early childhood. However, the Motor Development account which we described at the start of 
2.1, and which it is a prime purpose of Study 1 to evaluate, incorporates the idea that IC leads to 
FMC, rather than the reverse. It predicts that IC would impact on FMC which in turn (as a 
mediator) would be associated with drawing skills: it does not propose that FMC is mediated by 
IC in its effect on drawing skills. Hence, aside from its concern with the three accounts of how 
IC might affect drawing skill, Study 1 may additionally be seen as a contribution to our 
understanding of how IC and FMC are related to each other. In particular it explores the 
neglected possibility that IC in some sense has priority over FMC rather than the reverse.  
2.1.2 Overview of Study 1  
In order to properly evaluate the three accounts described in 2.1, it was necessary to 
measure more than one dimension of drawing skill. Thus two of the measures used in the current 
study focused on the emergence of children’s ability to draw something that an adult could 
recognize as an object or person (the measures of figurative representation and figurative detail). 
The measure of figurative representation (FR) targeted the transition from scribbling to some 
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kind of figurative drawing in the four drawings elicited in this study: of a person and a house 
from memory, and of a mug and two balls from models in view. Each was scored 1 for figurative 
and 0 for non-figurative, so the overall scale ran from 0 to 4. A measure of figurative detail (FD) 
quantified the amount of detail in the drawings of a person and of a house. This employed an 
overall scale of 0 to 16 based on the Cox and Parkin Human-figure scale (1986) and 12 common 
features of a house that could be included (based on Barrouillet, Fayol, & Chevrot, 1994).  
Since these scales did not quantify the kind of realism involved, I also measured the 
child’s progression from intellectual realism to visual realism, through a task where children had 
to make two drawings of objects as they were seen in front of them: first a mug with the handle 
turned away (Freeman & Janikoun, 1972), and then two balls where one was partly hidden 
behind the other (Cox, 1978). The children were scored for whether they drew them precisely as 
seen (visual realism, +1 for each drawing) or how they knew them to be, including parts that 
were hidden  (intellectual realism, -1 for each drawing).  
In order to assess the three accounts, in the current study, I further needed to measure IC 
and FMC. The former was achieved through two age-appropriate tasks, which were selected 
from the range usually used to measure IC in children, as recommended by Petersen and 
colleagues (2016). These two tasks, the grass/snow and day/night tasks, were chosen for their 
minimal motor demands (verbal response or just pointing at pictures), so as to avoid any 
confounding of the measure of IC with the measure of FMC.  
FMC was measured using eight age-appropriate tasks selected from the Peabody 
Developmental Motor Scale (PDMS-2 – Wang, Liao & Hsieh, 2006). They involved folding and 
cutting, putting laces through holes, and building with wooden blocks: tasks which required 
drawing were omitted, so as to avoid any confounding of the measure of FMC with the measures 
of drawing skills. 
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Based on the literature reviewed above and arguments set out here, I formulated a number 
of hypotheses concerning the findings of my study. These fall into three areas: background 
variables (age and gender), predictors of figurative representation and detail, and predictors of 
drawing realism. First, on the basis of much previous research which shows that age-related 
development occurs in the abilities which are of current concern, age was expected to be 
associated with improvement in performance on drawing ability of all types, as well as with 
improvement in IC and FMC. Hence age had to be included in all analyses so that its effects 
could be controlled for. In particular, the age-related transition from intellectual realism to visual 
realism, which occurs in middle childhood (Clark, 1897; Freeman & Janikoun, 1972), is in fact 
one of the oldest findings in cognitive development. Overall, the use of visual realism is usually 
seen as increasing monotonically during childhood (Cox, 2005; Golomb, 2002; Jolley, 2010). 
Gender was also included in the study, but on the basis of previous research was not expected to 
associate with drawing skills.  
Next, all three of the accounts predicted a relationship between IC and figurative 
representation and figurative detail. The difference is that while under the Behavioural Inhibition 
account this relationship would be direct, under the Motor Development account the relationship 
would not be direct, but mediated through FMC. The Symbolic Competence account predicts a 
link mediated through symbolic understanding, but, since I did not measure symbolic 
understanding, in the context of this study the link would appear to be also direct. A relationship 
between IC and figurative representation was deemed particularly relevant to the Symbolic 
Competence account, however. If the strongest direct relationship were found between IC and 
figurative representation that would suggest that the mediating role of symbolic understanding 
should be explored further. 
Third, only the Behavioural Inhibition account predicted a relationship between IC and 
drawing realism (visual versus intellectual). It further predicts that this link would be direct, not 
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mediated through FMC, and, given the usual development of realism in the literature, from 
intellectual to visual, positive. The other two accounts do not appear to predict such a 
relationship. One might speculate that since the motor demands of drawing a visually realistic 
picture do not appear to exceed those of drawing an intellectually realistic picture, the Motor 
Development account would predict no impact of FMC on this measure. Furthermore, since 
arguably visual and intellectual realism are equally the product of symbolic understanding, the 
Symbolic Competence account does not appear to predict a relationship between IC and change 
between these drawing styles. 
2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Participants  
One hundred children (55 girls and 45 boys) participated in this study, with age range from 
3 to 4 years (mean age = 44.2 months, SD = 6.77 months). These children were recruited from 
nurseries and preschools in Bury St Edmunds and Colchester. All spoke English as their first 
language, and none were reported as having any behavioural or learning difficulties (based on 
teachers’ reports). The sample was of mixed social background and was predominantly white. 
One hundred was selected as a suitable sample size since I wished to perform multiple 
regression and had been advised that 100 was a suitable minimum number for this. In order to 
obtain this number I began with a larger number but had to eliminate some 12 children who 
either could not or were not willing to participate in one or more of the IC or FMC tasks. For 
instance, one child declared that he did not know the names of the sun and the moon. I provided 
the names and then administered the IC day/night and grass/snow tasks which required 
knowledge of these words. To my surprise the child performed perfectly, but I excluded him 
since I supposed that his perfect performance was not due to his high rate of IC but rather to the 
fact that he had no established knowledge of the words sun and moon. Hence the association of 
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the word sun with a picture of the sun was not for him an established prepotent response which 
had to be inhibited at all. Children who produced a scribble rather than a drawing were not 
excluded, however, since this provided measurable information about their figurative drawing 
ability (2.2.4.1). 
2.2.2 Design   
In the current study, a within-subjects correlational design was used. The three drawing 
measures: figurative representation (FR), figurative detail (FD) and realism (intellectual vs 
visual) were the dependent variables. The independent variables were IC, FMC, age and gender. 
2.2.3 Materials  
The following materials were used for the tasks involved in the study.  
Drawing tasks: plain A4 paper, pencils, a mug (height 12cm, diameter 6cm) and two balls 
(diameter 9cm). IC grass/snow task: two pictures: one of the moon in a night sky, and the other 
of the sun in a day sky (height 12cm, width 12cm – See Figure 2.1). IC day/night task: a flip-
book, which contained 16 pictures, half of the sun in a day sky and half of the moon in a night 
sky. FMC motor control task: materials from the Fine Motor Quotient of the Peabody 
Developmental Motor Scale – Second Edition (PDMS-2, Wang et al., 2006). The materials 
included two sheets of A4 paper: one with a black circle and the other with a black square, in the 
centre of each sheet. These were photocopied for each child. In addition to this, there were blunt 
scissors, ten coloured square blocks made of wood, a strip of card with 6 holes in it and a shoe 
lace (See Figure 2.2). 
 
Figure 2.1. The day/night task
1
. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Images from Simpson and Riggs (2010) 
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Figure 2.2. PDMS-2 test materials
2
. 
 
 
 
2.2.4 Procedure and scoring  
Informed consent was first obtained from the parents of participants and the school 
authorities. The measurement sessions involved two people, the researcher (E1) and a Master’s 
student with experience of these tasks (E2). E1 was responsible for the administration of the 
tasks and E2 recorded the children’s responses. All the children were tested individually, in the 
morning, either in a separate room from their classroom, or in a quiet corner of their classroom. 
E2 sat next to the child to record the responses while E1 sat across the table. The children were 
asked for their help, and told that they were going to play some fun games.  
Table 2.1. Task order of Study 1. 
Session 1                          Session 2 
1. Draw human figure 1. Draw a house 
2. Grass/snow 2. Day/night 
3.Draw mug (handle occluded) 3. Draw balls (overlapping) 
4. Lace a string 4.Cut a circle 
                                                          
2
 Image from publisher’s website 
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5. Cut a square 5. Fold paper 
6. Build a pyramid 6. Build diagonal-pyramid 
7. Button strip 7. Touch Fingers 
 
There were 14 tasks in all, which were administered over two sessions to each child, on 
different days, each session lasting about 20 minutes, and which followed a fixed order, shown 
in Table 2.1. In each session drawing tasks, starting with the most demanding (human figure or 
house), came first, and the purely motor tasks later. 
2.2.4.1 Drawing tasks. Four tasks were administered over the two sessions. In each session 
a plain A4 paper and a pencil were placed on the table in front of the child.  
In Session 1, for the Human-figure task, children were asked to draw themselves with the 
instruction, "Can you draw a picture of yourself?” The drawing in this task was therefore totally 
based on the children’s memory. For the Occluded-handle task, a mug was placed on the table in 
front of the child in such a way that the handle was not visible. Children were then asked to 
"Draw what you see". If they asked any questions about how to draw it they were asked to 
“…Just do your best drawing”. The drawing in this task was therefore instructed to be based on 
representing the objects in view. 
In Session 2, for the House task, children were asked, "Can you draw a picture of your 
house? (Or a house, if they said they did not live in one)”. The drawing in this task was therefore 
based on the children’s memory of houses. For the Occluded-ball task, two balls were placed on 
the table in front of the child so that one ball was half-hidden by the other. Children were asked, 
"Can you draw a picture of these two balls?" 
The drawing tasks were scored as follows. For figurative representation, E1 and another 
expert independently scored each of the four drawings as either showing figurative 
representation or not (figurative representation scale scored from 0-4). Drawings were assigned 
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to the figurative category if the two raters were able to identify the drawing as resembling the 
object in the real world. Drawings were assigned to the non-figurative category if the raters were 
unable to identify them. Where there was disagreement, the drawing was discussed until 
agreement was reached.  
In order to measure figurative detail, just the human figure and house drawings were 
scored by two measurers, as follows. The human figure was scored according to the Cox and 
Parkin (1986) Human-figure scale (See Figure 2.3). It is scored in detail as follows: 1. Scribbles 
– 0 point (Abstract, nonrepresentational. No distinct forms or strokes); 2. Distinct forms – 1 
point (Some distinct forms or strokes); 3. Tadpoles – 2 points (Has only one enclosed head/body 
area. All figures have legs attached to lower part of this closed area. May have facial features. 
May also have arms attached to side of head/body area); 4. Transitional figures – 3 points 
(Shows some definite separation of the head and body features. May have arms and facial 
features. Arms may be attached to legs); 5. Conventional figures – 4 points (Drawings include a 
separate head and body, i.e., two distinct enclosed areas. Usually have facial features, legs, and 
arms) (See Figure 2.3). 
The house task was scored using a revised version of the house scale of Barrouillet, Fayol 
and Chevrot (1994), and identified 12 features of a house to look for in the drawings. Each item 
was given 1 point providing a maximum score of 12. This revised scale was taken from Brechet 
and Jolley (2014) who excluded certain features from the longer list of 22 items in Barrouillet 
and colleagues (1994) because none of their children drew them (‘chimney’, ‘vertical chimney’, 
and ‘folding out of house elements’). The item ‘at least a window’ was also excluded because it 
was considered repetitious of the ‘two or more windows’ item. Three additional items related to 
windows were also excluded. ‘Two high windows’ was omitted because it would have 
disadvantaged children who drew bungalows, ‘alignment of windows’ because it was too similar 
to ‘position of windows’, and ‘texture/shape of windows’ because the criteria were not 
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sufficiently clear. ‘Attic’ was excluded because it was unrelated to the representational quality of 
a house drawing. Finally, the two items ‘path’ and ‘other buildings attached’ were relabelled as a 
single item ‘extraneous’. The revised list of items used in the scale was therefore: ‘outline of 
house’, ‘roof’, ‘roof shape’, ‘door’, ‘door handle’, ‘base of the house’, ‘two or more windows’, 
‘position of windows’, ‘proportion of windows’, ‘curtains’, ‘extraneous items’ and ‘perspective’. 
The scores for the human-figure task and house task were added to produce the overall figurative 
detail scale score (scored 0-16). 
In order to measure realism, just the occluded-ball and occluded-handle drawings were 
used. The drawings of the mug and ball were scored on the realism scale (scored -2 to 2) as 
follows. A score of -1 was given if the handle of the mug was included, or both balls shown in 
full (intellectual realism), and +1 if the handle was omitted, or the balls shown with one partly 
hidden (visual realism). Thus higher scores reflect greater visual realism.  
Figure 2.3. Cox and Parkin’s (1986) classification system for human figure drawing. 
 
 
2.2.4.2 IC tasks. IC was assessed with the day/night task and the grass/snow task, which 
were adopted from Simpson and Riggs (2009). The grass/snow task was in fact implemented 
with day and night pictures in the present study: it is referred to as the grass/snow task because 
that is the form it originally took in earlier studies (see chapter 1.3) and to distinguish it from the 
day/night task which requires speaking rather than pointing by the child. 
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In Session 1, for the Grass/snow task, E1 explained that they were going to play a ‘silly 
game’ in which the child had to point to two pictures. Children were shown the sun and moon 
pictures and asked to name them. E1 then explained that in the game they had to point to the sun 
picture when she said, moon, and to the moon picture when she said sun. The child was 
explicitly told not to point to the named pictures. E1 then ‘talked children through the rules’ by 
saying the two names and getting them to point to the appropriate picture (e.g., “…so when I say 
sun can you show me which picture you have to point to” confirming that they were correct or 
correcting them if necessary by referring to the rules. Children then received four practice trials 
(order: sun, moon, sun, moon) with feedback. If, for example, the child pointed to the moon 
when the researcher said sun, E1 confirmed that this was the correct response. If, however, the 
child pointed to the sun, E1 said that this was wrong because moon was correct. Children next 
received 16 test trials in the same pseudorandom order (ABBABAABBABAABAB) and with no 
feedback. E2 coded children’s responses.  
In Session 2, for the Day/night task, the procedure was identical to that for the grass/snow 
task except that children in the day/night task were asked to say sun when they see the moon 
card and to say moon when they see the sun card, so the day /night task required a verbal 
response. E1 first explained the rules using the sun and moon pictures. The four practice and 16 
test trials were presented using a flip-book, which contained 16 pictures. E2 again recorded 
responses. A total score out of 32 was given to each child depending on the number of correct 
responses given in both IC tasks. 
2.2.4.3 FMC tasks. This included eight tasks from PDMS-2 (See Figure 2.2), which were 
presented in a fixed order (See Table 2.1). The tasks were administered as follows.  
In Session 1, the first task was Lacing a string (item 58 in PDMS-2). E1 placed a string on 
the table and showed the child a strip consisting of 6 holes. E1 asked the child to "watch me 
lace", then E1 held the string and strip clearly so that the child could see exactly what she was 
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doing. E1 began to lace by placing the string top down through the first hole, and up through the 
second hole, and down through the third hole. E1 showed the child the final result, and then 
removed the string from the strip, and placed these two items on the table in front of the child. 
Children were instructed to "Do it like I did". Children were allowed to take as much time as 
they needed to complete the task.  
The second task was Cutting a square (item 68 in PDMS-2). Children were given a piece 
of A4 paper with a square depicted on it and a pair of scissors, and instructed to cut out the 
square along the line. The third task was Pyramid building (item 69 in PDMS-2). E1 used six 
cubes to build a pyramid. E1 placed three cubes next to each other, then two cubes on top and 
one cube on top of the two cubes. The pyramid was kept in front of the child and six additional 
cubes were provided with the instruction "build a pyramid like mine". The fourth MC task in 
session 1 was the Button strip (item 24 in PDMS-2). E1 placed a button strip on the table and 
unbuttoned all of the buttons. The E1 then asks the child to "button and unbutton this one as fast 
as you can" whilst pointing at one of the buttons. 
In Session 2, the first FMC task was Cutting a circle (item 65 in PDMS-2). Children were 
given a piece of A4 paper with a circle depicted on it and a pair of scissors, and instructed to cut 
out the circle along the line. The second task was Folding paper (item 72 in PDMS-2). Here 
children were shown a folded piece of paper. They were then given two pieces of A4 paper and 
instructed to "fold your paper to look like this one". Third came Diagonal-pyramid building. This 
task was a modification the Pyramid building task that increased its difficulty. The pyramid was 
constructed with edges adjacent (rather than faces as in the original task). There was also a 
distance of a few millimetres between each block (rather than the faces being in contact). E1 
used six cubes to build a pyramid. E1 placed three cubes next to each other, then two cubes on 
top and one cube on top of the two cubes (with a distance of a few millimetres between each 
block). The pyramid was kept in front of the child and six additional cubes were provided with 
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the instruction "build a pyramid like mine". Finally came Finger touching (item 26 in PDMS-2). 
E1 demonstrated touching her thumb with each finger successively at a rate of one touch per 
second. Children were then instructed to do the same thing.  
The MC tasks were all scored by E2. The PDMS-2 scoring criteria were used to assess the 
motor tasks for each child. A score ranging from 0 to 2 was given for each task and these scores 
were then added together to form the total FMC score for each child (maximum of 16 for all 
tasks).  
2.2.5 Choice of Statistics 
 
Pearson correlation was chosen to initially explore the relationships between the variables 
of the data, in a simple pairwise fashion. In order to answer the research questions realistically, 
however, it was important to be able to distinguish between predictors and dependents, and to be 
able to assess the strength of relationships between variables in the presence of the full set of 
variables included in the design, not just in isolated pairs. Hence multiple regression was the 
central form of analysis deemed appropriate since it takes into account the inter-correlations 
between predictors in assessing their relationship with any dependent. Finally, since the key 
question to be answered in order to assess the three accounts of the relationship between IC and 
drawing skill turned on whether IC affected drawing skill directly, or via some other variable 
such as FMC, we adopted an enhancement of multiple regression known as mediation analysis. 
This adds to conventional multiple regression, as implemented in SPSS and other packages, the 
capability of assessing not only the strength of direct relationship between a predictor and a DV 
(such as IC and a drawing skill measure), in the presence of other inter-correlating variables, but 
also the strength of indirect relationships via a third, mediating, variable (e.g. IV with a drawing 
skill via FMC). 
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2.3 Results 
Table 2.2 summarises descriptive statistics for age and gender, as well as the five 
performance variables, IC, FMC, Figurative Representation (FR), Figurative Detail (FD), and 
Visual Realism (VR). The last was on a scale where negative scores reflect high intellectual 
realism and positive ones higher visual realism.  
Table 2.2. Descriptive statistics for Study 1. 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
Inhibitory control 100 0 32 18.3 11.4 
Fine motor control 100 0 16 9.14 4.77 
Figurative representation 100 0 4 1.91 1.46 
Figurative detail 100 0 15 4.67 4.52 
Visual realism 65* -2 2 0.58 1.31 
Age (in months) 100 36 54 44.2 6.77 
 
 Number of children who produced at least one figurative picture in the realism drawing tasks. 
 
2.3.1 Correlation Analyses 
 Initially, bivariate correlations were computed for the total sample of children to assess the 
relationships among the 7 variables, without considering any possible mediation effects: age, 
gender, IC, FMC, FR, FD, and VR. As seen in Table 2.3, all variables were correlated highly 
significantly with each other, except gender, which correlated significantly with none of the 
other variables, though descriptively it showed a low correlation with FD (r=.238; girls scoring 
slightly higher than boys: girls 5.64, boys 3.49).  
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Table 2.3. Correlations between the seven variables of Study 1. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Age -       
2 Gender .023 -      
3 Inhibitory control .470
**
 -.003 -     
4 Fine motor control .577
**
 .031 .635
**
 -    
5 Fig. representation .597
**
 .151 .565
**
 .735
**
 -   
6 Fig. detail .544
**
 .238 .456
**
 .683
**
 .844
**
 -  
7 Visual realism -.540
**
 -.047 -.574
**
 -.530
**
 -.567
** 
 .466
**
 - 
(* p<.05, **p<.01, *** p<.001) 
 
2.3.1.1 IC and other variables. Analysis showed that there was a moderate positive 
correlation between IC and age, as would be expected, r(98) = .47, p < .001. When examining 
the relationship between performance on FMC and IC, I also expected based on all three 
accounts that the correlation would be in the positive direction, where children with higher 
inhibitory capacity performed better on FMC tasks. As expected there was indeed a strong 
positive and significant relationship between IC and FMC, r(98) = .64, p < .001. Moreover, it 
appears that IC and FR also had a moderate positive relationship with each other, r(98) = .56, p 
< .001, consistent with the Symbolic Competence account. Furthermore, IC showed a significant 
and moderate positive correlation with FD, r(98) = .46, p < .001, as predicted by the Behavioural 
Inhibition account.  
With respect to the relationship between IC and VR, it was expected (e.g. from the 
Behavioural Inhibition account) that the correlation would be in the positive direction, where 
children who had higher scores on IC tasks would perform better on the VR scale, meaning that 
their drawing would be more visual than intellectual. However, the surprising finding was a 
significantly inverse relationship between IC and VR, r(63) = -.574, p < .001. Thus, better 
performance on the IC scale was related to a lower score for VR. This intriguing finding will be 
followed up in the Discussion. 
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 Gender, which is not of prime concern in the current study, had a near zero correlation 
with IC. In fact only a few studies have considered the role of gender in the operation of the 
executive function, including IC. Raaijmakers and colleagues (2008) for example reported that 
four-year-old boys exhibited less successful deployment of the EFs than girls, who exhibited 
better IC and verbal skills, and so, arguably, greater maturation. Kochanska, Murray and Coy 
(1997) also reported girls as young as 22 and 33 months outperforming boys in IC. Olson, 
Sameroff, and colleagues (2005) again found that three-year-old girls exhibited significantly 
greater IC than boys. Keenan and Shaw (1997) suggest that faster developmental maturation of 
preschool girls could be responsible for their greater IC than boys, who manifest more aggressive 
behaviour. In addition, socialization practices have been suggested as a possible contributory 
factor: in general, greater encouragement is given to girls than to boys with respect to exerting 
self-control of their behaviour (Keenan and Shaw, 1997). By contrast Herba and colleagues 
(2006), in a study of adolescents with behavioural problems, found no gender differences in 
performance on a range of measures of specific types of IC. Closer to the age range of the 
current study, Overman (2004) and Thorell and Wåhlstedt (2006) reported no differences in EF 
performance of preschool boys and girls. Thus my gender finding is consistent with what is 
perhaps the minority finding in the literature.  
2.3.1.2 FMC and other variables. The results of these correlational analyses indicated that 
all the four variables age, IC, FR, and FD were positively and significantly correlated with FMC. 
There was a moderate positive correlation between FMC and age, r(98) = .58, p < .001, which 
revealed that higher values on the FMC variable, as expected, were associated with higher values 
on the age variable (older children). Similarly, FMC had a strong positive correlation with both 
FR, r(98) = .74, p < .001, and FD, r(98) = .68, p < .001. Here again, children with higher levels 
of FMC tended to perform better on the FR and FD tasks. However, FMC, as found above, 
exhibited a significant and moderate negative correlation with VR, r(63) = -.53, p < .001. 
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2.3.1.3 Figurative detail and other variables. The results of the correlation analysis (Table 
2.3) showed that there were significant positive relationships between FD and both FMC and IC, 
as already stated. Similarly, FD had a moderate positive and significant correlation with age, 
r(98)= .54, p < .001, and a very strong relationship with FR, r(98) = .84, p <.001. However, FD 
again recorded a significant and moderate negative correlation with VR, r(63) = -.47,  p < .001. 
In this case, children with a higher level of figurative detail performance tended to perform 
worse on the VR measure, in the sense that they exhibited more intellectual than visual realism. 
2.3.1.4 Figurative representation and other variables. FR had a significantly positive 
relationship with age, IC, FMC and FD as already indicated. The relationship between FR and 
age was also strongly positive, as expected, r(98) = .60, p < .001. The only surprising finding, 
similar to that which was obtained for realism above, concerns the negative association between 
FR and VR, where a moderate but significant negative relationship found, r(63) = .57,  p < .001.  
2.3.1.5 The visual realism scale and other variables. VR had a negative correlation with 
all variables, as seen above. For example, even VR and age had a moderate negative relationship 
with each other, which was significant, r(63) = -.54, p < .001. This indicates that older children 
tended to produce drawings showing more intellectual rather than visual realism. The negative 
association between VR and the other six variables was initially surprising, but I was able to find 
an explanation for it (See further Discussion, Section 2). 
 In summary, the results of the current study revealed that children’s performances on IC, 
FMC, FR and FD were all linked moderately and positively to age, meaning that children’s 
capacities on these traits rose with age. However, VR was negatively correlated with age, 
meaning that visual realism scores declined with age. 
2.3.2 Multiple Regression Analyses 
Since the data exhibited many moderate or strong pairwise correlations between all 
variables, excluding only gender, a multiple regression analysis was essential to explore the data 
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further in a way that adjusted estimates of relationship in the light of all the inter-correlations 
among predictor variables. Therefore four separate analyses were conducted, with FR, FD, VR 
and FMC in turn as dependent variables.  
2.3.2.1 Figurative representation as dependent. In the first analysis (See Table 2.4), 
multiple regression analysis using the standard ‘enter’ method was conducted, where age, gender, 
FMC, and IC were entered as predictor variables and Figurative Representation as dependent 
variable. 
Table 2.4. Study 1, multiple regression with 3 drawing variables as dependent measures. 
 
 
The overall model explained 61% of the variance in FR, which was statistically significant, 
F (4, 95) = 37.3, p < .001, R = .781, R
2
 Adjusted = .594. Among the individual predictors, FMC, 
with Beta = .511, t(99) = 5.627, p < .001, significantly predicts FR scores, consistent with the 
correlation analysis, with the highest beta of all the predictors. This result suggests an important 
link between FMC and FR in early childhood. IC, however, contrary to the correlation analysis, 
was not significantly related to FR so had no direct effect on the children’s ability to move from 
non-figurative to figurative drawing when age and FMC are taken into account, Beta = .128, t(98) 
= 1.53, p = .130. Gender, Beta = .130, t(99) = 2.030, p = .045, and age, Beta = .239, t(99) = 
3.010, p = .003, also significantly predicted FR scores. This suggests that age and female gender 
are associated with a higher level of figurative representation in drawing. 
 Dependent variable 
 Fig. Representation Fig. Detail Visual Realism 
Predictor Beta T P Beta t P Beta t p 
Age .239 3.01 .003 .222 2.59 .011 .269 2.12 .038 
Gender .188 2.03 .045 .216 3.12 .002 .018 0.18 .855 
IC .128 1.53 .130 .006 .064 .949 .364 3.11 .003 
FMC .511 5.63 <. 001 .545 5.56 <. 001 .164 1.23 .225 
Model statistics    
F (df) 37.3 (4, 95) 28.7 (4, 95) 11.9 (4, 60) 
R
2
 .611 .547 .442 
P <.001 <.001 <.001 
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This analysis was followed by a reduced multiple regression still with FR as dependent 
variable, but entering just age, gender and FMC as predictors, excluding IC, the non-significant 
predictor. In that analysis gender emerged as non-significant so was also excluded, and the 
regression run only with age and FMC included (Table 2.5). 58% of the variance was accounted 
for by FMC and age alone, and this was revealed to be highly statistically significant, F (2, 97) = 
68.314, p < .001, R = .765, R
2
 Adjusted = .576. The result showed again that FMC, Beta = .585, 
t(99) = 7.301, p < .001, is more strongly related to FR than age, Beta = .260, t(99) = 3.249, p 
= .002. The result confirms that FMC and age both play a key role in children’s success on the 
FR component of drawing skill (See Table 2.5). 
 
Table 2.5. Study 1, multiple regression with three drawing variables as dependent 
measures (non-significant predictors removed). 
 
 Dependent variable 
 Fig. Representation  Fig. Detail 
 
 Visual Realism 
 
Predictor Beta t p  Beta t p  Beta t p 
Age .260 3.24 .002  .223 2.65 .009  -.351 -3.25 .002 
Gender     .215 3.14 .002     
IC         -.413 -.3.82 <.001 
FMC .585 7.30 <.001  .548 6.52 <.001     
 
Model statistics 
        
F (df) 86.3 (2, 97)     38.7 (3, 96)  23.1 (2, 62) 
R
2
 .585  .547  .427 
P <.001  <.001  <.001 
 
2.3.2.2 Figurative detail as dependent. The second overall multiple regression (Table 2.4) 
followed the same pattern as above, but with Figurative detail as the dependent variable (children 
drawing themselves and a house). The four predictors of a child’s FD, age, gender, IC and FMC, 
together explained 55% of the variance, F (4, 95) = 28.694, p < .001, R = .740, R
2
 Adjusted 
= .528. In detail, the result indicated that the measure of FMC predicted FD significantly, Beta 
= .545, t(99) = 5.563, p < .001. Furthermore, the result revealed that both age, Beta = .222, t(99) 
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= 2.593, p = .011, and gender, Beta = .216, t(99) = 3.120, p = .002, were found to positively and 
significantly predict FD. Hence, FMC, age and gender act as strong predictors of FD. IC 
however did not significant predict FD, Beta = .006, t(99) = .064, p = .949.  
These relationships were further analyzed (Table 2.5) using multiple regression omitting 
IC, which, as already shown, had no significant effect, but retaining FMC, age and gender as 
predictors of FD. The result revealed that even without IC, 55% of the variance was still 
accounted for by FMC, age and gender at a statistically significant level, F (3,96) = 38.659, p 
< .001, R
 
= .740, R
2 
Adjusted = .533. The result again showed that FMC, Beta = .548, t(99) = 
6.519, p < .001, as well as age, Beta = .223, t(99) = 2.653, p = .009, and gender, Beta = .215, t(99) 
= 3.136, p = .002, all had positive and significant effects. 
2.3.2.3 Visual realism as dependent. For the third overall analysis (Table 2.4), I examined 
the predictors of a child’s representational drawing skill using the VR scale, measuring whether 
the child used intellectual realism or visual realism to draw their pictures.  
FMC, IC, gender and age were entered as predictor variables and VR as dependent variable. 
The overall model explained 44% of variance in VR, which was revealed to be statistically 
significant, F (4, 60) = 11.886, p < .001, R = .665, R
2
 Adjusted = .405. Considering each 
predictor separately, a significant negative relationship was observed between IC and VR, 
meaning that higher IC was associated with more use of intellectual realism in the drawing, Beta 
= -.364, t(64) = -3.114, p = .003. Similarly, age was found to be negatively and significantly 
correlated with VR, Beta = -.269, t(64) = -2.124, p = .038. FMC, Beta = -.164, t(64) = -1.226, p 
= .225, and gender, Beta = -.018, t(64) = -.183, p = .885, were also negatively correlated with 
VR but did not significantly predict it. The result suggested that all the predictors, FMC, IC, age 
and gender, were negatively correlated with visual realism. 
I again followed up this analysis (Table 2.5) with a multiple regression omitting non-
significant predictors. IC and age alone as predictors of a child’s VR explained 43% of the 
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variance, F (2, 62) = 23.094, p < .001, R = .653, R
2
 Adjusted = .408, barely less than the 44% 
with all four predictors included. Again, IC and age showed a negative and significant 
correlation with VR: IC, Beta = -.413, t(64) = -3.824, p < .001; age, Beta = -.351, t(64) = -3.252, 
p < .001. I had expected all the drawing measures to positively correlate with IC: thus, the 
negative relation between one of the drawing measures (realism) and IC was initially surprising 
and not as yet clearly explicable. 
2.3.2.4 Fine motor control as dependent. Finally, I investigated whether IC independently 
of age and gender predicted children’s FMC (Table 2.6).  
Age, gender and IC together accounted for 50% of the variance in FMC scores, F (3, 96) = 
32.413, p < .001, R = .709, R
2 
Adjusted = .488. The detailed result indicated that IC and age were 
both significant predictors of FMC:  IC, Beta = .468, t(99) = 5.739, p < .001; age, Beta = .356, 
t(99) = 5.739, p < .001. Conversely, the result showed that gender, Beta = .024, t(99) = .332, p = 
.740, was not a significant predictor of FMC. As this study expected, IC was the key predictor of 
FMC, but leaves open the precise role of FMC in the development of children’s skill in drawing 
tasks in early childhood. 
This analysis was again followed up with a multiple regression including only the 
significant predictors, IC and age. These two predictors alone explained 50% of the variance in 
FMC, the same as before, F (2, 97) = 49.014, p < .001, R
 
= .709, R
2
 Adjusted = .492. The result 
showed that separately both IC, Beta = .467, t(99) = 5.761, p < .001, and age, Beta = .357, t(99) 
= 4.401, p < .001, were significant predictors of the children’s FMC. Again, IC had the stronger 
effect (See Table 2.6). 
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Table 2.6. Study 1, multiple regressions with FMC as dependent measure. 
 FMC 
 
 FMC (significant predictors only) 
Predictor Beta t p  Beta t p 
Age .356 4.370 <.001  .357 4.401 <.001 
Gender .024 .332 .740     
IC .468 5.74 <.001  .467 5.761 <.001 
 
Model statistics 
    
F (df) 32.4 (3, 96)  49.0 (2, 97) 
R
2
 .500  .503 
P <.001  <.001 
  
2.3.3 Mediation Analyses  
A primary hypothesis of the Motor Development account which I aimed to test in Study 1 
was that FMC positively mediated the relation between IC and drawing skills. Although the 
analyses above are suggestive, in that in the multiple regression analyses IC is not always related 
to drawing skills in the presence of FMC, they do not precisely test this hypothesis. To better 
examine this precise hypothesis; I therefore followed the recommendations of Shrout and Bolger 
(2002), who suggest a mediation analysis, which includes a bootstrapping procedure to compute 
a confidence interval around the indirect effect (i.e., the path from the independent variable to the 
dependent through the mediator). If zero falls outside of this interval, significant mediation is 
said to be present. I used the SPSS macro designed by Preacher and Hayes (2008) to perform all 
the required analyses, both those using customary multiple regression and those using 
bootstrapping.  
2.3.3.1 Figurative representation as dependent. The first mediation analysis was 
conducted with FR as dependent (Table 2.7). The multiple regression analyses showed that IC 
was positively associated with FR when the effects of other, possibly mediating, variables were 
not taken into account, B = .047, t(99) = 4.409, p < .001. That effect is commonly termed path c 
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(see Figure 2.4). With all predictors taken into account it was also found that IC was positively 
related to FMC, B = .196, t(99) = 5.739, p < .001, on what is called path a. Thirdly, results 
indicated that the potential mediator, FMC, was positively associated with FR, B = .157, t(99) = 
5.627, p < .001, on path b. Since effects on all three paths a, b, and c were significant, further 
analyses were used to test if FMC was truly mediating between IC and FR.  
 
Table 2.7. Study 1. Mediation analysis with FR as dependent. 
Effect and Path Variables B 
Coefficient 
SE t p 
IV to MV (Path a) IC → FMC .1963 .0342 5.739 <.001 
Direct Effect of MV on DV (Path b) 
 
FMC → FR .1568 .0279 5.627 <.001 
Total Effect of IV on DV (Path c) IC → FR (not 
considering FMC) 
.0473 .0107 4.409 <.001 
Direct Effect of IV on DV (Path c') 
 
IC → FR .0165 .0108 1.526 .1303 
Partial Effect of Control Variables on 
DV 
Age → FR .0517 .0172 3.010 .0033 
Gender → FR .3810 .1877 -2.030 .0451 
    Bias corrected 95% 
confidence interval* 
Indirect Effect of IV on DV through 
MV (Path ab) 
IC→ FMC → FR .0308, 
.0302* 
.0093* .0157 to .0534 
*Bootstrapped estimates (1000 resamples)  
 
Further multiple regression results indicated that the direct effect of IC on FR became non-
significant, B = .016, t(99) = 1.526, p = .130, when controlling for FMC (path c’), thus 
suggesting full mediation of the effect of IC through FMC. The indirect path ab was also tested 
using the bootstrapping method with bias-corrected confidence estimates (MacKinnon, 
Lockwood, & Williams, 2004; Preacher & Hayes, 2008). In the present study, the 95% 
confidence interval of the indirect effects was obtained with 1000 bootstrap resamples (Preacher 
& Hayes, 2008). Results of the mediation analysis confirmed the mediating role of FMC in the 
relation between IC and FR, with B = .030, CI = .0157 to .0534: the confidence interval did not 
contain zero. Figure 2.4 displays the results. 
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Figure 2.4. Mediation model of IC and FR through FMC (B coefficients are shown with 
probabilities: ns not significant, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3.3.2 Figurative detail as dependent. Secondly, I performed the same analyses with 
figurative detail as dependent (Table 2.8). Multiple regression analyses were again used initially 
to assess each component of the proposed mediation model. First, it was found that IC was 
positively associated with FD, B = .104, t(99) = 2.909, p = .005, directly on path c when the 
effects of other, possibly mediating, variables were not taken into account (Figure 2.5). It was 
also found that IC was positively related to FMC on path a, B = .196, t(99) = 5.739, p < .001, and 
indeed that the potential mediator, FMC, was positively associated with FD on path b, B = .516, 
t(99) = 5.563, p < .001. Since effects on all three paths a, b and c were significant, I therefore 
next tested mediation. 
 
FMC 
IC 
FR 
.1963*** .1568*** 
.0473*** (.0165ns) 
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Table 2.8. Mediation analysis with FD as dependent. 
Effect and Path Variables B 
Coefficient 
SE t p 
IV to MV (Path a) 
 
IC → FMC .1963 .0342 5.7387 <.001 
Direct Effect of MV on DV (Path 
b) 
 
FMC → FD .5159 .0927 5.5631 <.001 
Total Effect of IV on DV (Path c) IC → FD (not 
considering FMC) 
.1036 .0356 2.9099 .0045 
Direct Effect of IV on DV (Path 
c') 
 
IC → FD .0023 .0360 .0645 .9487 
Partial Effect of control Variables 
on DV 
Age → FD .1482 
 
.0572 2.5925 .0110 
Gender → FD 1.9490 .6247 3.1201 .0024 
    Bias corrected 95% 
confidence interval* 
Indirect Effect of IV on DV 
through MV (Path ab) 
IC → FMC → FD .1012, 
.1007* 
.0328* .0470 to .1824 
*Bootstrapped estimates (1000 resamples) 
 
Further regression results indicated that the direct effect of IC on FD, path c’, became non-
significant, B = .002, t(99) = .065, p = .949, when controlling for FMC, therefore suggesting full 
mediation. Second, the indirect path ab was tested using the bootstrapping method as described 
above. Result showed that the indirect effect of IC on FD through FMC had a 95% confidence 
interval which did not include zero, B = .101, CI = .0470 to .1824. Thus the mediation role of 
FMC was again confirmed.  
 
Figure 2.5. Mediation Model of IC and FD through FMC (B coefficients are shown with 
probabilities: ns not significant, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FMC 
IC FD 
.1963** 
 
.5159**
* 
.1036** (.0023ns) 
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2.3.3.3 Visual realism as dependent. Finally, multiple regression analyses were again 
initially used to calculate each component of the proposed mediation model with visual realism 
of drawing as dependent (Table 2.9). First, it was found that a significant negative association 
existed between IC and visual realism when potential mediators were not considered, path c:  B = 
-.051, t(64) = -3.814, p < .001. However, the result also showed that IC was significantly and 
positively related to FMC on path a: B = .133, t(64) = 3.077, p = .003. Thirdly, results indicated 
that the potential mediator, FMC, was negatively associated with visual realism on path b: B = -
.049, t(64) = -1.226, p = .225. Statistically this was not significant, throwing doubt on the 
hypothesis that in this instance FMC played a mediating role.  
Testing the mediation more directly, it was first found that, when FMC was included in the 
analysis, the direct effect of IC on realism on path c’ IC remained significant, with only a very 
small fall in the value of B: B = -.045, t(64) = -3.114, p = .003. This again suggests that FMC 
had little mediation effect on relationship between IC and VR. Finally, the test of path ab using 
bootstrapping as above yielded a 95% confidence interval, which included zero, showing that the 
effect of IC on VR through FMC was not significant. In other words, the result showed that the 
effect of IV on DV (c’ path) controlling for the effect of FMC was statistically significant while 
the effect of IV on DV via the potential mediator was not. Hence, the influence of IC on VR is 
not mediated by FMC, meaning that IC has by far the majority of the influence on visual realism 
directly (Figure 2.6).
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Table 2.9. Mediation analysis with visual realism as dependent. 
Effect and Path Variables B 
Coefficient 
SE t p 
IV to MV (Path a) IC → FMC .1327 .0431 3.0775 .0031 
Direct Effect of MV on DV (Path b) FMC → VR -.0486 .0397 -.1.2257 .2251 
Total Effect of IV on DV (Path c) IC → VR (not 
considering 
FMC) 
-.0512 .0134 -3.8138 .0003 
Direct Effect of IV on DV (Path c') 
 
IC → VR -.0447 .0144 -3.1136 .0028 
Partial Effect of Control Variables on DV Age → VR -.0520 
 
.0245 -2.1236 .0378 
Gender → VR -.0470 .2568 -.1830 .8554 
    Bias corrected 95% 
confidence interval* 
Indirect Effect of IV on DV through MV 
(Path ab) 
IC→FMC→VR -.0065, 
.0073* 
.0068
* 
-.027   to  .0015 
*Bootstrapped estimates (1000 resamples) 
 
Figure 2.6. Mediation model of IC and VR through FMC (B coefficients are shown with 
probabilities: ns not significant, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.4 Discussion 
Overall, the results show that there are widespread associations among IC, FMC and all 
three drawing measures (as well as age). Regression and mediation analyses further 
demonstrated that, when FR and FD were considered as dependents, the effect of IC was 
positive, and mediated through FMC. By contrast, when VR was taken as the dependent, the 
  
 
 
FMC 
IC VR 
.1327** 
-.0486ns 
-.0512*** (-.0447**) 
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effect of IC was negative, and not mediated through FMC. This then suggests that it is indeed 
unwise to talk generally about factors affecting drawing skill without considering what particular 
skill is being referred to. We now discuss these findings. 
2.4.1 Predictors of figurative representation and detail  
In section 2.1.2 I made predictions which concerned the relationships between IC and 
FMC on the one hand and FR and FD on the other. The findings of Study 1 have provided strong 
evidence of relationships between IC, FMC and these drawing skills in early childhood. After 
controlling for age and gender, mediation analysis using regression indicated that the 
relationships between IC and FR and FD were completely mediated by FMC, which is consistent 
with the Motor Development account. Recall that (section 1.6) this account proposes that, in 
order to draw skilfully, a child needs good FMC (Lange-Küttner, 2008; Toomela, 2002). It 
further proposes that IC is related to FMC, something known to be the case in older children and 
adolescents (Rigoli et al., 2012). The combination of those two proposals yields an account 
where IC would predict drawing skill mediated through FMC, which is indeed what my findings 
have supported. By the same token this result does not support either the Symbolic Competence 
or the Behavioural Inhibition account, both of which predict a direct link between IC and one or 
the other or both of these drawing skills.   
The Symbolic Competence account (section 1.5.5) proposes that the ability of children to 
make the transition from non-figurative to figurative drawing is linked to effective IC. In detail, 
this account proposes that IC is related to the development of symbolic understanding which in 
turn leads to the initiation of figurative drawing (Riggs et al., 2013). Thus it actually predicts that 
the effect of IC on drawing skill is mediated through symbolic competence, rather than any form 
of motor control. Since, however, in the present study symbolic competence was not measured 
and included in the models tested, this account would be supported by a direct relationship 
between IC and FR. However, the data did not support this account since there was no direct link 
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between IC and children’s performance on the figurative representation scale, once FMC, gender 
and age were taken into account.  
The Behavioural Inhibition account predicts that children’s drawing skill progresses by 
inhibiting more immature drawing behaviour. Hence it suggests a direct impact of IC on FR, not 
mediated by any other variable: children simply need the ability to directly inhibit drawing 
behaviour that was established before (Golomb, 1992; Cox, 1993; Ebersbach et al., 2011; Morra, 
2008; Panesi & Morra, 2016; Riggs et al., 2013). My finding however was that there was no 
direct link between IC and FD or FR (once other variables were taken into account). The current 
result therefore again failed to support the Behavioural Inhibition account.  
A different suggested explanation for a relationship between IC and FR is that FR 
measures such as that used in the current study, based on two types of drawing tasks (free 
drawing from memory and drawing from real objects), are in part assessing the child's ability to 
carry out a task according to the instructions given, which also needs IC for success. In any event, 
this direct connection of IC with FR was not supported by the finding of the present study. 
Indeed IC was not independently related to figurative drawing on FD either (the latter being in 
the present study measured from drawings produced exclusively from memory). 
2.4.2 The relationship between IC and FMC  
In Study 1 there is further an observed relationship between IC and FMC in the data, 
irrespective of drawing skill. This result constitutes an important finding in itself. In previous 
studies there was evidence for the relationship between FMC and aspects of the Executive 
Function, such as IC, in older children and adolescents who had been diagnosed with 
Developmental Coordination Disorder (Leonard & Hill, 2015). There is also some evidence that 
IC and FMC are related in typically developing infants (Gottwald et al., 2016; St. John et al., 
2016), and in 5- and 6-year-olds (Livesey et al., 2006). The result of my study however offers the 
first evidence for a relationship between IC and FMC in typical 3- and 4-year-olds, i.e. in the 
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period when IC is developing most rapidly (Garon et al., 2014; Johansson, Marciszko and 
colleagues, 2015; Petersen, et al., 2016; Simpson & Riggs, 2005; Wiebe et al., 2012).  
As we outlined in section 2.1.1, while there are various sources of evidence for a 
relationship between EFs, such as IC, and motor control abilities, such as FMC, there is no 
agreement on the direction of any relationship between them. Some theories suggest that they 
simply develop together (Thelen et al., 2001), others that FMC leads to IC (Von Hofsten, 2004). 
There has been little attention to the third possibility that IC might lead to FMC, especially in 
typical children in early childhood. Yet the findings of Study 1 are consistent with this.  
Study 1 is however correlational, so cannot definitively prove a direct effect of IC on 
FMC. One interpretation could be that better IC does indeed cause FMC to improve. A second 
explanation could be that the concept of ‘embodied cognition’ accounts for FMC and IC 
developing together in the one body of each child. It should be noted in this connection, 
however, that, as was seen in the regression results (Table 2.6), the relationship between IC and 
FMC is highly significant even when the effect of age on FMC is controlled for, and the betas for 
IC are greater than those for age. The relationship between IC and motor control is further 
explored in Study 2, and will be further discussed in the General Discussion in Chapter 5. 
2.4.3 Predictors of visual realism of drawing  
The third area of prediction presented in 2.1.2 concerned IC and FMC in relation to VR as 
the dependent variable. In this instance, it is the prediction of the Behavioural Inhibition account 
which is apparently supported, since a direct link was found between IC and VR, not one 
mediated through FMC. The relationship was however negative. While not strictly contradicting 
the Behavioural Inhibition account, this was counter to what we had expected given that the 
overwhelming burden of previous research suggested that VR exhibits progression from 
intellectual to visual realism with age, rather than the reverse. Hence IC was expected to show a 
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positive relationship with VR, by enabling greater inhibition of the immature style (intellectual 
realism). This aspect of the result will be examined in detail later below. 
With respect to the other two accounts, it should be recalled that the inclusion of VR was 
something of a novelty in the present study, so it was not entirely clear what precise predictions 
they would offer in relation to it. Based on the reasoning offered in 2.1.2, it could be argued that 
the Symbolic Competence account in this case would predict that, since the demands placed on 
symbolic understanding do not differ between drawing visually and intellectually, no 
relationship would be found between symbolic understanding and VR. Since symbolic 
understanding was not measured in the present study, however, this prediction becomes a 
prediction of a direct link between IC and visual realism, which indeed was found for VR as 
dependant (though not for FR, as we saw above). Once again, however, it is anomalous that the 
relationship between IC and VR is negative, for the same reason as stated above.  
The finding of a direct link between IC and drawing realism must also be considered in 
relation to the Motor Development account. Again it is not entirely clear what this account 
predicts for VR. If it predicts a link mediated through FMC, as it does for FR and FD, then it is 
clearly not supported. It was argued in 2.1.2, however, that this account might not make that 
prediction for realism, since realism is not a drawing variable which entails obvious implications 
for motor skill demands in the way that FD and FR clearly do. Since it does not appear to require 
any difference of motor skill to draw an intellectually realistic picture or a visually realistic one, 
possibly this account would not expect FMC to be involved in this instance. In any event, it is 
clearly the latter position that is supported.  
To my knowledge these are new findings since nobody previously considered this full set 
of variables in this way. Riggs and colleagues (2013) for example only included age, IC and FR 
and FD. The results strongly suggest that drawing skills should no longer be spoken of as if they 
constitute a homogeneous construct. Rather, FD and FR constitute qualities of children’s 
 
 
82 
drawing skill which require good motor skill more than cognitive ability, while the reverse is 
true of VR. The FR and FD measures firstly do not involve such conceptually challenging 
instructions to the children, since the former in part, and the latter totally, is assessed from 
drawing produced entirely from memory. Being asked to draw a mug or a house from memory 
(when no specific exemplar is in view in the context at the time) is more straightforward than 
being asked to draw exemplars in view because the child is directed to use the only information 
source which he has available. In the VR case, where the instructor asks the child to draw the 
object “exactly as you see it”, memory / mental representation is inevitably also present so there 
are always two potentially competing information sources rather than just one. The child has to 
understand the instruction more precisely and pay greater attention during drawing. Motor 
control skill will not help with that.  
Secondly FR and FD target children's ability to draw something showing distinctive 
features and details of which the child must not only possess a mental representation, but also 
have the motor skill to actually draw. Hence, motor control skills are as important as IC, if not 
more so, in order to obtain higher FD and FR scores. VR however is not scored with attention to 
picture quality in terms of figurative representation or detail, but simply for whether it in any 
way shows intellectual or visual realism. Hence it is more a measure of the child’s cognitive 
representation of what they are drawing (what they see or what they recall) than of their motor 
skill in executing the drawing. Thus there are multiple reasons why IC might have a direct effect 
on VR but only have an effect mediated through FMC on FR and FD.  
Furthermore, research into attentional processes in children's drawing has shown that 7-
year-olds barely look more than once at the objects to be drawn, whilst 14-year-olds look more 
often, suggesting that attention increases with age (Mitchelmore, 1978). If this applied at the 
younger age group of the current study, and given that attention is associated with IC rather than 
FMC, this also could explain why IC has a direct effect on realism but not on FR and FD, which 
 
 
83 
were scored partly or totally from drawings where no objects were presented to be drawn, but 
rather memory alone was relied upon. In another study, however, increasing attention in 5- to 8-
year-old children did not seem to have a significant effect on drawing performance (Cox, 1991), 
although possibly this was due to the precise instructions being different from those in the 
present study. In that study, when children were presented with a partially occluded ball task, 
they were interrupted after they had drawn the first ball so that their attention could be drawn 
towards the appearance of the second ball. This had no effect on drawing performance however 
(Cox, 1991). Since the increased attention was unspontaneous, it is possible that children did not 
know the reason behind it and thus did not benefit from it. It is also possible that drawing the 
child's attention to the occluded object increased the child's belief that they need to draw the 
complete contour of the second ball. In the current study, however, there were no further 
instructions after the initial ones. Clearly more research is required to investigate the role of 
attentional processes in children's drawing. 
Thus, although my finding for VR might appear initially unexpected, in not involving 
FMC, it can be explained as follows. Visual realism of drawing is a construct which could be 
seen as fundamentally cognitive rather than motor in nature, and it is measured by consideration 
of what the child was trying to draw rather than how skilfully they drew it. Hence it is perhaps 
not unexpected that FMC does not play a key role in predicting scores for VR. IC on the other 
hand by its nature would be expected to affect both cognitive and motor functions. I would 
therefore propose a crucial modification to the Motor Development account of drawing skill 
development, so as to explicitly limit its scope. It should not be taken to apply to measured 
aspects of drawing skill such as VR which depend primarily on the child’s conceptualisation of 
what they are drawing and where there is no measurement of how finely they control their 
actions when executing the drawing.  
 
 
84 
We now return to the issue of the IC – VR relationship being negative. As I have indicated, 
my results show that there was indeed a direct link between IC and VR, with FMC, age and 
gender taken into account. This finding therefore superficially offers support for the Behavioural 
Inhibition account. However, that account would be standardly taken to predict that, in order to 
score higher for visual realism (what they see), children have to suppress earlier habits of 
drawing with intellectual realism (what they know). This implies that as IC increases so should 
VR. In fact, although the direct relationship between IC and realism in the present data is highly 
significant and not diminished by including FMC as a mediator, it is negative rather than positive. 
Thus the Behavioural Inhibition account seems not to be in fact supported, and neither is any 
plausible prediction based on the other two accounts. 
There is, however, a line of reasoning which allows us to regard the Behavioural Inhibition 
account as in fact fully supported. We have only to show that the progression which we assumed 
to exist from intellectual to visual realism is incorrect, and the progression is in fact from visual 
to intellectual. With that assumption, the finding is entirely consistent with the scenario of the 
earlier habit (drawing with visual realism) being inhibited so that the later one (drawing with 
intellectual realism) can emerge. Hence, we now consider whether such an assumption has any 
plausibility. 
The assumption that stronger IC and older age would lead children to draw more visually 
realistically had been made in Study 1 because it is very widely agreed that visual realism is the 
adult target mode of drawing, and not intellectual realism (Crook, 1985; Freeman, 1980; 
Ebersbach et al., 2011; Riggs et al., 2013). According to Luquet’s (1927/2001) theory of drawing 
development (and as observed in subsequent research, e.g. Chen and Holman 1989, Cox 1991), 
however, the shift from intellectual realism to visual realism occurs only around eight years of 
age, much later than the age of the children in the present study. Thus, it is possible that younger 
children, such as those in the current study, may use their inhibition in a different way, to 
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promote intellectual realism rather than to suppress it, or perhaps to suppress an earlier visual 
realism. This leads to the intriguing possibility that realism progresses, not in a linear pattern 
with age and IC, but in a U-shape. 
It is possible to speculate that, maybe at age three to four years, children are suppressing 
the tendency to draw with visual realism, which they did when they first emerged from 
scribbling, at a time when they did not yet possess fixed schemata/categories which represent all 
of what they see (e.g., a mug is not yet ‘made a mug’ by its handle). Rather, they first have to 
learn to see the world as categories of things, which also have names, and exist, as mental 
constructs, so as to draw intellectually, and then they have to learn that the convention is to draw 
what one sees, even where exemplars of categories are obscured. Thus they revert to visual 
realism again, evidencing an apparent U-shaped development. In terms of IC then they would 
pass through three stages: first they have to inhibit a pre-potent response to scribble in order to 
draw representationally what they see; then they inhibit the pre-potent response of drawing what 
they see to draw using their newly formed mental categories, intellectually; then finally they 
inhibit the pre-potent response of drawing what is in their mind to draw what they see, visually, 
in tasks where that is required.  
In other words, possibly children start with visual realism, then move to intellectual 
realism, around 3 and 4 years of age, and then finally move to visual realism again  (Simpson et 
al., 2018). Thus in the present study, due to the age band chosen, I have perhaps captured 
children who are still largely in the first part of the U- progression, so appearing to move towards 
more intellectual realism as age and IC increase. This hypothesis needs to be tested with a wider 
age band of children, and that is the focus of Study 3.  
2.4.4 Background variables  
There was overwhelming confirmation of previous research with respect to the role of age, 
which everywhere was significantly and positively related to IC, FMC and the measures of 
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drawing skill. Multiple regression analysis for example clearly showed that IC develops with 
age, consistent with previous studies (e.g., Welsh, Pennington & Groisser, 1991; Willoughby, 
Blair, Wirth & colleagues, 2012). Gender, by contrast, produced some unexpected findings in 
that it was often significantly related to figurative representation and detail, though not to visual 
realism, in analyses where the effects of other variables were controlled for. The prevailing 
pattern was of girls outperforming boys. There was no significant correlation of gender with IC 
or FMC, however, so the reasons for this intriguing relationship must await further research in 
the future. 
2.4.5 Conclusion 
  In conclusion, Study 1 has produced some suggestive and original findings, especially in 
two respects:  firstly, the mediation of the effect of IC on FD and FR through FMC, rather than 
the effect of IC being direct, and secondly the fact that the effect of IC on VR is not only direct 
rather than mediated through FMC, but also negative, evidencing increasing intellectual realism. 
In order to pursue these two results further, I therefore designed two follow-up studies, which 
comprise the rest of this thesis. The first (Study 2) considered in more detail the effect of IC on 
FMC, the mediator for two of the three dependent variables, without being concerned with 
drawing: in particular, it addresses the interrelationships between IC, FMC and gross motor 
control (GMC). The second (Study 3) is concerned with testing the hypothesis of a U-shaped 
relationship between age and realism of drawing, which was mentioned above, without being 
concerned further with IC, GMC or FMC. 
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Chapter 3.  How are IC, fine motor control, 
gross motor control, and IQ associated in 
preschool development? 
 
3.1 Introduction 
As discussed earlier in chapter 1 (Section 1.6), inhibitory control (IC) and fine motor 
control (FMC), and indeed gross motor control (GMC), have often been studied separately in 
young children, but there is an increasing awareness and understanding of the close relationship 
between these abilities in development (Diamond, 2000). Recently, researchers have especially 
shifted their focus to the influence of IC on FMC and to an extent on GMC (e.g. Livesey, Keen, 
Rouse, & White, 2006; St. John et al., 2016). Evidence suggesting that IC is linked to the 
improvement of both types of MC is, however, limited in early childhood studies of typical 
children.  
A few recent studies did find such a relationship in typical 18-month-old infants (Gottwald 
et al., 2016; St. John, Estes, Dager et al., 2016). Gottwald and colleagues (2016), for example, 
found an association between IC and a measure of motor planning (but not more general 
measures of motor control). A relationship has also been found between IC and FMC in 12-
month-olds and with both FMC and GMC in 24-month-olds (St. John et al., 2016). Furthermore, 
there is evidence for an association between IC and FMC in 5- to 6-year-olds (based on one of 
two inhibitory measures used – Livesey et al., 2006). The relationship between IC and MC has 
not however previously been studied in typical 3- and 4-year-olds, aside from Study 1, reported 
in the previous chapter, which was however limited in its scope to FMC, rather than also 
considering GMC. This is despite the fact that IC is investigated most frequently in this age band. 
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The purpose of the current study therefore was to fill a research gap by investigating this three 
way IC-FMC-GMC relationship in early childhood (range 3- to 5- year olds).  
As explained in chapter 2 the aim of Study 1 was to investigate the relationship between 
IC, FMC and Drawing Skills in young children. Among its findings, that study provides to my 
knowledge the first evidence for an association between IC and FMC in 3 and 4 years olds 
(typical developing children). Given the fact that the relationship between IC and GMC is also 
under-researched in this age group of typically developing children (chapter1, Section 1.6), I 
therefore proposed in my second study to follow up the relationship between IC and MC in this 
age group in more detail (without consideration specifically of drawing skills).  
3.1.1 IQ and its relationship with MC and IC  
In the current study, the possible influence of IQ is also taken into account, since there 
exists some evidence of relationships in children between IQ and both EF (including IC) and 
MC. Arffa (2007) for instance found evidence of relationship between IQ and EF, including 
within the latter an IC measure (the colour word Stroop test), in 6- to 15-year-olds. To explain 
such findings, a number of studies have suggested that IQ affects EFs, including IC, because 
individuals with higher IQ have the capability to activate more widely distributed regions of the 
brain which are specialized in relation to task performance, and so are able to process 
information more efficiently (Neubauer & Fink, 2009; Shaw, 2007; Van den Heuvel, Stam, Kahn 
& Hulshoff Pol, 2009). Indeed, some recent event-related fMRI studies have identified a 
distinctive pattern of processing in participants with high IQ who, in a cognitive set-shifting task, 
were able to involve brain regions which were more distributed, but important for successful 
performance (Graham et al., 2010). Recent literature reviews (Kelly & Garavan, 2005; Neubauer 
& Fink, 2009) also suggest that involvement of a wider set of regions of the brain in a given task, 
by more intelligent individuals, may be due to their greater efficiency in inhibition of other brain 
regions.  
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With respect to the relationship between IQ and MC, Smits-Engelsman and Hill (2012) 
reported some relationship between these in both typical and atypical children, albeit only 19% 
of the variance in MC was explained by IQ. Kenny, Hill and Hamilton (2016) also reported a 
significant positive correlation between (nonverbal) IQ and MC in 4- to 12- year old children. 
Furthermore, Roebers, Röthlisberger, and colleagues (2014), found significant correlations 
among FMC, IQ and EF (in which IC was included) in typical 5- and 6-year-olds.  
It is notable, however, that such studies once again usually target children older than the 
preschoolers tested here. Furthermore, the MC-EF-IQ relationships are often considered within a 
fuller model, where they function as predictors of some other dependent variable, such as school 
achievement or imitation skill. In addition, IC is not usually considered separately from other EF 
components. Hence I deemed it valuable to include IQ in the present study, where typical 
children younger than 5 years of age are considered, and the inter-relationships between MC 
(both FMC and GMC), IC, and IQ can be revealed regardless of any other variables which they 
may predict. 
3.1.2 Overview of Study 2  
Study 2 had two main aims. First, I wished to examine what specific relationships could be 
found between different subsets of motor skills (i.e. GMC and FMC) and IC in typical 
developing children aged 3 to 5 years old. Second, I wished to confirm that the association 
between IC and MC could not be explained by general intelligence (IQ). The current study 
therefore answers the following research questions. Does the relationship between IC and FMC 
found in Study 1 extend to GMC? If so, how?  Can the association between IC and FMC be 
explained by general intelligence (IQ)? 
In this correlational study, age was ascertained from teacher reports and gender by 
researcher observation. GMC was quantified through nine tasks selected from the Gross Motor 
Quotient of the Peabody Developmental Motor Scale (PDMS-2, Wang, Liao & Hsieh, 2006). 
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Three tasks were taken from each of the subscales: the Stationary (sustaining stationary control 
of the whole body), Locomotion (moving the whole body), and Object Manipulation (catching 
and throwing) subscales (See Table 3.1).  
FMC was measured through six tasks taken from The Fine Motor Quotient of the PDMS-2. 
Three were taken from each of two subscales: the Grasping sub-scale, and the Visual-motor 
Integration sub-scale. Some new tasks, however, were substituted when pilot testing revealed 
that only three of the tasks from the PDMS-2 produced substantial variance (grasping a marker, 
dropping pellets, building steps) in this age range, and so were included in the battery (See Table 
3.2). The remaining three FMC tasks for the main study of Study 2 were taken from Study 1 
(lacing a string, unbuttoning a strip, finger touching).  
Table 3.1. Tasks used to measure GMC in Study 2. 
Gross Motor Quotient 
The stationary sub-scale Locomotion sub-scale Object Manipulation sub-scale 
Standing on one foot (task 23) 
 
Jumping up (task 73) Catching a ball (task 17) 
Standing on tiptoes (task 22) 
 
Jumping forward on one foot (task 72) Hitting a target- overhand (task 18)  
Imitating movements (task 26) 
 
Walking a line backwards (task 78)  Bouncing a ball (task 21) 
 
Table 3.2. Tasks used to measure FMC in Study 2. 
Fine Motor Quotient 
 
The grasping sub-scale Visual-motor integration sub-scale 
Grasping a marker (task 22) Lacing a string (task 58) 
Finger touching (task 26) Dropping pellets (task 74) 
Unbuttoning a strip (task 24) Building steps (task 75) 
 
In order to measure IC, two age-appropriate response inhibition tasks were used, the 
day/night task and the grass/snow task (Petersen et al., 2016), together with the tapping task 
(Diamond & Taylor, 1996). In the day/night task children were asked to say sun when they see 
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the moon card and to say moon when they see the sun card, so an oral verbal response was 
required. In the grass/snow task they were asked to point to the sun card when the researcher said 
moon and point to the moon card when the researcher said sun, so a gestural response was 
elicited. Although the grass/snow task involves a slight motor response, as children need to point 
towards the cued picture, this was deemed to be minimal, as pointing is an easy task for 3-year-
olds. Hence it was not felt that the nature of this task biased the instrument in favour of detecting 
any influence of FMC. The same argument is made for the tapping task in which the child has to 
respond by tapping once when the researcher taps twice and twice when the researcher taps once. 
Finally, IQ was quantified with the British Picture Vocabulary Scale – Second Edition 
(BPVS-2) (Dunn & Dunn, 2009). This is a multiple-choice test of receptive vocabulary 
knowledge, where, for each word tested, four pictures are supplied to choose from. The child’s 
response is gestural, pointing to whichever of the pictures they think represents the meaning of 
the word they heard. Performance on the BPVS is regarded by experts as strongly linked with IQ 
(Dunn & Dunn, 2009; Glenn & Cunningham, 2005) and, as argued above for the grass/snow IC 
task, not to involve any motor challenge to children of the targeted age.  
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants  
One hundred children (55 girls and 45 boys) participated in this study, with age range from 
3 to 4 years and 11 months (mean age of 3 years and 11 months). All were recruited from 
preschools and nurseries in Colchester, UK. All spoke English as their first language, and none 
were reported as having any behavioural or learning difficulties (based on teachers’ reports). The 
sample was of mixed social background and was predominantly white. Just as described in 2.2.1, 
a larger number of children was initially approached in order to obtain the 100 actual participants 
deemed suitable for regression and mediation analyses. 
 
 
92 
3.2.2 Design  
In the current study, a within-subjects correlational design was used. The variables 
measured were IC, FMC, and GMC, along with IQ, age and gender. 
3.2.3 Materials  
The following materials were used for the tasks involved in the study. For the IC 
grass/snow task, two pictures were used: one of the moon in a night sky, and the other of the sun 
in a day sky (height 12cm, width 12cm) (See Figure 3.1:2). For the IC day/night task, a flip-book 
was used, which contained 16 pictures, half of the sun in a day sky and half of the moon in a 
night sky (See Figure 3.1:2). For the IC tapping task two wooden dowels were used (See Figure 
3.1:4). 
For the GMC tasks, I employed materials from the Gross Motor Quotient of the PDMS-2 
(Wang et al., 2006) (See Figure 3.1:3). For the FMC tasks, materials were used from the Fine 
Motor Quotient of the PDMS-2 (Wang et al., 2006) (See Figure 3.1:3).  
Finally, for IQ, the test-book and the performance record from the BPVS-2 (see Figure 
3.1:1) were used. The BPVS has four training plates for four practice words, followed by 14 sets 
of 12 test words, forming a total of 168 words which are arranged in order of increasing 
difficulty.  
3.2.4 Procedure and scoring 
Informed consent had previously been obtained from the parents of participants and the 
school authorities. The measurement sessions involved two people, the researcher (E1) and a 
PhD student with experience of these tasks (E2). E1 administered the tasks while E2 recorded 
the children’s responses. All the children were tested individually, in the morning, either in a 
separate room from their classroom, or in a quiet corner of their classroom. E2 sat next to the 
child to record the responses while E1 sat across the table. The children were asked for their help, 
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and told that they were going to play some fun games. In all, nineteen tasks were administered to 
each child in two separate sessions on different days, each session lasting about 20-30 minutes. 
Tasks followed a fixed order, as shown in Table 3.3. The first session consisted of an IC task (the 
day/night task) and eight PDMS-2 tasks interspersed. The second session consisted of two IC 
tasks (the grass/snow task and tapping task) and seven PDMS-2 tasks interspersed, concluding 
with the BPVS-2. All responses (correct/incorrect) were recorded on paper by E2 for later 
detailed analysis.  
3.2.4.1 MC tasks. This included fifteen tasks from PDMS-2 (See Tables 3.1 and 3.2 and 
Figure 3.1:3), which were presented in a fixed order (See Table 3.3). Eight of these tasks were 
presented in the first session and seven of these tasks were presented in session 2. The tasks were 
administered as follows.  
In Session 1, first came Standing on one foot (numbered 23 in PDMS-2): E1 demonstrated 
standing on one foot with the free leg bent back at the knee with her hands on her hips for five 
seconds. The child was instructed to “put your hands on your hips and stand on one foot like I 
did”. E1 counted the seconds out loud to further encourage the child to balance longer. Next 
came Standing on tiptoes (numbered 22 in PDMS-2): E1 would stand on her tiptoes with her 
hands held overhead for 3 seconds and then instructed the child to “hold your hands over your 
head and stand on your tiptoes like I did”. Third came Imitating movements (numbered 26 in 
PDMS-2): E1 stood three feet away from the child facing them and would say “I am going to 
move my arms and I want you to copy my movements”. A practice movement was done first, but 
using a movement, which would not be used on the test, just to be sure the child understood what 
was asked of him/her. No verbal cues were used while six positions were presented one at a time 
at one second intervals. 
Fourth came Jumping up (numbered 73 in PDMS-2): E1 instructed the child to stand with 
his/her side to the wall and their heels flat on the floor. Then the child was asked to raise their 
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hands overhead and the E1 marked the spot on the wall where the child’s fingertips touched. A 
line 3 inches above the first mark was marked. While pointing to the marked line, the child was 
told to jump up and touch the wall as high as they could. E1 observed the point where the child 
touched the wall. Fifth was Jumping forward on one foot (numbered 72 in PDMS-2): E1 
demonstrated jumping forward on one foot, from a line, without allowing the other foot to touch 
the floor. The child was instructed to “jump forward like I did”. The distance from the line to 
where the back of the heel touched was measured. Sixth came Walking on a line backward 
(numbered 78 in PDMS-2): E1 demonstrated walking backwards on the line with her hands on 
her hips with the toes touching the heels, without stepping off the line. The child was instructed 
to stand at the end of the line and told to “put your hands on your hips and walk backwards 
touching your heels with your toes like I did”. E2 would observe how the child placed their feet 
and the number of steps they could take before moving off the line. Seventh was Catching a ball 
(numbered 17 in PDMS-2): E1 stood five feet in front of the child and asked the child to “catch 
the ball”. The E1 tossed the ball to the child so that it arrived at chest height. Eighth and last in 
session 1 was Hitting a target overhand (numbered 18 in PDMS-2): E1 demonstrated an 
overhand toss of a tennis ball towards a target from a distance of twelve feet. The child is then 
told to “throw the ball and hit the target like I did”. This was done three times.  
In Session 2, first was Bouncing a ball (numbered 21 in PDMS-2): E1 stood five feet away 
from the wall, facing it. She used one hand to bounce a tennis ball so that it bounced once and 
then hit the wall. The child was given the tennis ball to “bounce the ball like I did”. Next came 
Grasping a marker (numbered 22 in PDMS-2): a marker and paper were placed in front of the 
child on the table. E1 asked the child to make a mark. E2 observed how the child held the marker. 
Third was Unbuttoning buttons (numbered 23 in PDMS-2): the button strip was placed in front 
of the child by E1 and the child was instructed to unbutton the strip as fast as they could. Fourth 
came Touching a finger (numbered 26 in PDMS-2): E1 demonstrated touching her thumb with 
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each finger successively at a rate of one touch per second. Children were then instructed to do 
the same thing. 
Fifth was Lacing (numbered 39-40 in PDMS-2): E1 placed a string on the table and 
showed the child a strip containing 6 holes. E1 asked the child to "watch me lace", then E1 held 
the string and strip clearly so that the child could see exactly what she was doing. E1 began to 
lace by placing the string top down through the first hole, and up through the second hole, and 
down through the third hole. E1 showed the child the final result, and then removed the string 
from the strip, and placed these two items on the table in front of the child. Children were 
instructed to "Do it like I did". Children were allowed to take as much time as they needed to 
complete the task. Sixth came Dropping pellets (numbered 41-42 in PDMS-2): E1 placed a bottle 
without a cap and 10 pellets on the table in front of the child. E1 would instruct the child by 
saying “put the food in the bottle as fast as you can”. The child was also told to place one pellet 
in the bottle at a time. Next was Building steps (numbered 51-52 in PDMS-2): E1 placed 6 cubes 
on the table in front of the child and made sure her hands were clearly visible to the child so that 
they could see exactly what was going on. E1 demonstrated building steps with three cubes on 
the bottom row, two cubes on the next row and finally one cube on top. E1 left the steps for a 
short while in front of the child for them to examine. The steps were then disassembled and the 
cubes were placed in front of the child. The child was then instructed to build the steps like E1 
did. 
With respect to scoring, the PDMS-2 scoring criteria were used to assess the motor tasks 
for each child. A score ranging from 0 to 2 was given for each task (maximum of 30 for all tasks). 
The scores for the nine GMC tasks (Table 3.1) were then totalled for each child to form their 
GMC score (out of 18) and their scores for the six FMC tasks (Table 3.2) were then added 
together to form the total FMC score for each child (out of 12). The total scores for MC tasks 
were all calculated by E1. 
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3.2.4.2 IC tasks. In Session 1 the day/night task was administered with an identical 
procedure to that used in Study 1. E1 explained the rules to the children using the pictures of the 
sun and moon. Four practice trials were then administered with feedback given, followed by 16 
test trials, all of which were presented using a flip-book that contained 20 pictures. The oral 
responses were recorded by E2.  
In Session 2 the grass/snow task was also administered with an identical procedure to that 
used in Study 1. The child was told that they were going to play a ‘silly game’. They would have 
to point to pictures. The researcher showed the children pictures of the moon and sun and asked 
the children to name them. They were then instructed to point to the sun picture when the 
researcher said, moon and point to the moon picture when the researcher said sun. They were 
clearly told not to point to the named pictures. The researcher explained the rules by saying the 
two names herself and pointing to the appropriate picture. Children were allowed four practice 
trials in the order of sun, moon, sun, and moon with feedback as to whether they answered 
correctly or not. For example, if the researcher said, moon and the child pointed to the sun, the 
researcher would confirm that the child answered correctly. However, if they pointed to the 
moon, the researcher would explain that this was the incorrect response and explain the correct 
response. Once the practice trials were over, children responded in 16 test trials in the same 
pseudorandom order (ABBABAABBABAABAB) with no comment or feedback. The second 
researcher (E2) coded the children’s responses.  
In the tapping task, children and researcher each had a wooden dowel (see Figure 3.1:4). 
The researcher explained the rule of the game in which the child taps twice with a wooden dowel 
when the researcher taps once and the child taps once when the researcher taps twice. The 
instruction was as follows: “When I tap one time like this (the researcher taps once), I want you 
to tap two times like this (the researcher taps twice). So let’s try that. When I tap one time 
(researcher taps once), you tap…” If the child responded correctly, the child would be praised 
 
 
97 
and would then continue on to the second rule. On the other hand, if the child responded 
incorrectly, the researcher would explain and once again demonstrate the first rule before 
proceeding onto the next. Once again, the second rule would be explained and demonstrated in 
the same way as the first rule. The child was praised if he/she responded correctly or corrected if 
they responded wrongly. The researcher began with two pre-test trials and if the child responded 
incorrectly the rules of the task would be explained once again. The child had to be correct on 
each of the rules at least once during the two practice trials, in order to continue to the testing 
trials. The researcher needed to be sure that the child understood what was asked of him/her. 
However, children who answered correctly in the practice trials had those trials counted as part 
of the testing. This was done to prevent the children becoming bored when given too much 
practice, since they usually easily understood what was required of them. 
A total of 16 tapping trials were conducted in pseudorandom order with each trial being 
composed of the researcher’s taps and the child’s response. Two wooden dowels were used, one 
for the researcher and one for the child. The series of taps by the researcher was as follows: 
1,2,2,1,2,2,1,1,1,2,1,2,1,1,2. During the trials, no feedback was given. 
With respect to overall scoring of IC, given that some other studies (e.g. Livesey et al., 
2006) did not find an unambiguous correlation between scores for different tasks used to 
measure IC, I first ascertained the agreement between the three measures. Even though the mean 
score for the tapping task (5.68/16) was noticeably lower than that for the day/night (9.53) and 
grass/snow tasks (9.92), a Cronbach’s alpha of .783 was obtained across the three measures of IC, 
which is satisfactory. Pairwise correlations between the task scores were also significant, even 
with age partialed out, for the correlation between the day/night and grass/snow tasks, r(98) 
= .640, p < .001, and for the correlation between the day/night and tapping tasks, r(98) = .223,  p 
= .027; only the correlation between the grass/snow and tapping tasks failed to reach significance, 
r(98) = .105, p = .300.  
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Although the agreement was not perfect, a Cronbach alpha of .783 is widely considered to 
be satisfactory, and perfect agreement is not found in the literature either.  Given this evidence of 
substantial agreement between the tasks, I therefore felt justified in using the total of the three 
task scores as a valid measure of IC for each participant. A total score out of 48 was therefore 
given to each child depending on their correct responses given in the three IC tasks, which of 
course reflects their tapping task score somewhat less than the other two scores.  
Figure 3.1. Materials used in Study 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.4.3 BPVS-2 tasks. The BPVS-2 was the last task in Session 2. For each item, the child 
was shown a page with four simple line drawings and they were instructed to point to the 
representation which matched the meaning of the stimulus word spoken by E1 the best.  
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The test-book (see Figure 3.1:1) was placed in front of the child who was asked, "Where is 
X?” avoiding using the word the so as not to cue the part of speech of the word, i.e. whether the 
item was a noun or not (Dunn and Dunn, 2009). The results were recorded in the Performance 
Record. 
The standard procedure for children under the age of eight years was followed, beginning 
with the researcher telling the child: "I want you to look at some pictures with me. See all the 
pictures on this page". The researcher pointed to each of the four pictures in Training Plate A and 
then said: "I will say something, and then I want you to put your finger on the picture of what I 
have said. Let's try one. Put your finger on 'ball'." When the child responded correctly, without 
any help, the researcher says Good and then continued to Training Plate B. On the other hand, if 
the child points to the incorrect picture, the researcher showed them the correct response and 
says "that was a good try, but let’s try again." The researcher could help as much as required 
until the child responded correctly, allowing continuation to the next Training Plate. If the child 
responded correctly to the second training word in Training Plate A, without any help, the 
researcher continued onto Training Plate B. However, if the child's response was incorrect, the 
researcher once again points to the correct response and give as much help as needed for the 
child to reach the correct response. On the other hand, if the child kept giving incorrect responses 
and it was clear that they could not perform the task, the testing was discontinued and a note of 
this was written on the Performance Record. 
The children who participated in the study were of a young age; hence I began the test with 
the first set of words, of the easiest level offered in the test. The test continued until the child 
answered 8 or more out of one of the sets of 12 items incorrectly, at which point the test was 
stopped. 
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With respect to scoring, the total number of correct answers constituted the 'Raw Score' 
which was used in the statistical calculations. Using the norm tables provided by the BPVS-2 
(Dunn and Dunn, 2009), a standardised score was calculated together with the age equivalent. 
Table 3.3. Overall task order in Study 2 (showing optimum age suitability in months for 
PDMS-2 tasks). 
Session 1 Session 2 
1. Standing on one foot (45-46) 1. Unbuttoning (41-42) 
2. Jumping up (45-46) 2. Dropping pellets (41-42) 
3. Catching a ball (44-45) 3. Grass/snow task 
4. Grasping a marker (41-42) 4. Imitating (59-60) 
5. Day/night task 5. Walking a line backward (51-52) 
6. Lacing (39-40) 6. Bouncing a ball (51-52) 
7. Standing on tiptoe (43-44) 7. Tapping task 
8. Jumping forward on one foot (43-44) 8. Touching a finger (53-54) 
9. Hitting a target overhand (43-44) 9. Building steps (51-52) 
 10. BPVS task 
 
3.2.5 Choice of Statistics 
 
For similar reasons to those given in relation to the previous study, I elected first to explore 
the relationships between all the included variables through simple bivariate correlation. Since, 
however, interrelationships between more than two variables at a time needed to be taken into 
account, partial correlation was also used, and then multiple regression, which allowed me to  
assess the relationship between each of five predictors and any potential dependent (IC, FMC, or 
GMC), with inter-correlations between predictors controlled for. Once again, indirect 
relationships were also of interest, so a set of mediation analyses was also conducted using a 
macro within SPSS as described for Study 1. These were used to explore which of the three 
types of control of interest (IC, FMC, GMC) might best be seen as predictor, mediator or 
dependent with respect to the others.  
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3.3 Results 
As described earlier, the aim of Study 2 was to assess the links between age, fine motor 
control (FMC) and gross motor control (GMC) and the development of inhibitory control (IC) in 
early childhood, taking account also of age, gender and IQ. Table 3.4 provides descriptive 
statistics for five of the variables. I performed a variety of analyses in order to illuminate the 
relationships among the six variables, including simple bivariate correlation, multiple regression, 
and mediation analysis. 
Table 3.4. Descriptive statistics for Study 2. 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
Age in months 100 36 59 48.39 7.809 
IQ 98 0 56 26.87 15.065 
GMC 100 0 17 7.04 3.736 
FMC 100 0 13 6.78 3.252 
IC 100 0 53 25.17 16.391 
Valid N (listwise) 98     
  
3.3.1 Correlation Analysis 
Bivariate correlations were computed on the total sample of 100 children to investigate the 
relations between the six variables (age, gender, general intelligence (IQ), IC, FMC and GMC) 
in early childhood. Table 3.5 provides the correlations between these variables. From the 
correlation table, it can be seen that all the variables had significant and positive relationships 
with each other, with the exception of gender. 
Table 3.5. Correlations among the variables of Study 2. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1    Age -      
2    Gender -.078 -     
3    IQ   .590** -.017 -    
4    Gross motor control   .675*** -.059 .600*** -   
5    Fine motor control   .659*** -.063 .647*** .750*** -  
6    Inhibitory control   .700*** -.112 .563*** .631*** .749*** - 
 (* p<.05, **p<.01, *** p<.001) 
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3.3.1.1 IC and other variables. The data revealed that IC had a strong positive correlation 
with both FMC, r(98) = .75, p < .001, and GMC, r(98) = .63, p < .001. Indeed, I had expected 
the relationships between performance on IC, FMC and GMC to be positive, where children with 
higher IC performed better on FMC and GMC tasks. In fact the IC-FMC correlation was even 
stronger than that found in Study 1 (r(98) = .635: Table 2.3).  
Furthermore, analysis showed that there was a strong positive correlation between IC and 
general intelligence (IQ) and this correlation was also significant, r(98) = .56, p < .001). In this 
case, a strong positive correlation between preschool children’s response inhibition IC and 
general intelligence is also expected from the literature (See 3.1.1). 
Finally, a strong positive and significant correlation between IC and age was also found, 
which again is as expected, r(98) = .70, p < .001. The gender coefficients are all very low and 
non-significant, consistent with some other studies, which found no gender difference at this age 
(see 2.3.1).  
3.3.1.2 FMC and other variables. The results of the correlation analysis again indicated 
that all four variables (age, IQ, IC and GMC) had a strong positive and significant correlation 
with FMC (Table 3.5): IQ, r(98) = .65, p < .001; GMC, r(98) = .75, p < .001; and age, r(98) 
= .66,  p < .001. These correlations suggest that higher values on the FMC variable were 
associated with higher value on all four variables, as would be expected from the literature. The 
lack of correlation with gender is again not surprising. 
3.3.1.3 GMC and other variables. The results again indicated that there were strong 
positive and significant correlations between GMC and IQ, r(96) = .60, p < .001, and age, 
r(98 )= .68, p < .001. In this case, once again better performance on the GMC task was linked 
with higher scores on the IQ task; also higher values on the GMC variable were associated with 
higher values on the age variable (older children). Once again there was no significant difference 
in GMC between girls and boys. 
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At this point Study 2 replicates the findings of Study 1, in the areas where the same 
relationships were measured in both studies. However, it adds to those findings that GMC and IQ, 
not included in Study 1, are also correlated with all the other variables except gender. However, 
these simple bivariate correlations are misleading, as they do not take account of inter-
correlations among all the variables included. Hence I proceeded to measure relationships in 
ways that do take account of such inter-correlations. 
3.3.2 Partial Correlation Analysis 
The simple bivariate correlations above give us an initial idea of the relationships between 
the six variables in the current study, but have the weakness that each pair of variables is 
considered without attention to the other four. Hence the correlation coefficients do not control 
for wider inter-relationships among the whole set. One simple way to take care of this is by 
calculating partial correlations, which are used to remove the effect of possible confounding 
variables. Partial correlation is an extension of bivariate correlation, which provides a more 
accurate picture of the relationship between pairs of variables by controlling for the effects of 
others.  
Partial correlation coefficients were therefore calculated in order to control for the possible 
effects of potentially confounding variables (age, gender and IQ) on the relationships which were 
of most interest, that is those between IC and FMC, and between IC and GMC. Table 3.6 
demonstrates that, when the variables of age, gender and IQ have been partialed out, there still 
exist significant correlations between IC, FMC and GMC. Strong positive and significant 
correlations were found between IC and FMC, r(91) = .47, p < .001, and between GMC and 
FMC, r(91) = .49, p < .001. However, there was only a weak positive and significant correlation 
between IC and GMC, r(91) = .244, p = .017, when the effects of age, gender and IQ were 
partialed out.  
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At this point it seemed apparent that IC and GMC were not very strongly related, thus only 
weakly supporting the hypothesis of Study 2. Therefore, multiple regression analyses were used 
to explore these relationships further, controlling for all inter-relationships among the variables 
when considering the relationship of each of them with one chosen as a dependent variable.  
Table 3.6. Partial correlations in Study 2. 
Control Variables Variables 1 2 
Age & Gender & IQ 1     Gross motor control - - 
 2     Fine motor control .492*** - 
 3     Inhibitory control .244* .474*** 
(* p<.05, **p<.01, *** p<.001) 
3.3.3 Multiple Regression Analyses  
Multiple regression was conducted taking each of the three focal variables (IC, FMC, and 
GMC) in turn as dependent variables and examining the relationships with the dependent of the 
other variables, regarded as multiple predictors, in each case (Table 3.7). 
In the first analysis, multiple regression analysis using the standard ‘enter’ method was 
conducted, where, IQ, gender, IC, age and FMC were entered as predictor variables and GMC as 
dependent to see whether IQ, gender, IC, age and FMC impact on GMC collectively and 
individually, once the inter-relations among all these predictors are controlled for. The overall 
model explained 63% of variance, which was revealed to be statistically significant, F (5, 92) = 
31.947, p < .001, R = .797, R
2 
Adjusted = .615. The analysis showed that FMC, Beta = .492, t(97) 
= 4.709, p < .001, and age, Beta = .278, t(97) = 2.499, p = .004, both significantly predict GMC. 
However, neither IC, Beta = .014, t(97) = .137, nor gender, Beta = -.013, t(97) = -.200, nor IQ, 
Beta = .110, t(97) = 1.270, significantly predict GMC. This suggests that strong FMC would be 
associated with strong GMC, and that GMC develops with age, as expected, but notably fails to 
find a significant relationship between IC and GMC, contrary to my hypothesis. The lack of 
effect of gender is not surprising given that gender showed no significant bivariate correlations 
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with any variables. The lack of impact of IQ could be seen as due to any effect of IQ (seen in the 
simple correlations) being only due to its correlation with FMC, whose effect is stronger.  
In the second analysis, multiple regression using the standard method was conducted to 
examine whether IQ, gender, IC, age and GMC impact on FMC considered as dependent. The 
overall model explained 70% of variance, which was revealed to be statistically significant, F (5, 
92) = 44.301, p < .001, R = .841, R
2 
Adjusted = .691. The result showed that IC, Beta = .373, 
t(97) = 4.429, p < .001, and GMC, Beta =. 395, t(97) = 4.709, p < .001, and IQ, Beta = .193, 
t(97) = 2.547, p = .013, all significantly predict FMC. However, neither age, Beta = .013, t(97) 
= .151, nor gender, Beta = .018, t(97) = .320, significantly predict FMC.  
In the third analysis, IC was taken as the dependent. The overall model explained 63% of 
variance, which was revealed to be statistically significant, F (5, 92) = 31.187, p < .001, R = .793, 
R
2 
Adjusted = .609. The result showed that both FMC, Beta = .471, t(97) = 4.429, p < .001, and 
age, Beta = .351, t(97) = 3.797, p < .001, significantly predict IC. However, neither GMC, Beta 
= .014, t(97) = .137, nor gender, Beta = -.044, t(97) = -.698, nor IQ,  Beta = .042, t(97) = .472, 
significantly predict IC. The picture that emerges could be summarized in the diagram displayed 
in Figure 3.2. 
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Table 3.7. Multiple regressions of Study 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Significant inter-relations among variables revealed through multiple 
regression analyses in Study 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Dependent variable 
 Inhibitory control Fine motor control Gross motor control 
Predictor Beta t p Beta t p Beta t p 
Age .351 3.80 <.001 .013 0.15 .880 .278 2.95 .004 
Gender -.044 -.698 .487 .018 0.32 .750 -.013 -0.20 .842 
IQ .042 .472 .638 .193 2.55 .013 .110 1.27 .207 
IC - - - .373 4.43 <.001 .014 .137 .891 
FMC .471 4.43 <.001 - - - .492 4.71 <.001 
GMC .014 .137 .891 .395 4.71 <.001 - - - 
Model statistics 
    F (df) 
    R
2
 
    p 
 
31.2 (5, 92) 
.629 
<.001 
 
44.3 (5, 92) 
.707 
<.001 
 
31.9 (5, 92) 
.635 
<.001 
IC GMC FMC 
 
IQ 
Age 
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3.3.4 Mediation Analyses  
The main finding of interest that emerged from the multiple regression analyses was that, 
counter to my hypothesis for Study 2, no significant relationship was found between IC and 
GMC when effects of all other variables were controlled for. This was the case both when GMC 
was treated as a predictor with IC as dependent, and when GMC was treated as dependent and IC 
as predictor.  
Now, from the literature on these variables (1.6), it has often been assumed that IC is prior 
to GMC and FMC in terms of having any effects on each other and on any other variables, as 
indeed was assumed for IC and FMC in Study 1. This, together with the picture seen in Figure 
3.2, suggested that, in order to complete the investigation of the IC relationship with GMC, it 
would be instructive to conduct a mediation analysis to ascertain whether FMC can be 
interpreted as a mediator variable between IC and GMC. However, it could also be argued that, 
despite the appearances of Figure 3.2, it could make more sense to see GMC as a potential 
mediator between IC as independent and FMC as dependent. Hence I also conducted a mediation 
analysis to explore this scenario. Furthermore, as was reviewed in 1.6, there exists also in 
psychology an increasing body of theory and evidence suggesting that the causal relationship 
between cognitive and motor development could be from the latter to the former (e.g. Piek,  
Dawson, Smith & Gasson, 2008) or that both could stem from a third agency (Gottwald et al., 
2016).  
To examine these possibilities, as in Study 1, I followed the recommendations of Shrout 
and Bolger (2002), who suggest a mediation analysis, which includes a bootstrapping procedure 
to compute a confidence interval around the indirect effect (i.e., path ab from the independent 
variable to the dependent through the mediator). If zero falls outside of this interval, significant 
mediation is said to be present. The SPSS macro designed by Preacher and Hayes (2008) was 
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again used to perform all the required analyses, both those using customary multiple regression 
and those using bootstrapping.  
Considering GMC as the dependent variable, as seen in Table 3.8, multiple regression 
analyses showed that IC was positively associated with GMC when the effects of other, possibly 
mediating, variables were not taken into account, B = .057, t(97) = 2.429, p = .017. That effect is 
commonly termed path c. With all predictors taken into account it was also found that IC was 
positively related to FMC, B = .093, t(97) = 5.192, p < .001, on what is called path a. Lastly, 
results indicated that the potential mediator, FMC, was positively associated with GMC, B 
= .576, t(97) = 4.709, p < .001, on path b. Since all three paths a, b, and c showed significant 
relationships, further analyses were used to test if FMC was truly mediating between IC and 
GMC.  
First, further multiple regression results indicated that the direct effect of IC on GMC 
became non-significant, B = .003, t(97) = .137, p = .891, when controlling for FMC (path c’), 
thus suggesting full mediation of the effect of IC through FMC on GMC. The indirect path ab 
was also tested using the bootstrapping method with bias-corrected confidence estimates 
(MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams, 2004; Preacher & Hayes, 2004). In the present study, the 
95% confidence interval of the indirect effects was obtained with 1000 bootstrap resamples 
(Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Results of the mediation analysis confirmed the fully mediating role 
of FMC in the relation between IC and GMC, B = .054; CI = .0307 to .0886. Figure 3.3 displays 
the results. 
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Table 3.8. Mediation analysis with GMC as dependent. 
Effect and Path Variables B 
Coefficient 
SE t p 
IV to MV (Path a) IC → FMC .093 .018 5.192 <.001 
Direct Effect of MV on DV 
(Path b) 
FMC → GMC .576 .122 4.709 <.001 
Total Effect of IV on DV 
(Path c) 
IC → GMC (not 
considering FMC) 
.057 .024 2.429 .017 
Direct Effect of IV on DV 
(Path c') 
IC → GMC .003 .024 .1372 .891 
Partial Effect of Control 
Variables on DV 
Age → GMC .134 .046 2.949 .004 
Gender → GMC -.095 .475 -.200 .842 
IQ→ GMC .028 .022 1.270 .207 
    Bias corrected 
95% confidence 
interval* 
Indirect Effect of IV on DV 
through MV (Path ab) 
IC→ FMC→ GMC .0538, 
.0540* 
.0142
* 
.0307   to  .0886 
*Bootstrapped estimates (1000 resamples) 
 
Figure 3.3. Mediation model of IC and GMC through FMC (B coefficients are shown with 
probabilities: ns not significant, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I next considered the scenario where GMC is the potential mediator and FMC the 
dependent. Considering FMC as the dependent variable, as may be seen in Table 3.9, multiple 
regression analyses showed that IC was positively associated with FMC when the effects of 
other, possibly mediating, variables were not taken into account, path c: B = .093, t(97) = 5.192, 
p < .001. With all predictors taken into account (path a) it was also found that IC was also 
FMC 
IC GMC 
.0933*** 
.0571** (.0033 ns) 
.5763*** 
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positively related to GMC, B = .057, t(97) = 2.429, p = .017. Lastly, results indicated that the 
potential mediator, GMC, was positively associated with FMC, B = .337, t(97) = 4.709, p < .001) 
on path b. Since all three paths a, b, and c were significant, further analyses were used to test if 
GMC was truly mediating between IC and FMC.  
First, further multiple regression results indicated that the direct effect of IC on FMC was 
also significant, B = .0741, t(97) = 4.429, p < .001, even when controlling for GMC (path c’), 
thus not supporting full mediation of the effect of IC through GMC on FMC. The indirect path 
ab was also tested using the bootstrapping method with bias-corrected confidence estimates 
(MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams, 2004; Preacher & Hayes, 2004). In the present study, the 
95% confidence interval of the indirect effects was again obtained with 1000 bootstrap resamples 
(Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Results of the mediation analysis confirmed the mediating role of 
GMC in the relation between IC and FMC, B = .0192; CI = .0012 to .0399, although it is 
noticeable that the lower limit of the confidence interval is very close to zero. Figure 3.4 displays 
the results. Overall, the evidence here is for partial mediation, since paths ab and c’ both yield 
significant effects: IC has a significant impact on FMC both directly and via GMC.  
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Table 3.9. Mediation analysis with FMC as dependent. 
Effect and Path Variables B 
Coefficient 
SE t p 
IV to MV (Path a) IC → GMC .057 .024 2.429   .017 
Direct Effect of MV on DV 
(Path b) 
GMC → FMC .337 .072 4.709 <.001 
Total Effect of IV on DV  
(Path c) 
IC→FMC (not 
considering GMC) 
.093 .018 5.192 <.001 
Direct Effect of IV on DV 
(Path c') 
IC → FMC .074 .017 4.429 <.001 
Partial Effect of Control 
Variables on DV 
Age → FMC 
 
.006 .036 .152 .880 
Gender→FMC 
 
.116 
 
.363 
 
.320 
 
.750 
IQ→ FMC 
 
.041 .016 2.547 .013 
    Bias corrected 
95% confidence 
interval* 
Indirect Effect of IV on DV 
through MV (Path ab) 
IC→ GMC →FMC .0192, 
.0194* 
.0097* .0012   to  .0399 
*Bootstrapped estimates (1000 samples) 
 
Figure 3.4. Mediation model of IC and FMC through GMC (B coefficients are shown with 
probabilities: ns not significant, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thirdly, in order to take account of approaches which view cognitive functions as 
developmental consequences of motor abilities, I conducted a mediation analysis with IC as 
dependent and GMC as independent, and FMC as potential mediator. 
GMC 
IC FMC 
.0571** .3370*** 
.0933*** (.0741***) 
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As shown in Table 3.10, multiple regression analyses showed that IC was positively 
associated with GMC when the effects of other, possibly mediating, variables were not taken 
into account, path c: B = 1.045, t(97) = 2.429, p = .017. With all predictors taken into account 
(path a) it was also found that FMC was positively related to GMC, B = .4144, t(97) = 5.451, p 
< .001. Finally, results indicated that the potential mediator, FMC, was positively associated with 
IC, B = 2.373, t(97) = 4.429, p < .001, on path b. Since all three paths a, b, and c were significant, 
further analyses were used to test if FMC was truly mediating between GMC and IC.  
First, further multiple regression results indicated that the direct effect of GMC on IC was 
not significant, B = .0619, t(97) =.1372, p = .891, in the presence of the other variables (path c’), 
thus supporting a possible mediation of the effect of GMC through FMC on IC. The indirect path 
ab was also tested using the bootstrapping method with bias-corrected confidence estimates 
(MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams, 2004; Preacher & Hayes, 2004). In the present study, the 
95% confidence interval of the indirect effects was again obtained with 1000 bootstrap resamples 
(Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Results of the mediation analysis confirmed the mediating role of 
FMC in the relation between GMC and IC, B = .9833; CI = .4922 to 1.650. Figure 3.5 displays 
the results. Overall, the evidence here is for full mediation, since path ab but not c’ yields a 
significant effect: GMC has a significant impact on IC only via FMC.  
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Table 3.10. Mediation analysis with IC as dependent. 
Effect and Path Variables B 
Coefficient 
SE t p 
IV to MV (Path a) GMC → FMC .414 .076 5.451 <.001 
Direct Effect of MV on DV 
(Path b) 
FMC → IC 2.373 .536 4.429 <.001 
Total Effect of IV on DV 
(Path c) 
GMC→IC (not 
considering FMC) 
1.045 .430 2.429 .017 
Direct Effect of IV on DV 
(Path c') 
GMC → IC .062 .451 .137 .891 
Partial Effect of Control 
Variables on DV 
Age → IC .727 .191 3.796 <.001 
Gender → IC -1.430 2.050 -.698 .487 
IQ→ IC 
 
.045 .094 .472 .638 
    Bias corrected 
95% confidence 
interval* 
Indirect Effect of IV on DV 
through MV (Path ab) 
GMC→ FMC → IC .9833, 
.9947* 
.2847
* 
.4922   to 1.4698 
*Bootstrapped estimates (1000 resamples) 
 
Figure 3.5. Mediation model of GMC and IC through FMC (B coefficients are shown with 
probabilities: ns not significant, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Finally, it is necessary to consider which of the three mediation analyses above is to be 
preferred, since each represents a different model of the possible sequences of effects among the 
variables. If one refers to the model summary statistics for each analysis it is found that all three 
models account for the variance of the DV with high significance (p < .001). The model with 
FMC 
IC GMC 
.4144** 2.3728*** 
1.0453** (.0619ns) 
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GMC as dependent however yields F= 31.95, R
2 
= .6345, adjusted R
2 
= .6417, while the model 
for FMC as dependent yields F = 44.30, R
2
 = .7065, adjusted R
2 
= .6906, and the model with IC 
as dependent gives F = 31.19, R
2
 = .6289, adjusted R
2 
= .6088. Statistically, therefore, the best 
fitting model, with an adjusted R
2
 of .69, is that with IC as main predictor, FMC as dependent 
and GMC as mediator, which as has been seen exhibited both direct and mediated significant 
effects of IC on FMC. I believe that this also represents a plausible cause-effect scenario in real 
life, i.e. that IC impacts on GMC skill and that improvement in GMC skills leads to, rather than 
is a consequence of, development of FMC skills associated with FMC. As Salkind (2005) 
indicates, fine motor control development depends on gross motor control development because 
the former presupposes the ability to control gross movements and body posture. 
Interestingly, the preferred model also exhibits a significant effect of IQ, but not of age. In 
other words, the impact of IC on FMC, both independently and via GMC, occurs within the 3- to 
5-year-old age group of my study without any significant developmental component: IC rather 
than age is what determines differential FMC in these children. IQ, however, does have some 
independent effect (B=. 041). This indeed is greater than the mediated effect of IC on FMC via 
GMC (B = .019) though less than the independent direct effect of IC on FMC (B = .074).  
3.4 Discussion 
Study 1 indicated that IC and FMC are associated in early childhood. Hence, the purpose 
of the current study was primarily to examine this relationship further and to determine whether 
this association extends to GMC (taken up in 3.4.1 and 3.4.2), and secondarily to determine the 
nature of any role played by IQ (3.4.3).  
3.4.1 The direction of the relationship between IC and FMC  
The preferred model in the earlier analyses (3.3.4) appears to support a scenario where IC 
affects FMC. However, on the vexed issue of causality it is necessary to remain cautious. It must 
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be remembered that Study 2 is purely based on correlational research, and that prediction in the 
analyses presented above does not equate necessarily with causality. Hence I now consider 
possible ways in which the key relationship which I have found might be explained. I explore 
first the proposal that good IC might lead to more effective FMC, and second the suggestion that 
in fact FMC leads to IC. Finally I elaborate on how embodied cognition might explain why FMC 
and IC simply develop together.  
One approach to explaining why IC might improve FMC would be to attempt to apply the 
three accounts which I tested in Study 1. That is to say, although these accounts concern possible 
mechanisms which explain how IC might affect drawing skill development, one could reinterpret 
them as potential accounts of why IC might affect FMC development, given that Study 1 showed 
that FMC mediated the effect of IC on two of the three measured drawing skills. 
One of the accounts, however, seems hard to apply to FMC. The Symbolic Competence 
account (Riggs et al., 2013) suggests that IC assists the development of symbolic understanding 
(e.g., Sabbagh, et al., 2006), which in turn means that IC impacts indirectly on any abilities 
which require symbolic understanding. However, actions requiring FMC, such as undoing a 
button, need no symbolic understanding since real objects are directly involved, rather than any 
symbolic representations of them. Hence this does not seem to be a convincing suggestion for 
how IC might impact upon FMC.  
Second, the Behavioural Inhibition account by contrast proposes that development in 
drawing skill occurs through the inhibition of previously established drawing behaviour 
(Ebersbach, et al., 2011; Riggs et al., 2013). Most actions which require FMC, however, do not 
appear to depend on the inhibition of previously established behaviours. If a child cannot undo a 
button, it is not so much that they possess an unsuitable behaviour which needs to be inhibited as 
that they do not possess a coherent, controlled, behaviour at all. 
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A different approach to explaining the relation between IC and MC in this account is to 
consider how preschooler’s IC develops. One scenario compatible with the Behavioural 
Inhibition account is that inhibition strength increases, which prevents inappropriate responses 
(Simpson & Riggs, 2007). Another scenario would be that IC improves through the slowing of 
behaviour, so that more care can be taken to produce the appropriate response (Diamond, 
Kirkham & Amso, 2002). There is in fact evidence that preschoolers complete IC tasks better 
when their response is slowed (e.g., Simpson et al., 2012; although see Barker & Munakata, 
2015 and the response of Ling, Wong & Diamond, 2016).  
The link between IC and some kinds of MC could be explained, then, by the proposal that 
effective IC is the consequence of slowed responding. For example, toddlers who respond more 
slowly show better performance on an MC task requiring some precision (e.g. building a tower 
from blocks); such toddlers do not differ from others in performance on an imprecise MC task, 
however (e.g. placing blocks into a container in no particular pattern, Chen, Keen, Rosander & 
von Hofsten, 2010). In just this way, I found that IC was associated with FMC (e.g. undoing a 
button), an activity which might benefit from unhurried response, but not with GMC (e.g. 
catching a ball), which might not. With respect to drawing, it has similarly been argued (Lange-
Küttner, 2000) that the development of drawing techniques (e.g., linking distinct elements of the 
subject represented) depends on the modification of fast procedural routines. Consistent with this 
proposal, she found evidence that young children do in fact slow down their speed of drawing 
when they produce open rather than closed shapes (Lange-Küttner, 1998). All these findings, 
then, are consistent with the proposal that effective IC improves MC (and some drawing skills) 
by slowing down the response process. 
Moving now to the third account of how drawing skill develops, the Motor Development 
account, it is at once clear that the findings of Study 2 are consistent with it, as were those of 
Study 1 (for two of the drawing skills measured). Recall that the Motor Development account 
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proposed that IC and FMC are associated directly in early childhood and indeed that IC affects 
drawing skill only via FMC. In the present study, after controlling for age, gender and IQ, 
mediation analysis using regression with bootstrapping indicated that a relationship existed 
between IC and FMC both directly and, less strongly, mediated through GMC. 
Explanations of the association of IC with FMC which see IC as leading to FMC are, 
however, not the only possible interpretations. With respect to the suggestion that FMC might 
improve IC, however, it must be noted that the tasks used to measure IC in the present study 
were selected precisely because they make minimal demands on motor skills. The day/night task 
only required a verbal response and while the grass/snow and tapping tasks did require manual 
responses, they were undemanding (e.g., pointing at any area of a picture) and not performed 
under time pressure. Hence it appears most unlikely that effective FMC improved performance 
on the IC tasks due to their motor demands. It remains possible however that while particular 
MC tasks are performed better where children have greater IC (second/preferred model in 3.3.4), 
rather than the reverse, it could also be true that, in terms of developmental change, the 
experience of MC task performance is instrumental in the improvement of IC (compare third 
model in 3.3.4). 
By contrast with the above, the theory of embodied cognition suggests an alternative 
explanation for how the development of MC and EFs are connected, where they each help each 
other and neither has priority. This approach proposes that cognition in humans develops through 
the physical interaction of their bodies with the world (see Marshall, 2016, and Shapiro, 2011, 
for reviews). This idea follows on from earlier work by Piaget (1952), as mentioned in 3.4.1, in 
which the first stage of cognitive development was the sensorimotor stage. Current thinking is 
that later cognitive development occurs in situations where a child is able to act upon the world 
through control of their body (Wilson, 2002). An example is the A not B task where an infant 
has to find something hidden in a new place, after previously retrieving it from somewhere else. 
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In such a task, the child has to use IC and working memory work together with MC to find the 
new location (e.g., Thelen, Schöner, Scheier & Smith, 2001). Such bi-directional interactions 
between EFs and MC are highlighted in Dynamic Systems Theory (e.g., Smith & Thelen, 2003), 
and reflected in the interactions between the regions of the brain which are associated with them 
(e.g., Diamond, 2000; Koziol et al., 2012).  
It remains unclear, however, whether certain aspects of MC are linked more closely with 
EFs than others, and how such linkages change during development. Study 2 suggests that it is 
FMC, but not GMC, which is associated with IC in early childhood. There is however some 
previous research with younger children which showed that GMC is related to IC at 24 months, 
but not at 12 months (St. John et al., 2016). Adopting a dynamic systems approach, it could be 
argued that this shows that different aspects of MC interact with EFs at different ages. For 
instance, the move from crawling to walking (in the second year) may lead to the integration of 
EFs such as IC with GMC. Later, however, FMC comes to the fore as preschoolers focus on 
activities such as dressing and drawing, which require finer motor skills. In order to better 
understand this sequence, a longitudinal approach needs to be adopted in future research. In that 
way a fuller account could be obtained of the development over time of the association found 
between FMC and IC in preschool children. 
3.4.2 The role of IQ.  
Turning to the second aim of Study 2, an effect was found of IQ on FMC, but not on GMC, 
in the presence of IC. This agrees, for example, with Frick and Möhring (2016), who in a study 
of 6-year-olds also found no relationship between GMC and verbal IQ. FMC however was not 
tested in that study, and they measured IC with a fruit colour Stroop task which requires control 
of visual attention rather than of behaviour, so is not close to the type of IC which I focus on, 
which is behavioural.  
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 Roebers and colleagues (2014), by contrast, like the present study, found a significant 
relationship between IQ and FMC in preschool children, and indeed a relationship between EF 
(including IC) and both IQ and FMC. Interestingly, their analysis suggests that FMC could be 
seen as predicting IQ, rather than the reverse. Since, however, in the present study IQ was 
included only in the role of a control variable, this issue will not be pursued further. 
3.4.3 The relationship between IC, GMC and FMC  
With respect to the first aim, the result of Study 2 has provided strong evidence again for 
the relationship between IC and FMC in early childhood, after controlling for age, gender and IQ 
as well as for GMC. The main finding was that IC is indeed directly associated with FMC, but 
only indirectly with GMC, in typical 3- to 5- year olds.  
Previous research has provided strong support for the existence of a relationship between 
MC and EFs in older children and adolescents with DCD (see review in Leonard & Hill, 2015). 
The current result may also be seen as consistent with some studies on the FMC of children with 
learning disabilities (Hartman, Houwen, Scherder & Visscher, 2010). These report evidence of 
EF, including IC, difficulty in children who suffer from motor difficulties, so by implication 
suggest that IC might be related to MC. This however falls short of demonstrating, as I do, an 
actual correlation between degree of MC difficulty and degree of IC limitation. 
There also exists some evidence for a relationship between IC and MC in typically 
developing infants (Gottwald et al., 2016; St. John et al., 2016), 5- and 6-year-olds (Livesey et al., 
2006; Roebers et al., 2014), and adolescents (Rigoli et al., 2012). Livesey and colleagues (2006), 
however, found some association between one measure of IC (a day/night task), but not another 
(a stop/go task), and FMC. This therefore only partially agrees with my finding. Wassenberg and 
colleagues (2005) also found little evidence of “a global relation between cognitive and motor 
performance” (p. 1099) in 5- and 6- year olds, although they did find a significant relationship 
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with MC of a specific IC task (word order). Here again my finding presents more definite 
evidence in favour of an association between IC and MC.  
Most notably, the current study, together with Study 1, for the first time shows evidence 
for an association between IC and FMC in 3- and 4-year-old children, at the stage of 
development when IC in known to develop most rapidly (e.g., Wiebe et al., 2012; Willoughby et 
al., 2011). Furthermore, none of those aforementioned studies examined, as the present one did, 
IC relationships with GMC separately from FMC, nor considered any possible mediating role of 
GMC in relation to IC (or EF more generally) and FMC. 
My finding may further be located more broadly in relation to a fundamental difference of 
view found in psychology concerning the connection between global cognitive and global motor 
performance capabilities of humans. Descartes (1984-1991) for example long ago proposed that 
cognitive processes are to be seen as totally distinct from motor processes (Hatfield, 2003). 
Piaget however more recently took the view that cognitive and motor processes must be seen as 
connected because development of the former relies on development of the latter (Piaget & 
Inhelder, 1966). Nevertheless, an important objection to Piaget’s theory of cognitive 
development is that insufficient consideration was given by it to the young child’s motor 
capabilities (Berger, 1988). Moreover, there appears to be little experimental evidence 
concerning what is often nowadays assumed to be a global relationship between cognitive and 
motor abilities of children (Wassenberg et al., 2005). Churchland (1986, 2002) in fact suggested 
that presenting this whole issue as a dichotomy is in any case a mistake. She rather hypothesized 
that there exists a continuum, which runs from lower (sensorimotor) functions (e.g. grasping and 
visual perception) at one end, to higher cognitive functions (e.g. planning and regulating of 
behaviour) at the other (Churchland, 1986).  
My study then provides evidence for an intimate connection between fairly general, if not 
global, cognitive and motor abilities, supporting a more Piagetian view. I not only demonstrate 
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that IC, a key component of the executive function, which is to be regarded as a global cognitive 
component of the human mind, is associated with the global MC category of FMC (but not 
directly with GMC), but that there is also possibly a more detailed interrelationship between 
these three variables in terms of mediation.  
3.4.4 Conclusion  
Through a series of increasingly sophisticated analyses of the relationships among the six 
variables included in this study I have revealed that IC impacts on FMC predominantly directly, 
though also with a smaller but significant effect mediated through GMC. IQ is also associated 
with FMC, though to a lesser extent than IC.  
Having in Study 2 followed up and illuminated more fully the IC-FMC relationship found 
in Study 1, I next turn in Study 3 to pursuing the precise nature of the age - drawing skill 
relationship suggested in Study 1. 
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Chapter 4. Is the development of visual 
realism in children's drawing linear or U-
shaped? 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter follows up on the findings of the Study 1 in a different direction from that 
pursued in the previous chapter. In Study 3 I leave IC and MC and focus attention instead on age 
and visual realism as a drawing skill. In particular I aimed to investigate a possible explanation 
for the finding in Chapter 2 that, in contrast with the result for figurative representation and 
detail as dependents, age (and IC) correlated significantly negatively with visual realism, despite 
a positive development generally found in the literature (e.g., Jolley and Rose, 2008). As already 
discussed (Chapter 2), this initially puzzling finding could be accounted for if the developmental 
pattern of visual realism in children’s drawing is in fact U-shaped. The first part of this Chapter 
is concerned with the relevant background, in particular Luquet’s (1927) traditional theory of 
children’s drawing, which was adopted as a theoretical framework for Study 3. The second part 
of this Chapter describes Study 3.  
4.1.1 Luquet’s four stages 
There are several frameworks that have been used to explain the processes of drawing and 
its development, such as Perceptual theories (Willats, 1977, 1997), Gestalt theories (Kellogg, 
1970, Arnheim, 1974), and Cognitive development theories (Luquet, 1927; Piaget, 1930, 1956; 
Karmiloff-Smith 1990). For the purpose of this study, I focus primarily on Luquet’s (1927) 
theory for a number of reasons. First, Luquet’s ideas have deeply influenced many later 
researchers (e.g., Costall, 1995, 1997; Cox, 1992; Freeman, 1972, 1980; Golomb, 2002, 2004; 
Light & Barnes, 1995; Milbrath, 1998; Thomas & Silk, 1990; Willats, 1997, 2005). Second, 
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although published 90 years ago, Luquet’s seminal paper was not available in full in English 
until relatively recently (Luquet, 2001). This has enabled Luquet’s ideas to become more widely 
known in an accurate form, rather than in the second-hand summaries, which were available 
before. Third, it provides the clearest account of the development of what is referred to as 
realism of children’s drawing, focused on the distinction between visual and intellectual realism.  
Luquet is credited with proposing that children’s drawing develops through four stages, 
which are considered in turn below. Luquet’s ideas were later incorporated by Piaget into his 
stage theory (Piaget & Inhelder, 1956). Although, studies have shown that development is not 
stages-like in the strict sense that children manifest the characteristics of one stage and lose the 
characteristics of that stage when adopting the characteristics of the next stage (Flavell, 1963). 
Rather, findings show that children’s drawing performance changes gradually and does not 
develop in discrete steps (for reviews, see Cox, 1991, 1992; Freeman & Cox, 1985; Light & 
Barnes, 1995; Thomas & Silk, 1990). Provided that Luquet’s stages are thought of as phases in a 
continuum rather than discrete steps, however, I suggest that what Luquet has to say remains 
valuable.  
According to Luquet (1927; 2001) ‘trace making or scribbling’ is the child’s first 
experience of drawing. He suggested that children, even though young, know that pictures can 
represent life but they do not believe that they can draw such representations and so suffice with 
scribbles. As children grow older they begin to notice that some of their trace making resembles 
something from the real world, which allows them to believe that they can represent life, so their 
drawing begins to develop, although at this point, children’s drawings are far from reality and do 
not yet resemble the original object from the researcher’s standpoint. 
Luquet (1927) argues that children’s drawing develops through stages of realism. There is 
no realism in their initial scribbles, as there is nothing in them which can be compared to 
something in the real world, even if the child may have wished to represent something. The 
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scribbles appear random and unplanned. However, as children grow older, there comes a time 
where they interpret their scribble as something other than simply lines. For example, they may 
see lines that look a little like a car within a larger scribble. This is the beginning of what Luquet 
calls ‘Fortuitous realism’ (The First Stage), which is the first stage when the child begins 
noticing similarities between their scribbles and an object from environment. For example, in an 
observational study, Luquet refers to a 2-year-old girl who apparently noticed a similarity 
between her scribbles and a bird and so added two vertical lines for legs (Luquet, 1927). Luquet 
interprets this as the child having not set out to make a realistic drawing, but later (post-hoc) 
making a realistic interpretation of it.  
Luquet proposes that children will happily go on scribbling in later drawings without 
intending to represent anything. However, they will increasingly notice chance similarities with 
real objects as time goes by. In this way, little by little, the child becomes an intentional ‘realist’, 
meaning that they begin to draw with the intention from the start of representing something. An 
adult observer, however, may still at this stage experience difficulty in perceiving any likeness 
between the drawing and reality. It may be argued that there are some issues with Luquet’s 
approach at these early stages of drawing ability, in that it is not clear how the researcher can 
reliably ascertain what intention was in the child’s mind when drawing. However, this is not so 
problematic at the later stages, which are of concern in the current study.  
Once the child becomes more consistent in drawing with a representational intention, the 
drawings initially have the characteristic which Luquet terms ‘Failed realism’ (The Second 
Stage). At this stage, the child’s drawings are recognizable to a researcher, and there can be no 
doubt about the child’s intention to draw something, but they still lack realistic features due to 
motor and cognitive immaturity, which the child is struggling to overcome. This leads the child 
to try to include some details in their representations, but quite clearly demonstrates ‘technical 
graphic problems of poor position, orientation and proportion’ (p 12). For example, the child 
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often draws the human figure in ‘tadpole’ form, where the torso is missing and the arms and legs 
are drawn inappropriately from the head. Luquet (1927) uses the term ‘synthetic incapacity’ to 
describe the lack of proper relations between the individual elements in the drawing. Piaget and 
Inhelder (1956), following Luquet, similarly described a progression characterized at age 3 to 4 
by synthetic incapacity in which children draw bounded objects (e.g., a closed circle) but ignore 
size and shape, and often are incapable of capturing the spatial relationships in any objects. 
It is through a gradual process that the child increases the number of details in what is 
drawn, as synthetic incapacity decreases, allowing the drawing to become more characteristic of 
the third stage of realism, ‘intellectual realism’, which is the first stage which is of central 
concern in my study. ‘Intellectual realism’ is evidenced when the drawings are based on many of 
the essential characteristics of a real object and represent it in its characteristic individual shape. 
The child is also more skilled at synthesizing the parts. Human figures may, for example, begin 
to be drawn clothed and with arms and legs from the body. The ability to draw the details in their 
usual and generic shape is described by Luquet (1927) as ‘exemplarity’.  
An important characteristic of children’s drawing at this stage, however, is as follows. In 
reality, the shape and visibility of an object’s constituent parts changes as an observer moves 
around it, to view it from different angles, sometimes causing certain parts to appear partially or 
completely occluded. However, children at this stage do not use the techniques required to draw 
the objectively ‘real’ or visible picture. Instead, children portray the features that they believe to 
be important aspects of the object, regardless of what can actually be seen (See Figure 4.3). The 
techniques used include separation of the details of the object, transparency, drawing some 
features from an air-view plan, and folding out certain parts of the topic (such as rooms in a 
house). Using these methods, the child may produce an “impossible” drawing, where the object 
or scene is drawn from several different perspectives. According to Luquet, children are not 
basing their drawing on an external visual model (i.e. how an object or scene appears from a 
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particular standpoint), but rather an internal model (what features of the object or scene the child 
regards as important or definitive). 
Some researchers have criticized Luquet due to the fact that his approach was based on his 
direct observations of children’s drawings without any instructions, rather than experimental 
manipulation. However, examples of intellectual realism are not only found in children’s 
spontaneous drawings. Jolley (1991), for example, asked children to draw a man riding on a 
horse and a man in a boat from three-dimensional scenes presented to them with some features 
of the man occluded (Jolley, 1991; see also Cox, 1992, 2005). The findings were interesting, 
since, for example, the drawing of a 7-year-old girl showed the man and the horse with no 
occlusion of one by the other. In other words, she used ‘transparency’ so that both of the man’s 
legs were seen. Likewise, a profile view of a horse was drawn, while the man was drawn in 
frontal view. Hence, both drawings seem to be based on the child’s knowledge or internal model 
of the main features of the objects which were to be drawn, and the perspective from which they 
are usually drawn separately (e.g., horse in profile and person frontal), regardless of how they 
appeared in the scene that they were asked to represent. Hence their representations of the scenes 
were not accurate depictions of them as seen.  
The dominance of children’s internal model changes over time, however, leading to the 
inclusion of more appropriate features in drawings of scenes such as those above (Jolley, 2010). 
Luquet argues that children’s realisation grows that their representations do not always capture 
how the objects and scenes appear in reality on a particular occasion. That is, they do not look 
visually realistic. This begins to bother children, which leads them to attempt to draw in a style 
with more ‘visual realism’ (Stage 4). There is a decreased use of separation and transparency. 
The drawings may include fewer folding-out techniques and there is an increased use of 
occlusion, suppression of details, and of perspective, which are graphic techniques associated 
with the last stage.  
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At this final stage, children begin to draw only what is visible, instead of relying on 
internal models or mental categories of each of the objects in a scene. For example, human figure 
representations begin to take the form of an individual that they are asked to draw, rather than a 
generic drawing used for all humans. According to Luquet (1927), even though children reach 
this final stage eventually, the laws of perspective still need to be learned and few children 
actually succeed in fully acquiring the conventions of visual realism. Hence, although children 
ultimately enter the stage of visual realism, Luquet argues that this stage is more a stage of 
intention rather than achievement. As Luquet points out, even many adults fail to draw in a fully 
visually realistic style. Luquet notes that many children stop drawing between 10 and 12 years of 
age (and this is still evident today), and that it is easy to find adult drawings similar to those 
produced by 12-year-olds and even those that use the intellectual realism system.  
Critics of Luquet’s model, especially with respect to the last two stages, which are of 
current concern, have pointed out that details of the research conditions in which drawings are 
elicited from children may have a considerable effect on their inclination to intellectual or visual 
realism. This therefore suggests that both styles may co-exist in the child, rather than that the 
child progresses from one to the other. For example, Lewis, Russell and Berridge (1993) found 
that the way in which the object to be drawn was named by the researcher had an effect on how 
it was drawn. In a study where the object to be drawn was a transparent glass mug, previously 
inspected by the children, but presented to be drawn with the handle turned away, labelling the 
object to be drawn as a 'glass' increased 5-year-olds use of visually realistic to 73%, compared to 
52% when calling it 'this', and even less (31%) when naming it 'mug'. The result can be 
interpreted as showing that the children’s use of intellectual realism, referring to canonical 
features of the object, was prompted by the word used by the researcher, since a glass does not 
typically have a handle, while a mug does. 
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Furthermore, when two cups were placed in front of the child, one with the handle hidden 
from view and the other visible, 77% of 5- and 6-year-olds drew visually realistically compared 
to 59% when a single cup was placed in front of them with the handle out of sight (Davis, 1983). 
Furthermore, Davis and Bentley (1984) asked children to draw a cup with its handle visible 
before drawing a cup with an occluded handle. This again increased production of a visually 
realistic drawing of the second cup. Again, when the paired cup task was presented first followed 
by the single cup task, more children produced visually realistic drawings as opposed to the 
reverse order of presentation (Davis, 1983). Based on such findings, Davis (1983) and Davis and 
Bentley (1984) concluded that both providing a contrast within a task or between tasks, and the 
order of tasks, had an effect on children’s awareness of the precise task demands, and hence how 
they drew.  
Other studies have also shown how the removal of a defining feature in the exemplar of an 
object used in a study can have an effect. Freeman and Janikoun (1972) established that children 
understand a handle as a defining feature of a cup by asking children to draw an imagined cup. 
They always included the handle, showing that the handle is for them the defining feature of a 
cup. Taylor and Bacharach (1982) then presented a cup with a broken handle, thus lacking this 
defining feature of a cup. Five- and 8-year-olds produced visually realistic drawings even when 
the broken handle was occluded which suggests that removal of defining features leads to an 
increase in visual realism. Finally, increasing the explicitness of instructions, such as by stressing 
to the child that they should draw from their point of view, increased the production of visual 
realism in children between the ages of 4 and 8 years (Barrett & Bridson, 1983). Light and 
Humphreys (1981) believe that standard instruction to "make the best drawing that you can" is 
seen as ambiguous and may actually encourage intellectual realism, suggesting that such 
instructions do not provide enough information to ensure the correct interpretation of the task 
demands. 
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In my study, these issues were dealt with predominantly by making standard choices of 
task conditions. Thus, I used only normal exemplars of the object (balls and mugs), without 
defining features like handles being missing or unusual materials used (e.g. a glass mug). I only 
used the usual names for the objects (mug and balls). The instructions also took the current 
standard form, asking participants to draw exactly what they could see from where they were 
sitting, thus prompting visual realism rather than encouraging intellectual realism.  
4.1.2 Age of transition from intellectual to visual realism  
I turn now to the age at which the transition may occur from drawing predominantly with 
intellectual realism to drawing mainly with visual realism, bearing in mind that this must be a 
considered to be a flexible age, dependent upon the precise task conditions under which the 
measurement is made (4.1.1).  
According to Luquet (1913), between the ages of 5 and 8 years, children produce 
intellectually realistic drawings. However, children begin to draw visually realistically after the 
age of 8 by suppressing this knowledge and only drawing from their viewpoint of the model 
placed before them. Cox (1991) however reports children as able to overcome this early strategy 
between the ages of 5 and 8 years.  
In fact, even discounting the effects of task conditions described in 4.1.1, it further emerges 
that the age of transition is influenced by the precise objects that are required to be drawn. Thus, 
a ball drawing task has been found to be more difficult than a cup drawing task (and both these 
objects were used in my study). Whilst almost all (94%) of 7-year-olds could omit the handle of 
a cup, only 54% were able to use hidden-line elimination for a partially occluded ball (Chen & 
Holman, 1989). It is possible however that the contrast effect used in this study led to that 
significant difference (Davis, 1983). On the other hand, it is possible that the instructions were 
less clear on the ball task, leading to poorer performance. Freeman (1980) however supported the 
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above finding by demonstrating that visually realistic ball drawings are produced until the age of 
9.  
More recently, Ford and Rees (2008) used a range of tasks involving and cups and mugs, 
but not balls, with (amongst others) typical children aged 3 years to 7-years-5-months. Relevant 
to my concerns, this age group exhibited only 22% visual realism on the task with a single mug 
with handle not visible. They found no significant age differences. This is therefore consistent 
with the view that the transition from intellectual to visual realism has not progressed far in this 
age range.  
Given the above estimates of the age of transition, it was felt appropriate in the current 
study to employ the technique of partial occlusion, with a mug task and a two balls task, to 
investigate the shift between intellectual and visual realism in the drawings of children aged 
from 2-years-6-months to 9 years. A partial occlusion model is where an object is only partly 
visible or partly hidden behind another object. Intellectual realism is evidenced if, when the 
model is presented to young children, the partly occluded object tends to be drawn as if it were 
fully shown. Hence Study 3 spanned this age range. 
4.1.3 The developmental trajectory of visual realism  
Luquet and much other research in this area tends to assume without question that the 
child’s drawing ability progresses in a linear, or at least monotonic, way through various stages, 
or along a continuum. This implies a progression only from intellectual realism to visual realism, 
not the reverse. There have however recently arisen some signs that this may not be the case. 
First, it must be noted that U-shaped patterns are not uncommon in child development in 
general (Morse, Belpaeme, Cangelosi &  Floccia, 2010). The most commonly cited examples are 
linguistic, such as the phenomenon of young children producing irregular forms like mice and 
bought at an early age, then going through a stage of saying mouses and buyed, before returning 
to the adult irregular forms (although this progression is nowadays seen as in detail more 
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complex: Lust, 2006). As Morse and colleagues (2010) say, however, the “U-shaped curve 
phenomena appear to be independent from any particular task or modality” (op. cit., p. 3034). A 
general characterization of the mechanism underlying U-shaped child development is offered by 
Morse and colleagues (2010), who see it as essentially falling into three phases. At the start, the 
child’s ability operates “in an isolated way relying on local information only” (e.g. rote learning 
the plural form mice) and the child is successful on a relevant task. Later, accumulation of 
additional information leads to refinement or reorganisation of ability (e.g. learning and 
generalising the rule that, to make a plural, you add /s,z/ to the singular form), during which time 
performance is disrupted, and the child scores lower on the task (sometimes saying mouses). 
Third “eventually this reorganization will conclude and the system will stabilize with new 
competences and high performance once again” (p. 3036), so the child once again scores high on 
the relevant task (e.g. having learned that the rule for plurals has some exceptions, such as mice). 
Thus, the two high points of the U, although both indicating success on some task, in this model 
do not at all indicate that the same underlying ability or cognitive organisation is being depended 
upon to produce that performance at the two high points.  
This could be applied to realism in drawing skills if the very young child is thought of as 
first drawing based on local information in the form of the specific exemplars of objects such as 
mugs as they see them (visual realism). Possibly this external information is prepotent for the 
simple reason that at the age of 2 to 3 years they are still developing their mental categories for 
common objects. Hence their focus is still on the real world input from which they build such 
mental representations rather than on the mental representations themselves. Later, as they see 
more examples of mugs, they develop established general concepts or cognitive categories for 
things like mugs incorporating certain typical attributes, independent of the specific instances 
seen. This internal ‘intellectual’ information then interferes (following the Morse model) with 
their performance in tasks where they are actually asked to draw what they see. Temporarily 
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their newly developed internal model of the world becomes pre-potent, and they prefer it to the 
world as it actually appears. Finally, their category development matures and they learn to 
operate both with the general mental categories and with the specific exemplars of those 
categories as perceived in daily life, without interference between one and the other, and use 
those two types of information appropriately when one of them is called for and not the other. 
That is to say that visual realism again becomes pre-potent and intellectual realism is inhibited 
(Ford & Rees, 2008; Luquet, 1927/2001), albeit in a different cognitive landscape from that 
which existed at the ‘early visual’ stage, in accordance with the Morse model.  
Next there are some studies which have in fact found U-shapes in the domain of drawing 
research. Davis (1997) for example studied the expressive drawing produced across an age range 
running from 5 years to adult. Pictures were elicited representing emotions such as anger, 
happiness and sadness. On almost all measures of quality used, the 5-year-olds and the adult 
artists scored higher compared with other ages in between, including teenagers and adult non-
artists. This study, then, yielded a U-shaped pattern with, in age terms, a very long low middle 
component. Although this does not relate directly to the scale of realism with which the present 
study is concerned, and involves a vastly different age range, it does show that drawing  skill can 
evidence U-shaped progression.  
Davis (1997) explains this pattern as due to the young children and the adult artists 
producing more truly expressive drawings while the ages in between were hampered by 
conventionalization of their representations (e.g. use of conventions such as visual metaphor and 
metonymy). This does not mean, then, that the 5-year-olds and the adult artists are seen as 
identical. As implied by the Morse explanation above, the child is seen as producing good 
expressive drawings in a local way through “understanding ….emotion …in terms of him or 
herself” (Davis, 1997, p. 155), in other words, spontaneously and not affected by artistic 
conventions, which they have not yet begun to learn. The adult artist, by contrast, has been 
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through a process of refinement and reorganization, involving learning the roles of metaphor and 
the like in drawing pictures, which the intervening age groups are in process of learning but have 
not yet learnt how to handle appropriately. The adult artist, however, has emerged “consciously 
employing the same lines and form that the boundariless young child exhibits”: “the artist breaks 
down the boundaries between symbol and referent and reclaims the lack of differentiation which 
is the gift …. of the youngest child”.  
In Study 1 (Chapter 2), recall that I found, somewhat unexpectedly, a negative relationship 
of all predictors, including age, with visual realism as the dependent. This called for explanation, 
since the usual assumption by researchers, including Luquet, has been that older age would lead 
children to draw more visually realistically, with improvement progressing in a more or less 
linear fashion, i.e. approximating ever more closely to the adult mode of drawing. Interpreted in 
terms of more recent discussion, it would be said that greater IC enables children to inhibit their 
early tendency to intellectual realism and adopt a visually realistic way of drawing (Ebersbach et 
al., 2011; Riggs et al., 2013). The findings of Study 1, however, appeared to be the opposite of 
this.  
I suggested, however (Chapter 2 Section 2.3.4) that a U-shaped development of realism 
could account for this. As seen in 4.1.2, the shift from intellectual realism to visual realism 
occurs only around eight years of age, yet the participants in Study 1 were in fact all 
considerably below that age (3-4 years old). Hence if that shift around age 8 represents the 
‘right-hand side’ of what is in fact a U-shaped pattern of development, it would not be 
unexpected to find children in the age range of Study 1 evidencing the falling pattern of the left-
hand side of the U, rather than the rising pattern of the right-hand side of it. In that scenario the 
turning point of the U-might be expected to occur after the age range of Study 1, around age 5 or 
6, after which visual realism would rise towards mastery at age 8. It was precisely the purpose of 
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Study 3 to see if such is indeed the case by measuring realism in children’s drawing across a 
range from age 2 years 6 months to age 8 years six months. 
Furthermore, the hypothesis that a U-shaped pattern applies to realism development does 
admit of a possible interpretation. It is not just a suggestion, which might account for a pattern of 
scores, but lacks any plausible explanation. As described above, it can be interpreted as a 
particular instance of a mechanism of the type which Morse and colleagues (2010) suggest 
generally underlies U-shaped development. The relationship with IC is also explicable. IC may 
be seen as developing predominantly in a linear fashion, with age. However, as the child 
develops, a succession of changes occurs in the child’s cognitive make-up which leads to a series 
of pre-potent responses being adopted which the child’s IC has to inhibit in turn in order for the 
child to develop normally. In the domain of drawing, the child initially is inclined to scribble and 
this is the first response that IC has to act upon to enable representational drawing to emerge. At 
that point the pre-potent drawing response of the child becomes to draw visually what they see, 
rather than to rely on whatever cognitive categories they possess at that stage for objects. They 
are still (in the Morse et al. view) at a stage where the child performs tasks in a more isolated and 
local way, in a cognitive world with fewer developed abilities. The child, however, is at this 
point establishing more developed cognitive categories for objects in the world, independent of 
their local exemplars in daily life, and for a time (the bottom of the U), the child’s pre-potent 
response becomes to draw these (intellectual realism). IC then has to operate again to suppress 
this and allow visual realism to emerge a second time. 
Having made the above case for a possible U-shaped development of drawing realism, it 
must be said, however, that the evidence for it in existing studies is lacking, even in studies 
which potentially might have revealed it. Take, as an example, Ford and Rees (2008), which 
included measuring intellectual realism of pictures produced by typical children across an age 
range of 3 years 7 months to 7 years 5 months. This then might have been expected to show 
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some signs of a U-shape in development, if one exists, yet none was reported. There are many 
possible reasons for this. One is that, of course, the aims of that study were not to investigate 
such a possibility: the focus was on differences between groups of typical and autistic children. 
Hence correlations with age are not explored, so the researchers may not have noticed any such 
pattern, even if it was there. Again, the sample size of typical children was small (n = 27), which 
could well have led to no significant quadratic trend being identifiable, even if it had been tested 
for. It is also possible that, in studies which covered the requisite age range and measured 
realism, a U-shaped development may have been evidenced, and even noticed by the researchers, 
but that, given the prevalence of the assumption that such development is linear (e.g. Jolley & 
Rose, 2008), it was deemed inconvenient rather than a crucial observation, so not reported. 
4.1.4 Tasks used to measure drawing skill  
In Study 1, like many other researchers, I measured children’s drawing ability, including 
realism, by asking children to draw. It was observed, however that a considerable amount of the 
children’s responses had to be classified as scribbling (59% of house drawings and 12% of 
person drawings). While this contributed usefully to my measure of figurative representation, it 
was not helpful for my measure of realism, since scribbles did not tell us whether what was 
drawn was either visual or intellectual. Scribbles had to be regarded as neutral, or similar to non-
responses, with respect to this measure. Since in Study 3 I included children of a lower age even 
than those in Study 1, as well as much older children, it therefore seemed prudent to search the 
literature for other means of measurement of realism which could be used with very young 
children and avoid such a loss of usable data. A way forward presented itself, in the form of the 
use of receptive picture comprehension tasks. DeLoache, Strauss and Maynard (1979), for 
example, long ago found that even babies, who clearly could not produce recognisable drawings, 
could nevertheless successfully perceive the similarity between an object and its picture.  
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Other studies have demonstrated that children of an age range 3 to 9 years, who were able 
to produce a picture with some degree of figurative representation, when offered a choice of 
pictures, did tend to choose the picture which matched the features of the picture they would 
produce (Moore, 1986; Brooks et al., 1988; Littleton, 1991). Other studies, however, have 
demonstrated some tendency for a lag, in the sense that children in selection tasks prefer pictures 
which are a little ahead of what they are able to produce themselves in terms of typical drawing 
development (Kosslyn, Heldmeyer, & Locklear, 1977; Fayol, Barrouillet, & Chevrot, 1995). 
Although some of these early studies have design flaws (Jolley & Rose, 2008), better recent 
studies generally confirm that drawing production and receptive selection follow the same 
trajectory, but with some lag (Jolley, Knox and Wainwright, 2001).  
Given the above findings, and the prior use of picture selection tasks specifically for 
measuring realism (e.g. Jolley & Rose, 2008), I therefore adopted a task of this sort in Study 3. 
Children less than 4 years old are unlikely to be able to draw, although if the U hypothesis is 
correct, they would like to draw visually realistic pictures, but lack the motor control to do so. 
Thus, by the time they are able to draw, they often have already reached the stage of drawing 
intellectually realistic pictures. This means that it is very difficult to measure visual realism in 
very young children. Nevertheless, using a selection task can help us to see this U-shaped pattern, 
if it exists.  
Although all such tasks involve the child pointing to a picture rather than drawing one, 
there remains an issue of precisely what form of selection task is to be preferred. Ones found in 
the literature vary in the number of pictures chosen to select from and the precise instructions. In 
Taguchi and Hirai (2003), for example, there were five pictures and the instructions were to 
choose the one “which looks closest to what you want to draw” (p. 911). Brooks and colleagues 
(1988), on the other hand, offered 8 pictures and instructed children to choose the best drawing. 
Those studies were concerned with wider aspects of drawing ability than just realism, however. 
 
 
137 
In the current study, since only realism was in focus, only two pictures were relevant, relative to 
a particular scene on display: one showing a visually realistic representation of what was 
displayed, such as a mug with the handle turned away, and the other the intellectually realistic 
version, with the handle included. 
4.1.5 Overview of Study 3 
 In this study, the focus was on the intellectual and visual realism stages of child drawing 
development, and the precise pattern of development of these when plotted against age. Thus it 
was designed to replicate and expand upon the finding of a negative relationship between age 
and Visual Realism in Study 1. Children between the ages of 2 years six months and 8 years six 
months were tested since previous studies suggest that any transitions between these two realism 
styles occur within this age range. Hence, such a range was needed so as to achieve the aim of 
establishing whether the development of Visual Realism in fact follows a U-shaped pattern in 
child development. Such a pattern would indicate that children may start with visual realism, and 
then move to intellectual realism and then back to visual realism in their drawings. In detail, I 
hypothesised that children’s age related progression with respect to realism of drawing would 
follow a pattern broadly in three stages. Initially, corresponding to the left hand side of a U, 
younger children (up to around 4 years old) would make greater use of visual than intellectual 
realism (provided they did not just scribble or in other ways produce a drawing which gave no 
evidence of either). Next, corresponding to the low point of a U (perhaps 4 to 6 years old), 
children would evidence greater reliance on intellectual realism. Finally, corresponding to the 
right hand side of a U (approaching 8 years old), children would revert to dominance of visual 
realism. 
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4.2 Method 
4.2.1  Participants  
As in the previous studies, and for similar reasons, the target was 100 participants, but I 
was aware that in a longitudinal study considerable attrition of participants had to be anticipated. 
Therefore I initially targeted a much larger sample. Two-hundred and thirty-three children were 
assessed at the start of the Study but, due to attrition, by the third occasion when data was 
gathered, the total sample was 164. At the start of the study approximately half the children were 
between the ages of 2½ and 4¾ years of age (n = 115), and half between the ages of 4¾ and 7½ 
(n = 118). Children were recruited from preschools or nurseries in the Riyadh region of Saudi 
Arabia. Although all were Saudi, some of the children normally spoke English whilst others 
spoke Arabic. None of the children were reported as having any behavioural or learning 
difficulties. Although the sample of children was predominantly white-Arabian, their 
backgrounds varied in terms of socio-economic status. As in Study 1, children were not 
eliminated if they failed to produce a recognisable drawing, although some were inevitably 
eliminated who produced no representational drawings at all out of the four trials (see further 
4.2.5).  
For the purposes of graphic presentation, I divided the participants into age bands, 
although for statistical tests age was treated as a continuous variable of individual participant 
ages. Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of participants across age bands.  
Figure 4.1. Numbers of children in different age bands in Study 3 at each time-point. 
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Besides attrition, the analysable data was reduced by children not responding, or 
responding with scribbles (which I could not analyse with respect to visual or intellectual realism  
see 4.2.5). Hence the usable responses were smaller numbers (e.g. Figure 4.2). In fact only 83 
children provided valid drawings on all three occasions. On the less demanding selection task, 
however, 148 provided responses on all three occasions. It is particularly noticeable that in the 
youngest age band, which is crucial for establishing the left-hand side of any U-shaped 
distribution, the rate of valid drawing response was quite low despite the quite large numbers of 
children recruited. This should be borne in mind when interpreting the findings. 
 
Figure 4.2. Numbers of children giving valid responses on the drawing task at each time-
point. 
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4.2.2 Design  
This study follows a sequential design, where the variable of time is represented both by a 
covariate (age of child on each of three occasions when data was gathered), and by a longitudinal 
component (time: three data gathering occasions over one year). Data collection involved a total 
of three occasions of measurement, with two equal intervals of 6 months. This study also 
included gender of child. The dependent variable of intellectual versus visual realism of drawing 
was measured in two ways: by the children producing drawings of objects presented and by the 
children selecting drawings for objects presented.  
4.2.3 Materials  
The study involved two tasks, the drawing and the selection task. The following materials 
were used. Drawing tasks:  plain A4 paper, pencil, a mug, two balls, a block and a toy man. 
Selection tasks: the same objects as for Drawing (apart from A4 paper and pencil). In addition, 
there was a book consisting of four pages, with each page showing two versions of the objects 
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placed in front of the children. One picture consisted of a visual realism representation, such as a 
mug with an occluded handle, and the other demonstrated intellectual realism, such as the mug 
with the handle. These pictures had been drawn in pencil on white paper by an artist expressly 
for the study, and represented the precise objects used in the tasks. 
4.2.4 Procedure and scoring  
Age at the start of the study was ascertained from teacher reports, and gender by researcher 
observation. Realism was measured through 8 tasks: four drawing tasks and four picture 
selection tasks. Informed consent had previously been obtained from the parents of participants 
and the school authorities. The measurement sessions involved two people, the researcher (E1) 
and a PhD student with experience of these tasks (E2). E1 administered the tasks while E2 
recorded the children’s responses. All the children were tested individually, in the morning, 
either in a separate room from their classroom, or in a quiet corner of their classroom. E2 sat 
next to the child to record the responses while E1 sat across the table. The children were asked 
for their help, and told that they were going to play some fun games. The eight tasks were 
administered to each child in two separate sessions on same day, each session lasting about 10-
20 minutes (longer for drawing than for selection). There was no time limit for the participant to 
select a picture or to draw the objects. Tasks followed a fixed order, from simpler to more 
demanding, as shown in Table 4.1.  
The first session consisted of four drawing tasks. The second session consisted of the four 
selection tasks. Drawing was elicited first because the same objects were used in both the 
drawing and selection tasks, and if the selection task had been presented first, this would have 
offered them models to recall and copy in a later drawing task.   
The standard instructions were used for both drawing and selecting tasks. The researcher 
asked the child to draw or select a picture of the model “exactly as you can see it from where you 
are sitting”. Responses for the drawing tasks were collected for later analysis. All responses on 
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the selection tasks (visual realism choice versus intellectual realism choice) were recorded on 
paper by E2. 
4.2.4.1 Drawing tasks. All the drawing tasks were presented in the first session. Children 
were given an A4 paper and a pencil for each task. In each task, if the children asked any 
questions about the drawing they were simply told to do their best in drawing. With respect to 
scoring, on each task a score of 1 was given if the children managed to draw the true 
representation of what they saw in front of them, with respect to what was hidden. 
Representation of irrelevant features such as the smiley face or shape of the mug was not 
considered. A score of 0 was given if the children drew what they knew instead of what they saw 
in front of them, with respect to what was hidden (see further 4.2.5). Examples of responses 
produced are shown in Figure 4.3.  
The tasks were administered and scored individually as follows. For the occluded-handle 
task, a mug with a smiley face design on the outside was placed on the table in front of the child 
in such a way that the smiley face was visible to the child and the handle not visible. Children 
were then instructed to draw the picture of the mug. A score of one was given if the handle was 
correctly omitted. A score of zero was given if the handle was not omitted. The occluded-ball 
task involved two balls. One ball had a smiley face design outside and the other ball not. These 
two balls were placed in front of the child on the table, with one ball with the smiley face half-
occluded by the other. Children were asked to draw what they see. A score of 1 was given if one 
ball was drawn behind the other. A score of 0 was given if two balls were drawn in full together. 
For the occluded ball behind block task children were asked to draw a picture of a ball that 
was placed behind a block situated on the table in front of them. This ball included a smiley face 
design outside and only the top of the ball could be seen behind the block. A score of 1 was 
given if the ball was drawn behind the block. A score of 0 was given if the ball was drawn 
separately from the block. For the occluded man task: a model of a man was placed behind a 
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block in such a way that only his head could be seen. Once again, children were asked to draw 
the picture of the man and the block. A score of 1 was given if the man was drawn behind the 
block. A score of 0 was given if the man was drawn separately from the block. 
4.2.4.2 Selection tasks. There were a total of four selection tasks, which were presented in 
a fixed order, the same as for the corresponding drawing tasks (See Table 4.1). Children were 
presented in turn with four pages of a booklet, each page showing two pictures of the objects 
placed in front of them on the table in the same way as for the drawing tasks. Two versions of 
the objects were shown in the pictures on each page. One version showed a visual realism 
representation, whilst the other demonstrated an intellectual realism version. For two of the tasks 
the visual representation appeared in the left-hand picture on the page, and for two in the right-
hand picture. For each task, the researcher first drew the child’s attention to the objects that she 
had just set up and then asked the child to point to the picture that looked like what they saw.  
Again, a score of 1 was given on each of the selection tasks if the children pointed to the 
picture that looked like what they saw in front of them (visual realism). A score of 0 was given if 
the children selected the picture which showed complete objects separately (intellectual realism). 
The tasks were administered in detail as follows. For the occluded-handle task, children were 
presented with a page which contained two pictures of the objects. One version omitted the 
handle and showed a smiley face visible outside the mug. The other picture showed a visible 
handle with a smiley face design outside. Children were then instructed to select the picture that 
looked like what they saw. In the occluded-ball task one of the pictures included one ball half-
occluded by the other, and the other picture had two separate balls. Then children were asked to 
select the picture that looked like what they saw from where they were seated.  
In the occluded ball behind block task children were asked to select either a picture of a 
ball that was placed behind a block situated on the table in front of them, where only the top of 
the ball could be seen behind the block, or a picture of a block and a ball one below the other but 
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separated. The ball again had a smiley face on it. Finally, in the occluded man task children were 
presented with two pictures, one of which showed only the head of the man behind the block, 
while the other picture showed a whole man separately above the block. Once again, children 
were asked to select the picture that looked like what they were seeing in front of them. 
Table 4.1. Task order in Study 3 
Drawing tasks – Session 1 Selection tasks – Session 2 
A mug (occluded-handle task) A mug (occluded-handle task) 
Two balls (occluded-ball task) 
 
Two balls (occluded-ball task) 
Ball & block (occluded-ball behind block task) Ball & block (occluded-ball behind block task) 
Man & block (occluded-man behind block task) 
 
Man & block (occluded-man behind block 
task) 
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Figure 4.3. Seven examples from the study data, illustrating the three types of children's 
drawing relevant to the VR scale. 
 
1. A scribble. 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Mug with hidden handle drawn overtly (intellectual realism). 
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3. Mug drawn as seen, with hidden handle omitted (visual realism). 
 
 
 
4. Overlapping balls drawn separately (intellectual realism). 
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5. Ball behind block drawn separately (intellectual realism). 
 
 
 
 
6. Man behind a block drawn in full (intellectual realism). 
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7. Man behind a block drawn as seen partly hidden (visual realism). 
 
 
4.2.5 Overall score calculation  
In this study, it was required to assess the extent to which each child exhibited visual 
versus intellectual realism. There were however many instances in the drawing tasks of children 
missing out task items or drawing only one of the two objects in view, or, especially, producing 
scribbles which gave no evidence of either kind of realism. These were totalled for each child on 
each task at each data gathering time point and used in some analyses. In the selection tasks, 
however there were almost no missing responses, so they were treated as negligible. The focal 
issue then was, how best in the drawing production tasks to quantify children’s degree of visual 
realism for the purposes of the statistical analyses, in the light of the missing/scribble instances. 
There is more than one way of doing this, of which I describe here three.  
The first method, which I initially considered, since I had used it in Study 1, was to award 
each child on each task 1 for each visual realism response, -1 for each intellectual realism 
response, and zero for a missing or scribble response. The 4 responses for a given task would 
then be totalled, giving a child a score between -4 and +4, with higher scores indicating more 
visually realistic response. This, however, in effect treated a missing or scribble response as 
actually closer to a visually realistic response than an intellectually realistic response was, and 
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hence, on reflection, was considered not to validly capture what I intended to measure. For 
instance, a child who produced three visually realistic responses and one intellectually realistic 
one would gain a score of 3+(-1)=2 but a child who produced three visually realistic responses 
and one scribble would gain a score of 3+0=3, which would unwarrantedly suggest that the child 
favoured visual realism to a greater extent. In reality, a missing or scribble response should be 
treated simply as uninformative as to which type of realism is indicated. What was needed, then, 
was a scoring system that treated scribbles/missing instances in a fairer way, as not really 
indicating anything definite about either sort of realism.  
A second method which was suggested simply took the view that each child had four 
opportunities to evidence visual realism, so their visual realism score was simply how many of 
those four opportunities evidence visual realism, as compared with anything else (whether a 
scribble, missing response, or intellectual realism response), giving a scale 0 to 4. 
(Correspondingly a child could also obtain a raw number out of 4 for scribble/missing responses, 
and another for intellectually realistic responses.) This approach to quantifying visually realistic 
responses therefore does not appear to distinguish between a scribble/missing response and a 
drawing with intellectual realism: they all just count as non-visually realistic responses. By this 
method, however, a child who produced one scribble, two visually realistic drawings and one 
intellectually realistic drawing scored 2 for visual realism and a child who produced no 
scribbles/missing responses, two visually realistic drawings and two intellectually realistic 
drawings also scored 2 for visual realism. Once again this did not capture what I wanted, since a 
scribble was in this case in effect being counted as the same as an intellectually realistic drawing, 
which it clearly is not. 
The third method, which I adopted, therefore took the view that missing or scribble 
responses (or instances where only one of two objects presented was drawn) give no information 
as to what kind of realism the child was drawing with. Hence, scores for visual realism were 
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calculated for each child on the drawing production tasks excluding all such missing/scribble 
responses as invalid. For each valid drawing produced, a visually realistic response then scored 1, 
and an intellectually realistic one zero, and the overall 'total' score was calculated as the mean 
score out of the total number of valid responses. This mean score represents the proportion of 
valid (representational) drawings or selections, out of the four available, which exhibited visual 
rather than intellectual realism, with scribbles treated in the same way as omitted responses. 
Thus, the scale ran from 0 to 1. For instance, a child who produced one scribble, two visually 
realistic drawings and one intellectually realistic drawing scored 2/3 = .67 for visual realism. A 
child who produced no scribbles/missing responses, two visually realistic drawings and two 
intellectually realistic drawings scored 2/4 = .50 for visual realism.  
Consistency between the individual drawing task items was demonstrated separately at 
each of the three times with item-total correlations, i.e. the correlations between children's scores 
for a single item (one drawing or selection) with their total scores for all four items (the four 
drawings or four selections). The drawing task reliabilities on this measure are in Table 4.2. The 
correlations are all acceptable, and those for items 2, 3, and 4 are impressively high. The lower 
correlations for item 1 could be due just to the fact that the first item was the first item, and so 
served as, in effect, a practice item. Alternatively, it could be due to the fact that the first item 
was always the item featuring the mug with the hidden handle, and possibly something about this 
specific task led to greater inconsistency in response. The same analysis for the selection task 
yielded the mostly slightly lower but still acceptable correlations seen in Table 4.3.  
 
Table 4.2. Item - total correlations in the drawing task (with n). 
 Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 
r Item 1 with total .541 (119) .493 (124) .568 (121) 
r Item 2 with total .752 (112) .773 (118) .788 (105) 
r Item 3 with total .765 (106) .731 (114) .830 (111) 
r Item 4 with total           .780 (96) .735 (109) .855 (106) 
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Table 4.3. Item - total correlations in the selection task (with n). 
 Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 
r Item 1 with total .473 (231) .574 (193) .634 (160) 
r Item 2 with total .652 (231) .648 (193) .595 (161) 
r Item 3 with total .700 (231) .702 (193) .749 (161) 
r Item 4 with total .589 (231) .677 (192) .625 (161) 
 
The generally lower item-total correlations on the selection task compared with the 
drawing task could be due to a number of factors. One is that this task was performed 
immediately after the drawing task, and children might have been tired by this point. Secondly, 
the selection task involved pictures of the same objects that children had just drawn, and it was 
noted that some children did not appreciate the need for the task and asked, “Why do we have to 
do this, as we have already drawn pictures?” Thirdly, since the selection task, on each item, took 
the form of a choice between two pictures, it lent itself to random choice of one of the two 
alternatives if children were tired or otherwise not motivated to pay attention. Although not 
impressively high, the correlations for the selection task were deemed to be adequate, bearing in 
mind that some of the participants were very young children and that degree of measured internal 
reliability is due not just to the nature of the test/task items but also to the capacity of the 
participant to attend and respond consistently across multiple items within a test.  
Mean scores for each participant on each task on each occasion when data was gathered 
were then calculated. These were all on a scale of 0 to 1 with zero indicating maximum 
intellectual realism and 1 indicating maximum visual realism.  
4.2.6 Choice of Statistics 
 
As in the studies reported so far, it was deemed useful initially to explore the relationships 
in the data through the use of simple bivariate Pearson correlations. My interest was however 
especially in discovering a quadratic or U shaped relationship, if one existed, between age and 
drawing realism, while the Pearson correlation statistic essentially assesses only linear (straight 
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line) relationships. In order to overcome this, I included the square of age as well as age in the 
Pearson correlations (and indeed in the mixed model analysis below). Since the squares of 
numbers follow a quadratic pattern, with respect to their un-squared counterparts, anything 
correlating linearly with age squared would be exhibiting a U shaped relationship with age, or at 
least some part of such a U, while a linear correlation with age would reflect a simple linear 
relationship.  
At the next level of sophistication it was required to assess the nature of the age – drawing 
realism relationship treating age both as a between subjects and a within subjects variable. When 
examining the rate and pattern (linear or not) of the development of any characteristic with age, 
it is often deemed as ideal to pursue individuals longitudinally, gathering repeated measures 
from within the same subjects over time. In that way, individual characteristics of participants 
other than the one of interest would be eliminated from consideration. That is beneficial since 
such other characteristics might otherwise vary between children of different ages and some 
might have an impact on the trait of interest, and so become confounded with it. In a longitudinal 
design, however, arguably the subjects are their own controls since they are the same with 
respect to individual differences at all ages. In the present research, however, the age range that 
we wished to study in Study 3 was of the order of 6 years (from age 2 years six months to 8 
years six months). Hence it was not feasible within the scope a PhD study to undertake a fully 
longitudinal study of the development of drawing realism in the same individuals, and 
predominantly different children had to be measured at different ages. Nevertheless I wished to 
retain something of the benefit of longitudinal study so I additionally measured all the children 
three times over one year. The effect of this particular mixture of the within and between 
subjects designs was that I had a set of children of a wide range of ages, each measured three 
times within one year. This meant that age was a covariate in the design, but in such a way that it 
took different values on the occasion of each repeated measure. For instance, a child of age 60 
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months when first measured would be 72 months when measured for the third time. This departs 
from the standard situation which implementations of ANOVA deal with in statistical packages, 
where covariates are assumed to take constant values for each case across all repeated measures 
or occasions. In order to deal with this situation of a covariate which varied with repeated 
measures, within SPSS therefore it was found necessary to use the Mixed Linear Models option 
rather than the General Linear Model option (see further 4.3.2).  
 
4.3 Results 
In the current study, I needed primarily to ascertain the effects of age of the child, and of 
the time when the child was tested (out of three successive occasions), on their realism score in 
both the drawing and the selection tests. In order to test the hypothesis that the age related 
progression of visual realism followed a U-shape, it was necessary to include age in the analysis 
both as a linear and quadratic covariate (i.e. both age and age squared). Interaction effects of age 
and age squared with time were also of interest. Following the procedure used when analysing 
Study 1 and 2, I first performed correlation analysis, then, in this case, mixed linear model 
analysis.  
4.3.1 Correlation Analyses 
Bivariate correlation analyses were first conducted including all the independent variables  
gender, time, age and age squared - together with the dependent variables:  visual realism of 
drawing production and drawing selection scores. Scribbling production (raw numbers, out of 4) 
was also examined, simply as a means of demonstrating the validity of the drawing task 
instrument. A decrease in scribbling with age and time would naturally be expected, and, if 
observed, would support the view that the drawing tasks were performing as they should. In 
these analyses the maximum potential number of data points is 233 (the initial number of 
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children sampled) for each time when considered separately, and 699 when all times are 
considered together. In many analyses n is smaller than these figures due to missing data. 
4.3.1.1 Scribbling and other variables.  As Table 4.4 shows, with the data for all three 
times considered together, scribbling correlated negatively and highly significantly with time,  
r(591) = -.204, p < .001, and age, r(591) = -.697, p < .001, and age squared, r(591) = -.673,  p 
< .001. This is as would be expected, and is consistent with the findings of Study 1: older 
children are better able to inhibit scribbling. Interestingly gender also exhibited a highly 
significant negative correlation with scribbling, r(591) = -.223, p < .001, showing that girls 
scribbled less than boys. This could at least in part be due to the fact that gender also showed a 
small but significant positive correlation with age, r(697) = .196, p < .001. That is to say that 
girls in the sample tended to be on average slightly older than boys: for that reason, possibly they 
appeared also to scribble less. Notably there was no significant relationship, however, between 
scribbling and incidence, among non-scribble responses, of visual realism, r(421) = -.086, p 
= .079. 
4.3.1.2 Visual realism and other variables. Turning now to visual realism, there were no 
significant correlations with gender or time. Crucially, however, the relationships with both age 
and age squared were highly significant and positive. The relationship with age squared was 
however slightly stronger, r(421) = .228, p < .001, than that with age, r(421) = .216, p < .001, 
indicating some support for a U-shaped relationship between the two.  
 
 
155 
 
Table 4.4. Correlations between the variables of Study 3: Drawing production task (visual 
realism scores). 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1    Scribble       - 
 
 
  
2    Visual realism 
 
-.086 
      - 
 
  
3    Gender -.223*** .009      -   
4    Time 
 
-.204*** .062 .000 
      -  
5    Age 
 
-.697*** .216*** .196*** .304*** 
      - 
6    Age squared 
 
-.673*** .228*** .206*** .298*** .988*** 
(* p<.05, **p<.01, *** p<.001) 
 
The correlation analysis of the selection task data (Table 4.5) shows similar non-significant 
correlations with visual realism scores to those for drawing with respect to time,  r(584) = .002, p 
= .968, and gender, r(584) = .039, p = .340. A notable difference however is that, while the 
correlations between visual realism and both age and age squared are again positive and highly 
significant, the correlation coefficients are almost identical for the selection task: with age, r(584) 
= .335, p < .001; with age squared r(584) = .336, p < .001. This suggests that the distribution of 
the selection task visual realism scores against age is such that a U-shape and a linear pattern fit 
the data equally well.  
Table 4.5. Correlations between the variables of Study 3: Selection task (visual realism 
scores). 
 
 1 2 3 4 
1    Visual realism    -    
2    Gender .039    -   
3    Time .002 .000    -  
4    Age .335*** .196*** .304***   - 
5    Age squared .336*** .206*** .298*** .988*** 
(* p<.05, **p<.01, *** p<.001) 
 
The general picture emerging from the overall correlations is that age squared always has 
stronger positive correlations than age with the dependent drawing variable, although both are 
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highly significant. The difference between the correlations is however very small in the case of 
the selection task. The correlations of gender and time with drawing are weak. Since I was 
additionally interested in the interactive effects of age with time, I also calculated the 
correlations for each time separately (Table 4.6). 
Table 4.6. Correlations between the variables of Study 3, by time (visual realism scores). 
 
Time 
Mean Visual Realism 
(4 drawings) 
Mean Visual Realism 
(4 selections) 
 1 Gender .099 .124 
Age      .224**      .227** 
Age squared      .249**        .238*** 
2 Gender                  -.077 .044 
Age   .184*         .471*** 
Age squared   .191*         .462*** 
3 Gender .011 -.065 
Age   .213*         .360*** 
Age squared   .220*         .352*** 
(* p<.05, **p<.01, *** p<.001) 
 
Correlations with gender are again never significant, as would be expected. For the 
drawing production, positive correlations with age squared are greater than those with simple age 
at time one: with age r(142) = .224, p = .007; with age squared r(142) = .249, p = .003. The same 
is true at time two: (r(141) with age = .184, p = .027; r(141) with age squared = .191, p = .022. 
And again at time three: r(134) with age = .213, p = .013; r(134) with age squared = .220, p 
= .010. All however are significant. It is noticeable, however, that the correlations with age and 
with age squared, and the differences between those correlations, are stronger at time one than at 
times two or three. This suggests a possible interactive effect of time and age and of time and age 
squared, such that the U-shaped relationship is stronger at time one than at the other times for the 
drawing production task. 
The selection task data yields a different picture. All correlations of drawing selection with 
age or age squared are highly significant. However, it is only at time one that the correlation with 
age squared exceeds that with age: r(229) with age = .227, p = .001; r(229)  with age squared 
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= .238, p < .001. The reverse is true at time two: r(191) with age = .471,  p < .001; r(191) with 
age squared = .462, p < .001. And again at time three: r(160) with age = .360, p < .001; r(160) 
with age squared = .352, p < .001. The differences are small, however. Hence a U-shape is 
supported only at time one from the selection task correlation data. 
4.3.2 Mixed Linear Model Analyses 
Although correlation analysis produced some suggestively significant results in favour of 
my hypothesis concerning the U-shaped development of visual realism, at least with respect to 
the drawing task scores, they suffer from some major objections. One is that, in the overall 
analyses including all three times, they both treat the three times on which each child was 
measured as three independent groups of cases; in other words they treat data points at different 
times as independent of each other in the same way that each child is independent of each other 
child. In fact, however, the three times are not independent as they are repeated measures, which 
come from the same children. Hence it would be expected that responses at different times 
would be correlated within each child and not independent. The consequence of this is that 
correlation analyses may produce deceptively strong significance values, due to the fact that they 
effectively treat the data as if it consisted of 699 rather than 233 children. A small relationship 
detected in a sample of 699 is more likely to be judged as unlikely to be due to sampling error 
(i.e. significant) than the same relationship detected in a sample of 233. 
A second problem is that correlation analysis (and indeed regression analysis) cannot 
conveniently test interaction effects, and some such interactions are of interest in this study 
(those between age and time, and between age squared and time). 
In order to overcome these obstacles, I first considered using the repeated measures option 
within the general linear model (ANOVA), since that allows within-subjects variables (like time 
in our case) to be analysed along with between subjects factors like gender and (usually) 
covariates such as age. Since, however, the covariate of age did not take the same value for a 
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given child on all three of the repeated occasions (times) when the child was measured, the 
analysis could not be performed using the standard ANOVA or General Linear Model repeated 
measures options in SPSS. Instead it was necessary to employ Mixed Models analysis, since that 
allows for the inclusion of a covariate which takes different values for a participant at different 
levels of a repeated measures variable. Although the use of Mixed Models is usually associated 
with the inclusion in the model of multiple random factors, beyond the cases/participants 
themselves, in fact there was no need for this feature to be involved in the present case since I 
did not regard times or ages (or genders) as constituting random choices.  
A further advantage of the Mixed Model mode of analysis is that it uses the data in the 
‘long’ form (with repeated measures data listed in the same column, one column per variable, 
several rows per participant) rather than the ‘wide’ form (where repeated measures data is listed 
in columns side by side, one for each repeated-measures variable value, and with one row per 
participant). This in turn has the advantage that missing data is handled in a more refined way. In 
my data, there were a number of instances where a child produced only scribbles or missing 
drawings on one testing occasion (so was treated as missing on that occasion), but produced at 
least one valid drawing on other occasions (so was not missing on those occasions). Using data 
in the wide form (e.g. as occurs when using Repeated Measures ANOVA in SPSS), such a child 
would have their data excluded for that child as a whole, across all occasions. Using data in the 
long form, however, data gets excluded only for the occasion where the data was missing. Hence 
there is a reduced loss of data due to such circumstances. 
The mixed model analysis of the visual realism data of the drawing task (Table 4.7) shows 
that only one of the effects included in the model was significant. That is age squared:  F(1, 262) 
= 4.85, p = .028. Age as a linear component, by contrast, is not quite significant: F(1, 255) = 
3.56, p = .060. Thus, when the within-subjects variable of time is properly dealt with in the 
analysis, and interaction effects of age with time are taken into account, the analysis yields 
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significances which are much more clearly separated than those of the correlation analysis given 
above (Table 4.4). Time and gender continue to register no significant impact on drawing 
realism.  
Overall, since the relationship with age squared is significant while that with age is not, a 
U-shaped relationship fits the data better than a linear one, as may be observed visually also in 
Figure 4.4. The effect size is not large, however, since R
2
 for the linear trend is .046, while that 
for the quadratic trend is .058. 
Table 4.7. Mixed model analysis for Study 3, with visual realism in the drawing task as 
dependent. 
 
Source Numerator df Denominator df F p 
Intercept 1 248.102 3.934 .048 
Gender 1 413.874 .613 .434 
Time 1 291.087 1.006 .317 
Age 1 254.818 3.557 .060 
Age squared 1 262.000 4.853 .028 
Time * Age 1 293.056 1.435 .232 
Time * Age squared 1 296.200 1.849 .175 
 
In Figure 4.4, it may be seen that a quadratic or U-shape is quite clearly apparent, albeit the 
‘fall’ on the left-hand side is not strongly present. Arguably the best fit curve is more of a J than 
a U. This is however consistent with my hypothesis concerning the possible existence of an early 
visual realism stage. Such an early stage is, however, evidenced only in a quite weak way, in that 
even the highest visual realism scores on the left-hand side of the graph are below .7, and most 
participants record less than 50% of valid responses exhibiting visual realism. The majority even 
at that stage still exhibit intellectual realism. Furthermore, it is apparent that even at the lowest 
point of the U, around age 4½ years of age, where there is maximum evidence of intellectual 
realism, that maximum is not absolute since there always remains a minority of responses 
(around 40%), which exhibit visual realism. Furthermore, it is not until after around 7 years of 
age that children's responses tend to exhibit a definite majority of visual realism.  
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Figure 4.4. Mean realism scores on the drawing task (scale 0-1). 
 
 
Although the mixed model analysis did not show time, or any interactive effect of age with 
time, to be significant, the patterns for each time separately are descriptively informative. As 
Figure 4.5 shows, a U-shape is very visible at time 1, where the youngest age band is best 
represented, and even evidences a majority for the mean of visually realistic responses in the 
very lowest age group. At time 2 the left side of the graph starts level, resembling the bottom of a 
U, while at time three it more clearly resembles the steep start of the right-hand side of a U only. 
This is consistent with the lowest scores at each time exhibiting progression from left to right 
through a U-shape. It also suggests that any early visual realism stage rapidly passes as children 
move on from the very youngest age band in our sample.  
Figure 4.5. Time differences in age related progression in visual realism on the drawing 
task (scale 0-1). 
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Turning now to the selection task, as seen in Table 4.8, a number of effects are significant. 
The statistics firstly show that, once time is treated, as it should be, as a within subjects variable, 
and has its interactions with age taken into account, again the effect of age squared is significant, 
F(1, 392) = 4.39, p =.037, and that of age alone is not, F(1, 382) = 2.77, p = .097. The R
2
 values 
are, however, barely different: linear .112, quadratic .113. Furthermore, the evidence of Figure 
4.6 shows a rising monotonic pattern, which visually is somewhat ambiguous between a linear or 
quadratic trend. Certainly, if it really has a U-shape, it is very much the right-hand side of the U 
with no crucial high values of visual realism to the left of any low point, so not even 
approximating a J.  
Table 4.8. Mixed model analysis for Study 3, with visual realism in the selection task as 
dependent. 
 
Source Numerator df Denominator df F p 
Intercept 1 375.404 8.276 .004 
Gender 1 576.479 .902 .343 
Time 1 420.698 5.384 .021 
Age 1 381.774 2.767 .097 
Age squared 1 392.041 4.386 .037 
Time * Age 1 418.146 4.460 .035 
Time * Age squared 1 418.993 4.106 .043 
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Figure 4.6. Mean realism scores on the selection task. 
 
 
With respect to the visual realism results for the selection task, it must further be 
considered that the effect of time also emerges as significant, F(1, 421) = 5.38, p = .021, indeed 
more markedly so than that of age squared. Furthermore, the interaction effects of age with time, 
F(1, 418) = 4.46, p = .035, and of age squared with time, F(1, 419) = 4.11, p = .043, are also 
significant. Examined further (Figure 4.7), the simple time related effect is somewhat puzzling as 
it exhibits lower rates of visual realism at times 1 and 3 than at time 2, rather than a successive 
rise across times as would be expected. Figure 4.8 further illustrates the interaction effects. It 
shows that the change across ages does not follow the same pattern at different times. Instead of 
continuously rising patterns (monotonic) there are dips in certain age groups, but inexplicably 
these dips are in different age bands at different times. At the moment, I have no suggestion as to 
why such patterns would occur. Possibly the selection task results are non-informative due to the 
lower degree of concentration perceived by the researcher to be given by the children to this task 
(as noted in 4.2.6).  
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Figure 4.7. Time differences in visual realism on the selection task. 
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Figure 4.8. Time differences in age related progression in visual realism on the selection 
task. 
 
 
 
4.4 Discussion 
 
From Study 3, I found that correlational and mixed model analyses combine to give a 
reasonably consistent picture of the findings, at least for the drawing production results. The fact 
that different statistical methods produced similar findings suggests that the findings are reliable. 
I next discuss these findings, with an eye to the research hypotheses concerning a possible U-
shape to the development of visual realism of drawing (4.1.5).  
First, it is clear that the results agree in one basic respect when the drawing production task 
is considered in comparison with the drawing selection task. Both are consistent with the general 
finding that visual realism changes with age, as has been found in a number of studies such as 
Luquet (1927), Jolley and colleagues (2001). My findings do not however accord with Ford and 
Rees (2008), who failed to find any change in intellectual realism of pictures produced by typical 
children across an age range of 3 years 7 months to 7 years 5 months (discussed in 4.1.3). 
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 Secondly, the mixed model analysis findings from both tasks agreed in that they both 
showed a significant overall effect on visual realism of age squared, but not of age. Thus  both 
supported the existence of a quadratic pattern of development for visual realism which has not 
previously been established in typical children.  
Notwithstanding, the two tasks differed in that the drawing task showed some evidence of 
the left-hand side of a U-shape, while the selection task did not. This difference between the 
findings from the two tasks is however explicable on the basis of the difference in nature 
between the tasks, which we may suppose generates a lag, in the following way. Clearly, in the 
drawing production task, no prompt was offered to guide how the picture was drawn, apart from 
the objects themselves, which were displayed to the child, and the task was to produce a drawing. 
By contrast, in the drawing selection task, just two possible pictures were offered, with no 
further distractors, and the task was to receptively select and not productively draw. This made 
the selection task considerably easier, and, as reviewed in 4.1.4, it is a common finding that 
children evidence mature drawing behaviour receptively ahead of the age at which they produce 
it. It was found both by early studies such as Kosslyn and colleagues (1977) and Fayol and 
colleagues (1995) and by better designed studies (Jolley et al., 2001) that the age-related 
sequence which drawing production follows in children matched the sequence which their 
receptive selection preference followed, but with some lag. It is possible therefore to interpret the 
results for the bottom age band in Figure 4.6 as essentially corresponding, with lag, to a band 
after the base of the U-shape in Figure 4.4, such as the 55-64 months age band, and progressing 
from there. Hence the selection task scores are all after the low point of the U, and so, if anything, 
exhibit only the right-hand side of a U pattern.  
Next, I had anticipated (4.1.5) that, corresponding to the left hand side of a U, younger 
children up to around 4 years old would make greater use of visual than intellectual realism. 
From the U-shape found in the drawing production data, the evidence is that the point of least 
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evidence of visual realism, and greatest of intellectual realism, does lie at around the age of 4½ 
years. It is therefore possible to say that there is some evidence in support of this part of my 
hypothesis, in that, before this age, there was slightly more use of visual realism than at this age, 
at least for drawing production. Indeed, this result accords with the findings of Study 1, where a 
negative correlation was found between age and realism of drawing in the 3-4-years age range.  
Crucially, however, I was only able to demonstrate an actual majority use of visual realism 
over intellectual realism in this early age range at time 1 (Figure 4.5), not in the graph 
representing  the data as a whole (Figure 4.4). This is connected with the fact that although the 
result in favour of a quadratic trend is significant, the effect is quite small. As may be seen from 
Figure 4.4, the pattern for drawing is far from presenting a complete U. Instead, the left-hand 
side of the U is quite low, so visually the pattern is more of a J than a U. Furthermore, in terms of 
the measure used (mean proportion of visual drawings, out of all valid drawings), the mean 
sample value for the lowest age group overall is only .42. In other words, before the bottom of 
the U, when all times are considered together, there was still a majority (58%) of drawings being 
produced with intellectual realism and only a minority with visual realism. This minority then 
fell very slightly to produce the low point of the U/J before increasing steadily after that. Notably, 
it was only for the first time-point that a majority of responses in the lowest age band displayed 
visual realism (Figure 4.5). This section of the data of course included the lowest aged children 
in the entire study, and suggests that at the very lowest ages a majority of response (60%) is in 
fact visually realistic.  
Confronted with a picture like this, one might of course be encouraged to extrapolate the U 
pattern backwards into age groups earlier than those which I sampled. Then I might claim that, if 
I had sampled children below the age of 29 months, I might have obtained a result where visual 
realism of drawings was in a great majority over intellectual realism. This, however, we cannot 
do. The logical conclusion of such extrapolation would be that children in the womb have a 
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dominant ability to draw with visual realism. In reality, of course, even at the lowest age group 
which I sampled, I struggled to obtain a reasonable number of instances of valid drawings. 
Undoubtedly at earlier ages instances of omitted or scribbled drawings would rise to 100%, so 
that no data would be available to judge any type of realism. Indeed, the point at which children 
start to be able to produce a drawing with any sort of even partial representational or figurative 
realism is probably around age 2, the age of ‘fortuitous realism’ (Luquet, 1927). Hence, I must 
be content to have shown at least some evidence of the low age group side of a U pattern, as I 
have. Indeed, the implication is that it may be impossible to demonstrate a U-shape much more 
convincingly than I have done, even with a much larger sample of participants under the age of 
3½ years, due to the greatly increased rate of invalid drawings which children of such an age 
inevitably produce.  
Nevertheless, it constitutes an original and novel contribution to this area of research to 
have shown even slight, but significant, evidence of a U-shaped rather than a linear progression 
in visual realism of drawing development. This constitutes a modification of the picture revealed 
by the many studies which evidenced a progression where intellectual realism simply lost ground 
with age in favour of visual realism (Crook, 1985; Freeman, 1980; Riggs et al., 2013). Such 
studies often did not sample at the very low age bands, which I did, or, if they did, did not find, 
or did not notice, any evidence of greater use of visual realism at the lowest levels.  
There are several possible interpretations of my findings. One follows the argument used in 
the discussion of Study 1, and suggests that, prior to the age of 4 or 5, it is visual realism that is 
pre-potent and which has to be inhibited to increase the rate of use of intellectual realism in 
drawing tasks; then later intellectual realism becomes pre-potent and has to be inhibited so that 
visual realism re-emerges. This explanation however leaves unexplained why prepotency, and 
hence what it is that inhibitory control acts upon, should shift from visual to intellectual realism.  
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An alternative explanation, inspired by Morse and colleagues (2010), is a modification of 
the scenario suggested in 4.1.3. When a child first starts to inhibit her inclination to scribble, or 
starts identifying something representational in her scribbles, at age 2 onwards, she may perhaps 
be at a mixed stage of cognitive development with respect to cognitive categories for common 
objects such as are often included in tests of drawing development (mugs and balls etc.). For 
some of these she may already have developed idealised stereotypical mental categories, where a 
mug, for example, always has a handle, and these are prepotent when it comes to drawing such 
an object (intellectual realism). For others, she may not yet have developed any such category, 
and so of necessity relies on local information in the form of specific exemplars of the objects 
exactly as they appear in the environment at the time of attempting to draw them (visual realism). 
At age 3½ she has perhaps reached over 50% category formation for such objects and this 
increases to nearly 60% at age 4½, as reflected in the rate of drawing with intellectual realism.  
Thereafter, however, with development of IC (Study 1), the default choice of what to draw, 
in ‘draw what you see’ tasks, shifts from the general category that is in the mind to what is 
specifically in the environment. The pre-potency of the stored concept/image starts to be 
inhibited and visual realism starts regaining ground in children’s drawing, regardless of whether 
the child possesses or does not possess a mental category for the object to be drawn (and by this 
time children would surely possess such categories for all the items commonly used in drawing 
tests). The internal ‘intellectual’ information however continues to interfere (following the 
Morse model: Morse et al., 2010) with their performance in tasks where they are actually asked 
to draw what they see. Finally, their category development matures but they learn to operate both 
with the general mental categories and with the specific exemplars of those categories as 
perceived in daily life, without interference between one and the other, and use those two types 
of information appropriately when one of them is called for and not the other in a task (e.g. 
‘draw a mug from memory’ versus ‘draw the mug as you see it presented to you now’). That is 
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to say that pre-potent intellectual realism is finally widely inhibited in tasks where the request is 
to draw what is seen (For & Rose, 2008; Luquet, 1927/2001).  
In this view, the choice of visual realism at the early stage would be due to absence of a 
mental category to be relied upon, while at the later stage it arises through inhibition of an 
existing mental category, when the task requires it. This is consistent with the general 
observation of Morse and colleagues (2010) that the two high points of a U typically arise from 
quite different cognitive backgrounds that exist at the relevant ages. In other words, this 
explanation introduces the idea that intellectual realism is pre-potent from the start, and does not 
(around age 4-5) replace pre-potency of visual realism: the apparent greater preference for visual 
realism at an early age, under this account, is simply due to deficit, in the form of lack of the 
mental category which is a prerequisite for intellectual realism to operate. Clearly future research, 
which replicated Study 3 but included also measures of IC and of category formation, might 
address further this issue.  
Turning to my second expectation, that corresponding to the low point of a U, around 4 to 
6 years old, children would evidence greater reliance on intellectual realism in their drawing, I 
would have to say that the relevant age band characterised by drawing with intellectual realism 
appears somewhat wider in my data than 4-6 years. If we regard the age band dominated by 
drawing with intellectual realism as being that where the mean proportion of visual realism is 
less than .5 (50%), then this period runs from my lowest age group up to around 6½ or so. Only 
around that time does the proportion of visual realistic drawings tend to exceed 50% of valid 
drawings produced.  
Finally, with respect to the prediction that, corresponding to the right hand side of a U, 
approaching 8 years old, children would revert to dominance of visual realism, my results 
suggest that the switch to a majority of visually realistic drawings occurs around age 7 rather 
than 8. However, as I have shown in my discussion above, this cannot be unequivocally be 
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referred to as ‘switching back’ to a dominant use of visual realism which obtained at an earlier 
age, since my data does not comprehensively succeed in demonstrating an early stage where 
visual realism actually predominates over intellectual realism. It remains best treated as the age 
of onset of visual realism, if we mean by that a majority use of visual realism in tasks which call 
for it. My finding is therefore broadly consistent with Cox (1991), who reported children as able 
to overcome the early intellectual realism strategy between the ages of 5 and 8 years. It also 
accords with Luquet (1913) who stated that between the ages of 5 and 8 years, children produce 
intellectually realistic drawings: in my data even at age 8 they are still producing up to 10% of 
intellectually realistic drawings. However, in my data they also produce such drawings before 
age 5. Davis (1983) more precisely reported that 59% of 5-6 year old children drew visually 
realistically when a single cup was placed in front of them with the handle out of sight. My data 
on this item and age band separately yields the value of   55%, which is remarkably close.  
If we consider finally the evidence of the selection task with respect to age of onset of 
visual realism (calculated in the same way as above), then the picture is strikingly different. We 
can see from Figure 4.6 that the age when choice of visually realistic drawings starts to exceed 
the choice of intellectually realistic drawings is around age 4 years. This is at least two and a half 
years before this happens in my data for drawings that are produced rather than selected (Figure 
4.4). This however is to be expected, since as discussed above, a lag is typically found between 
receptive and productive drawing test scores. In my data, this lag appears to be of the order of 
2½ years. 
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Chapter 5.  Summary and Conclusion 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I first summarize and discuss the findings of the three studies conducted for 
this thesis. I then present the limitations of the study and conclude by making some suggestions 
for further research.  
5.2 Overview of the three studies 
In the present study, three separate but connected studies were conducted with young 
children, together illuminating the inter-connections between Inhibitory Control (of the response 
inhibition type), Motor Control (both Fine and Gross), and several drawing skills (Figurative 
Representation and Detail, and Visual vs Intellectual Realism), together with Gender, verbal IQ 
and Age. It therefore contributes to extending our understanding of the relative roles of the 
Executive Function, represented by Inhibitory Control, and the physical aspects of drawing 
ability, represented by Motor Control, in determining the qualities of a young child’s drawing, 
and the pattern of development of these over time. An association between Inhibitory Control 
and at least some drawing skills in preschool children had already been established from 
previous findings (Panesi & Morra, 2016; Riggs et al, 2013). My studies built on this foundation 
to clarify the additional involvement of Motor Control. Indeed they show that all types of 
drawing skills are not related in the same way with Inhibitory Control and Motor Control and 
furthermore do not follow the same developmental trajectory.  
Overall, my findings give us a better understanding of the role of Inhibitory Control during 
early childhood development. An important finding (Studys 1 and 2) is the direct and strong 
relationship between Inhibitory Control and Fine Motor Control, but perhaps surprisingly, not 
Gross Motor Control. Even though Fine Motor Control and Gross Motor Control are directly 
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associated, there is only an indirect association between Gross Motor Control and Inhibitory 
Control. Furthermore, an association was established between Inhibitory Control and drawing 
skills. This relationship was positive for those measured by the figurative representation and 
figurative detail scales (which quantify respectively how far a drawing represents a real object 
recognizable to an adult, and with what degree of detail). However, the pattern of results differed 
for the Visual realism measure of drawing (which measures how far the child draws objects 
exactly as they see them, rather than with properties which they know they possess but cannot 
see). That was not associated with Fine Motor Control, but rather with Inhibitory Control. 
Furthermore (Study 3), its developmental progress was shown to follow a partial U-shaped 
pattern moving in some measure from visual realism to intellectual then back to visual, rather 
than a monotonic one. 
5.2.1 Study 1: The relationship between Inhibitory Control, Fine Motor Control, 
and Drawing skills  
Study 1 primarily was concerned with evaluating three alternative accounts of the role of 
Inhibitory Control in drawing skill. These were termed respectively the Symbolic Competence 
account, the Behavioural Inhibition account and the Motor Development account. The first two 
had been introduced, in essence though not by name, by Riggs and colleagues (2013), while the 
third was proposed here.  
Riggs and colleagues (2013) state that the Symbolic Competence account suggests that 
effective inhibition is associated with the domain-general development of symbolic 
understanding which in turn is essential to improvement in drawing skill. The Behavioural 
Inhibition account, on the other hand, proposes that inhibition is directly required to suppress 
immature drawing behaviour and so lead to drawing skill improvement (Golomb, 1992; 
Ebersbach et al., 2011; Morra, 2008; Panesi & Morra, 2016; Riggs et al., 2013). The third and 
final account is the Motor Development account which suggests that inhibition improves 
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drawing skill due to its direct relationship with Fine Motor Control, without which the finer hand 
movements required for good drawing cannot be made. This led me to three areas of prediction.  
One hypothesis was that all three of the accounts predicted a relationship between 
Inhibitory Control and the Figurative Representation and Figurative Detail aspects of drawing 
skill. The Behavioural Inhibition account, however, predicted this relationship to be direct, while 
the other two regarded it as indirect. The Motor Development account proposed it to be mediated 
through Fine Motor Control, while the Symbolic Competence account saw it as mediated 
through Symbolic Understanding, although since Study 1 did not measure Symbolic 
Understanding, in my study the link would appear to be direct (and with a particularly strong 
association expected between Inhibitory Control and Figurative Representation).  
The findings here did not support the Behavioural Inhibition account since there was only 
an indirect association of Inhibitory Control with Figurative Representation and Detail, mediated 
via Fine Motor Control. The Symbolic Competence account was also not supported, due to the 
notable indirect rather than direct association of Inhibitory Control with Figurative 
Representation (and Figurative Detail), mediated via Fine Motor Control. The Motor 
Development account, however, was supported since it alone predicted a strong positive 
association of Inhibitory Control with FMC, which would mediate its relationship with 
children’s performance on the Figurative Representation and Detail. 
The second area of hypothesizing was that only the Behavioural Inhibition account 
predicted a relationship between Inhibitory Control and degree of Visual Realism of drawing (in 
contrast with intellectual realism). That is, it suggested that children needed to inhibit a tendency 
to draw what they know is there in order to correctly draw just what they can actually see. It 
further predicted that this link would be direct, not mediated, and, following the literature, that 
Visual Realism would move from intellectual to visual as Inhibitory Control strengthened, thus 
showing positive correlations. The other two accounts did not appear to predict anything definite, 
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since the visual-intellectual dimension of drawing skill might be deemed not to differ in demands 
made upon Symbolic Understanding or Motor Control ability. The findings supported the 
Behavioural Inhibition account, in that a direct link was indeed found between Inhibitory Control 
and Visual Realism of the children’s drawing, not mediated through Fine Motor Control. The 
relationship was, however, unexpectedly negative (see further below).  
Third, on the basis of much previous research, age was in all the three accounts expected to 
be positively associated with performance on all types of drawing ability, as well as increased 
Inhibitory Control and Fine Motor Control. Indeed, the transition in middle childhood from 
intellectual realism to visual realism (Clark, 1897; Freeman and Janikoun, 1972) is one of the 
oldest findings in cognitive development. Furthermore, use of visual realism is usually seen as 
increasing monotonically during childhood (Cox, 2005; Golomb, 2002; Jolley, 2010). Gender 
was, on the basis of previous research, not expected to be associated with drawing skills. These 
expectations were supported for all the variables except Visual Realism, whose relationship with 
age (and Inhibitory Control) was significantly negative rather than positive (i.e. intellectual 
realism increased rather than decreased with age).  
Overall, the findings support the view that theories which try to explain the relationship 
between inhibition and drawing skill might well be expected to include Fine Motor Control in 
some way, at least with respect to those drawing measures which focus on the degree to which a 
drawing has more representational quality and detail, rather than being a simpler representation 
or indeed just a scribble. This dimension of drawing ability is, after all, a skill clearly requiring 
careful hand motor control. Two of the accounts of drawing development, however, do not refer 
explicitly to Fine Motor Control as a relevant variable in the model. The Symbolic Competence 
account proposes that inhibition helps the development of symbolic understanding, and only in 
that way impacts on drawing skill, yet Fine Motor Control, which does not require symbolic 
understanding, is not mentioned. On the other hand, the Behavioural Inhibition account suggests 
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that the development of drawing skill occurs only through directly inhibiting previously 
established drawing behaviour. This again does not refer explicitly to any involvement of Fine 
Motor Control. My Study 1 therefore established that Fine Motor Control, as well as Inhibitory 
Control, must both be present in any convincing model of drawing skill development (though it 
does not rule out that other variables, such as Symbolic Understanding, which I did not measure, 
may also prove to play a key role). What this next prompted me to consider was the issue of 
whether Gross Motor Control, which is known to be associated with Fine Motor Control, is also 
intimately related to Inhibitory Control, and this became the issue which formed the core of 
Study 2 (next section).  
In contrast with the findings for Figurative Representation and Detail, when it comes to 
measures of drawing skill which focus on the degree of intellectual versus visual realism, my 
findings were quite different. Fine Motor Control no longer played a key mediational role and it 
was the direct effect of inhibition which emerged as paramount, thus supporting the Behavioural 
Inhibition account rather than the Motor Development account. While this makes sense, since 
similar levels of motor control are surely needed to produce both visually and intellectually 
realistic drawings (where non-realistic drawings are, as they were, treated as missing data), it 
does bring to the fore the idea, not hitherto much emphasized, that drawing skills do not 
constitute a homogeneous set of constructs. Hence, different accounts or models are needed to 
explain different dimensions of drawing skill.  
While the finding that inhibition was directly linked to performance on the Visual Realism 
scale came as little surprise, it was initially quite unexpected that young children who had 
acquired better Inhibitory Control were better able to produce intellectually realistic drawings, 
rather than more visually realistic ones. This negative association, reflected also in the 
correlation between age and Visual Realism, was a paradoxical finding since the standard view 
in the literature is that children progress from drawing with intellectual realism to visually 
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realistic drawing, not the reverse. Hence the role of inhibition is usually claimed to be to prevent 
behaviour that could lead to intellectually realistic drawings so that visually realistic drawing can 
be produced (Crook, 1985; Freeman, 1980; Riggs et al., 2013). In my findings, the reverse was 
the case: visual realism seemed to be being inhibited in order to produce intellectually realistic 
drawings.  
However, this finding is not as contrary to the established theory as may seem at first 
glance. The most common age group selected to investigate the developmental shift from 
intellectual to visual realism is between the ages of 5 and 10 years (Bremner & Moore, 1984; 
Chen & Holman, 1989; Cox, 1978; Cox & Martin, 1988; Freeman, Eiser and Sayers, 1977; 
Freeman & Janikoun, 1972; Taylor & Bacharach, 1982), whereas the participants in my study 
were 3 and 4 year olds. Therefore, it is quite possible that while 5 to 10 year olds do evidence 
increasing preference for visual realism, younger children may exhibit a different progression of 
preferences. I proposed therefore that the younger subjects in my study were progressing from a 
very early stage where their preference was for drawing with visual realism into a stage around 
age 5 where preference for drawing with intellectual realism is at its greatest. Hence for them it 
was visual realism that needed to be inhibited in order to execute drawing with more intellectual 
realism.  
This scenario then provides a plausible explanation for the negative correlation between 
Inhibitory Control and Visual realism of Drawing in preschool children. Such young children 
need to inhibit visual realism so as to be able to draw in an intellectually realistic manner, thus 
supporting the Behavioural Inhibition account. This can be further explained by arguing that 
young preschool children, at the point when they emerge from just scribbling, may indeed 
initially simply draw what they see, which corresponds to visual realism. If so, this would 
require effective inhibition in order to draw something beyond visual realism. Studies of young 
talented artists and autistic children gifted in drawing have indeed provided evidence of visual 
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realism in early drawing development (Golomb, 1992; Selfe, 1983; Winner, 1996), although to 
my knowledge this has not previously been shown for typical preschool children such as those in 
Study 1.  
This then suggested a second line of enquiry to be followed up in the current study (in 
Study 3):  the precise development with age of visual and intellectual realism of drawing, across 
a comprehensive range of ages from below the age group of those in Study 1 up to age 9 years. If 
my suspicion was correct, it was possible that a U-shaped pattern of development might be 
observed. 
5.2.2 Study 2: The relationships between Inhibitory Control, Fine Motor Control, 
Gross Motor Control and General Intelligence  
Study 2 had two main aims. First, I wished to examine what specific relationships could be 
found between different subsets of motor skills (i.e. Gross and Fine Motor Control) and the 
executive function (specifically Inhibitory Control) in typical developing children aged 3 to 5 
years old. In particular, did the relationship between Inhibitory Control and Fine Motor Control 
found in Study 1 extend to Gross Motor Control? If so, how? In fact, the relationship between 
Inhibitory Control and Gross Motor Control was found not to be direct, but mediated by Fine 
Motor Control. The relationship between Inhibitory Control and Fine Motor Control by contrast 
was found to be both direct and mediated by Gross Motor Control. However, the size of the 
direct link (B=.074, p<.001) was greater than that of the indirect association via Gross Motor 
Control (B=.019, p<.05). In short, Inhibitory Control is more intimately linked to Fine than to 
Gross Motor Control in pre-school children. 
Second, I wished to confirm that the association between Inhibitory Control and Motor 
Control could not be explained by general intelligence (IQ). In fact, it was only in the analysis 
with Inhibitory Control as main predictor and Fine Motor Control as dependent that IQ did have 
a significant effect on Fine Motor Control mediated through Gross Motor Control, in the 
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presence of Gender and Age (B=.041, p=.013). This was however less than both the direct effect 
(B=.074) and the total effect of Inhibitory Control on Fine Motor Control, not considering 
General Motor Control (B=.093). Hence the role of IQ must be considered minor. 
Study 2 was novel in at least three ways. First it showed the relationship between 
Inhibitory Control and Fine Motor Control at an age level where it has not been considered 
before in typical children. Secondly it demonstrated the role of Gross Motor Control as an added 
variable in that relationship. The latter has been considered in relation to Inhibitory Control at 
the age level of my study before, but not in the presence of Fine Motor Control in the same 
study. Third it revealed the limited impact of IQ on those other inter-relationships. 
There are many previous studies confirming the relationship between motor control and 
executive function in older children and adolescents diagnosed with DCD (Leonard and Hill, 
2015). Such a relationship specifically exists between inhibition and motor control in typically 
developing infants, and 5- and 6-year-olds, as well as adolescents (Gottwald et al, 2016; St. John 
et al, 2016; Livesey et al, 2006; Rigoli et al, 2012). The first evidence for an association between 
Inhibitory Control and Fine Motor Control specifically in 3 and 4 year olds is however provided 
by the current study. This age is in fact usually the time when Inhibitory Control develops most 
rapidly, according to several authors (Garon et al., 2014; Johansson, et al., 2015; Petersen, et al., 
2016; Simpson & Riggs, 2005; Wiebe et al., 2012). There are two possible explanations for the 
correlation. First, Inhibitory Control may in fact be needed so that effective Fine Motor Control 
can develop. Second, the notion of embodied cognition may explain why Fine Motor Control 
and Inhibitory Control develop alongside one another. The embodied cognition theory provides 
an explanation as to how executive function and motor control development are associated by 
means of its suggestion that human cognition is built through the physical interaction that our 
bodies have with the world (Marshall, 2016; Shapiro, 2011).  
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In Study 2, the current study not only confirmed that Fine Motor Control is indeed directly 
associated with Inhibitory Control in early childhood but additionally demonstrated the position 
of Gross Motor Control with respect to these. Hitherto it has been unclear which specific 
components of the motor system are linked to the executive function more than others in this age 
group, and how these relationships change during development, although Gross Motor Control 
has been separately shown to be related to Inhibitory Control at 24 months (St. John et al., 2016). 
My finding is that Inhibitory Control is significantly and directly related to Fine Motor Control, 
and indeed also, less strongly, but still significantly, via Gross Motor Control. A variety of 
different analyses however failed to show any instances where Gross Motor Control and 
Inhibitory Control were directly linked, if Fine Motor Control was included in the analysis at the 
same time.  
A Dynamic Systems account can provide the explanation for different components of the 
motor system interacting with executive function at different ages in this way. At the age of one 
year, infants usually begin to walk, hence maximizing the relationship between Gross Motor 
Control and executive function. By the age of two years, infants are exploring their environment. 
Later on, Fine Motor Control is more prominent, allowing for the development of more delicate 
skills in preschoolers, such as drawing and dressing.  
This finding I also deem to be consistent with the Motor Development account of how 
drawing skill develops, and so with the result of Study 1, at least with respect to the drawing 
skills of Figurative Representation and Detail. Recall that the Motor Development account 
proposed that Inhibitory Control and Fine Motor Control are associated directly in early 
childhood and indeed that Inhibitory Control affects drawing skill only via Fine Motor Control. 
Study 2 extended this through a mediation analysis with regression and bootstrapping showing 
that, after controlling for age, gender and IQ, a relationship existed between Inhibitory Control 
and Fine Motor Control both directly and, less strongly, mediated through Gross Motor Control.  
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Another explanation for the relationship between inhibition and motor control is related to 
how Inhibitory Control develops in pre-school children. An explanation which fits the 
Behavioural Inhibition account, suggested by Simpson and Riggs (2007), is that as the strength 
of inhibition increases, inappropriate responses are put on hold, and this was supported by the 
findings of Study 1 with respect to the drawing skill of Visual Realism. Alternatively, however, 
Diamond, Kirkham and Amso (2002) suggest that such findings arise because Inhibitory Control 
improves due to behaviour slowing down, and hence the child being able to take better care to 
produce the appropriate response. There is some evidence to support this explanation, found in 
preschool children who performed better on inhibitory tasks when their response was slowed 
down (Diamond et al., 2002; Simpson & Riggs, 2007; Simpson et al., 2012; although see Barker 
& Munakata, 2015; Ling, Wong & Diamond, 2016). Evidence specifically related to drawing 
and showing that improved Inhibitory Control is associated with slowed responding comes from 
a study by Lange-Küttner (2000) who found that children slowed down whilst drawing open 
shapes rather than closed shapes. She suggests that, in order to integrate different segments and 
components into an overall outline in a drawing, a child is reliant on being able to modify their 
procedural speed.    
If effective Inhibitory Control in preschool children is indeed reliant on being more careful 
and responding slowly then one might suggest that such behaviour could also improve 
performance on the more delicate motor control tasks as well. Hence, this suggestion is 
compatible with the observation in Studys 1 and 2 of a link between Inhibitory Control and Fine 
Motor Control but not between Inhibitory Control and Gross Motor Control. Since, however, 
none of the studies in the current research either measured or manipulated speed of response, this 
must remain for now in the realm of conjecture.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
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5.2.3 Study 3: The pattern of development of Visual Realism in children’s drawing. 
Study 3 set out to confirm and extend the striking finding of Study 1 that the relationship 
of age (and indeed of Inhibitory Control) with the drawing skill of Visual Realism was highly 
significant but negative in the pre-school age range. In order to obtain information about 
children’s receptive ability with respect to drawing realism to complement information on their 
drawing production ability, I measured not only their skill of picture drawing of objects in view, 
as in Study 1, but also their skill of selecting the picture which most closely resembled objects in 
view. This also allowed the researcher to obtain data relevant to the assessment of visual realism 
from children who were as yet unable to produce a drawing that was not a scribble, and hence 
gave no information about their realism in drawing production. This study furthermore included 
a much wider age range (from 29 to 102 months) than the previous ones, so as to have the best 
chance of showing a U-shaped pattern of development, if one existed. Finally, in order to obtain 
the benefits of a within subjects design, at least in part, it re-measured the same children three 
times over the period of one year, with six month intervals. Naturally, however, it was not 
practical within the time span of a PhD to follow up the same children over the entire age range 
of interest in a fully longitudinal study (which would have taken six years). 
It was hypothesised that the children would progress through a U-shaped continuum of 
behaviour with respect to Visual Realism of drawing following a pattern which, for convenience, 
could be divided into three phases. Initially (the left-side of the U), younger children (up to 
around 4-years-olds) would make greater use of visual than of intellectual realism, provided they 
did not just scribble. Next (the low point of the U), there would be a period (perhaps 4- to 6-
years-olds) when children would evidence greater reliance on intellectual realism. Finally (the 
right-hand side of the U) children approaching 8-years-old would revert to dominance of visual 
realism. This pattern was substantially confirmed, in that in the mixed models analyses a 
quadratic trend fitted the data significantly, while a linear trend did not. There are however some 
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reservations as to the first phase, where a left-hand side of a U was only weakly supported for the 
drawing production and not at all for the picture selection: hence the overall pattern followed 
more a J than a U-shape.  
This study demonstrated that indeed, when Visual Realism of drawing is plotted against 
age across an age range of 2½ to 8½ years, a quadratic pattern fits the data for picture drawing, 
and, less markedly, for picture selection. In other words, in picture drawing, both the youngest 
and oldest in the age range exhibited higher proportions of visual realism while those in between 
displayed more intellectual realism. As to picture selection, it may be argued that this, as a two-
choice receptive selection task, was much easier than picture drawing, and therefore presented 
children as more advanced in Visual Realism than did their scores for picture drawing (Jolley et 
al., 2001). Even for the youngest children, therefore, the pattern of scores for picture selection 
had progressed to the right-hand half of the U-shape, and the overall pattern did not exhibit the 
two-peak J shape found for picture drawing. 
My study was informed by Luquet’s (1927) account of drawing realism development. 
Indeed, it is Luquet who popularized the terms ‘intellectual realism’ and ‘visual realism’ for the 
last two stages of this kind of development, after some form of representational drawing has 
become dominant. Luquet however recognises a number of stages prior to these two, which he 
discusses under labels such as ‘fortuitous realism’, ‘failed realism’ and ‘intentional realism’. As 
far as I am aware, he does not apply the terms intellectual or visual at these earlier stages, where 
he is more concerned with characterizing child progress in terms of being able, or not, to produce 
any form of drawing that would be recognized by an adult as figurative representation, i.e. as 
representing something definite. Nevertheless it makes sense to ask, even at the stage of failed 
realism, whether what the child failed to fully represent successfully was in fact what they were 
looking at (visual realism) or a mental representation of an ideal exemplar of something 
(intellectual realism). My study in effect suggests that there may exist a (probably brief) stage 
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between failed realism and intellectual realism, in Luquet’s terms, where the child, given a 
sufficiently simple object to draw (e.g. a mug or a ball rather than a human figure), may produce 
a drawing where the realism is not failed, but it is visual rather than intellectual. Such a stage 
might be termed ‘early visual realism’. 
Neither Luquet nor anyone else to my knowledge has discussed a possible U-shape in the 
development of drawing realism in typical children. Instead, a linear or at least monotonic 
pattern of progression is always claimed or assumed (e.g. Jolley and Rose, 2008). Hence, I drew 
on more general accounts of U-shaped developmental phenomena such as that presented by 
Morse and colleagues (2010). This recognized that a variety of phenomena in child development 
exhibit a U-shaped progression, such as famously the ability to produce irregular verb forms. 
They share, however, a number of features. The early success is characterized as due to children 
working in some sense in a local and isolated way. Later the child refines or reorganizes their 
underlying knowledge, e.g. by seeing general patterns. While this is occurring, performance 
changes in some instances to what is often from the adult or objective point of view the wrong 
performance. Finally, the reorganization concludes and new abilities are established in such a 
way that the correct performance emerges again, while the new cognitive structures are 
essentially retained. This is very obvious for the irregular verbs where a child initially simply 
copies what he/she hears, e.g. toy broke. Later, however, the child notices that many verbs in the 
past end in a sound /d/ or /t/, e.g. walked, loved and begins to form a mental rule. For a time this 
generalization dominates their thinking and the child may then say erroneously toy breaked. 
Finally, the child gets to realize that there are exceptions to the generalization and reverts to the 
correct form broke in the case of that verb, although this is now based on knowledge radically 
different from that before. It is no longer an isolated fact but identified cognitively as an 
exception relative to a general pattern.  
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Analogously one can see the child as initially, as soon as they manage to inhibit scribbling 
and draw something recognizable, trying to draw just what they see in the local context when 
they are drawing (early visual stage). Later, however they increasingly notice that many objects 
which they see (e.g. mugs) are in some slightly abstract sense the same, even though they differ 
in details like colour and precise shape. E.g. they all have handles, are made of some opaque 
material, are taller than they are wide, and usually contain something to drink. Hence, they begin 
to form mental categories which incorporate these prototypical features. Temporarily they are 
captivated by this discovery, so that these categories become their pre-potent response, even 
when the task is to draw an exemplar that does not have all the features visible (intellectual 
realism stage). Finally, they manage to inhibit that general response where they are asked to 
draw what they actually see in a particular context (visual realism stage), although they will of 
course still draw on the mental category when asked to draw a mug or whatever from their 
general memory of it. Thus, the cognitive abilities underlying the correct response at the end are 
quite different from those underlying the correct observed performance at the start. 
In conclusion, it must be noted, however, that while the evidence for a quadratic trend of 
visual realism development with age was undoubtedly supported by the significance tests for 
both tasks, the existence of a full U-shape, with a clear left-hand side, is more questionable, even 
for the drawing production task. In fact, the most convincing indication of a full U-shape came 
only from the drawing task on the first data gathering occasion, when the greatest number of the 
youngest participants was available (Figure 4.4). Here the mean for Visual Realism achieved a 
value greater than 0.5 for the youngest group (under 45 months of age), showing that a majority 
of the drawings were in fact visually realistic. This gave way at higher ages to a majority of 
intellectually realistic drawings, and a majority of visual drawing was not achieved again until 
after the age of 75 months.  
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5.3 Limitations of the study 
The field of investigation which the present thesis was engaged with, concerning the 
development of cognitive and motor aspects of young children, relies heavily for the validity of 
its conclusions on the careful choice, creation and administration of various tasks suited to the 
age groups of the children involved, which are used to measure the key variables involved. In the 
current study, great care was therefore taken in particular to make sure that the key variables of 
Fine Motor Control, Gross Motor Control, and Inhibitory Control were quantified in ways which 
uncontestably quantified the intended constructs and were not contaminated by partly measuring 
each other at the same time. For example, the SRC tasks used to measure Inhibitory Control 
were chosen from the range commonly used in studies of this variable specifically because they 
have minimal motor demands. Whilst the day/night task requires only a verbal response, it is true 
that the grass/snow task and the tapping task require a manual response. Nevertheless, I argue 
that this is not a limitation since the motor element is undemanding and performed with no time 
constraints. Therefore, although some might see this a limitation of this task, I deem that it is 
very unlikely that children with more effective Fine Motor Control performed better on the 
inhibitory tasks purely as a function of their motor demands.  
Related to this point is that in Study 1 I found that the IC measurement tasks, both of 
which required knowledge of the words sun and moon, were too difficult for a few children 
simply due to the fact that they did not know the words sun and moon. Hence they responded 
with guessing, which of course meant that on some occasions they gave the right (inhibitory) 
response purely by chance. I countered this issue however by excluding these children from the 
analyses, and in the second study remedied this by including the tapping task which measures IC 
without the requirement for lexical knowledge of this sort. 
In Study 3, there was perhaps a limitation related to subject sampling. Despite my efforts 
to access sufficient children right through the age range of interest, there was in the end a rather 
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limited number of children producing valid drawings (i.e. ones that were sufficiently 
representational to be able to be scored for exhibiting visual or intellectual realism) in the very 
lowest age bands (under 45 months). This is reflected in the wide confidence intervals for the 
lowest age groups represented in Figures such as 4.4. The youngest children are, however, 
crucial for the demonstration of a clear left-hand side to any U-shaped relationship between age 
and degree of Visual Realism of drawing. It is undoubted that, as one samples children at 
successively lower ages below the age of 4, it becomes increasingly difficult to obtain drawings 
with any degree of figurative representation. Hence clearly very large numbers of such children 
need to be recruited in order to obtain a really solid basis for claims about a left-hand side to the 
U pattern. A disadvantage then, however, would be that many children of that age would remain 
unrepresented in the study, since the majority would still be scribbling. An alternative could be 
to rely on the picture selection task rather than drawing production at that age. However, that too 
carries disadvantages since it did not seem from our findings that the pattern of results of the 
selection task matched that from the drawing task directly at all, but only possibly with a 
considerable time lag. That is to say that children appear more advanced in development on an 
easier receptive task such as picture selection than they do on a harder production task such as 
picture drawing. Hence it may be that, as in our study, relying only on selection data will mean 
that no U or J shape will ever emerge. 
Finally, some difficulties were experienced with the picture selection task. This was 
administered immediately after the drawing tasks, in the same session, and the researcher noticed 
that some children seemed unwilling to do it. For this reason, possibly they did not all respond 
very assiduously, as could be reflected in the somewhat lower item-total correlations obtained 
for this task compared with the drawing production task. With hindsight, if doing such a study 
again, it would be advisable not to attempt to administer both tasks in the same session. This 
would not only combat fatigue, but also the fact that the same objects were represented as had 
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been used in the drawing task (as was desirable so as to control for any object familiarity effect). 
Some children in fact complained that they were being asked to respond about the very same 
things that they had just drawn pictures of. If, on the other hand, the selection task was on a 
different day, the drawings they had made themselves would not be fresh in their minds. The 
selection task could also be made more appealing to young children if presented, for example, on 
a tablet with the response being to place a sticker on the preferred picture, rather than in hard 
copy with the response being merely to point.  
Other possible limitations concern further variables which, in retrospect, might usefully 
have been included, which will be considered in  section 5.5. 
 
5.4 Implications 
This study has implications of a number of types. First, as summarized in 5.2, there are at 
least two considerable implications for theory. In particular the study has contributed 
substantially to finding an answer to the issue of which of the three currently suggested accounts 
of the relationship between IC and drawing skill is correct.  My work has importantly shown that 
there is in fact no single answer to the issue of which account is correct. It depends on what 
drawing skill is considered. Thus while the Motor Development account seems suitable to 
explain development of figurative, representational aspects of young children’s drawing, it is the 
Behavioural Inhibition account which better explains the development of visual realism.  
Secondly, the non-linear relationship between age and visual realism of drawing which I 
uncovered is in striking contrast to the predominant finding of recent decades, albeit with slightly 
older children than mine, that visual realism simply starts low and increasingly supplants 
intellectual realism. Although a U shaped development starting in children at pre-school age is 
well known in certain areas, such as the development of irregular language forms, it was 
somewhat of a novelty to find it in a similar age range in an area such as drawing development. 
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We might speculate however that there could be a similar underlying mechanism. Very young 
children have an under-developed cognitive apparatus, and so rely heavily on input to guide their 
production. If they hear mice they say mice. If they see a mug without a handle in view, they 
draw it without a handle. As their cognitive ability develops, however, they establish mental 
categories, patterns or rules. When more than one thing is spoken of, the word usually ends with 
/s, z, iz/. If a cup or mug is to be seen, it almost always has a handle. There is a period then when 
their production over-relies on the cognitive model at the expense of perceived input. Just as 
some words come with irregular plurals but are said as if regular by the child (mouses rather than 
mice), so also some mugs come with handles missing or hidden but are drawn as if prototypical 
(with a handle rather than without). In both cases IC seems to be involved to eventually ensure 
that reality triumphs over the child’s cognitive representation of reality. If further work 
supported the parallelism of development here, that would, for example, have considerable 
implications for those who believe that language acquisition is in some way a different kind of 
process (a separate ‘module’) from the general development and learning processes of young 
children. 
Second, there are implications for research practices. For instance, as just indicated, it 
seems that researchers in future need to speak less about ‘drawing skill(s)’ as if they were a 
uniform construct, and pay more attention to separate subskills. Furthermore, my findings 
combine to suggest that including drawing tasks in measures of  EF or FMC needs considerable 
care, and might best be avoided. With respect to FMC, drawing measures would need to be used 
that focused on figurative representation and detail rather than realism. With respect to EF, a 
measure focused on visual realism would be relevant, but the complexity of the relationship 
between visual realism on the one hand and age and IC on the other makes it difficult to use such 
a drawing score as a simple linear indicator of IC. That point is relevant both for research and 
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pedagogical or therapeutic uses of standard measures of EF or FMC which include drawing 
measures  
Third, one may speculate about the practical applications of the research which is 
reported here. Although my studies were all ‘pure’ in nature, there are potential implications for 
the practices of teachers and therapists who are concerned with young children’s drawing.  In 
particular it is surely of value for them to understand better what aspects of a child’s drawing can 
be interpreted as requiring good motor control and which not. Only then, for example, can they 
better judge where the common intervention of practicing drawing simple shapes and lines, 
which targets FMC, is really going to be relevant to assist the child’s development. 
Finally, the study has implications for how research may usefully proceed in future in this 
area, to which I now turn. 
5.5 Suggestions for future research 
During my study, several specific points came to my attention as needing further work. In 
Study 1, for instance, I feel that although my design adequately dealt with the Motor 
Development account and the Behavioural Inhibition account, the Symbolic Competence 
account (Riggs et al., 2013) was not adequately considered. This was due to the fact that I did not 
include a measure of Symbolic Understanding, and it is central to the Symbolic Competence 
account that Inhibitory Control is primarily associated with the domain-general development of 
Symbolic Understanding, through whose mediation it has an effect on drawing skill 
development. In order, definitely to discount this theory it would be necessary to conduct a study 
similar to Study 1 but with a measure of Symbolic Understanding included as well, so as to 
ascertain what role if any that plays in relation to Inhibitory Control and Fine Motor Control, 
with respect to the development of either Figurative Representation or Detail of drawing, or 
indeed Visual Realism. While my study has, for the targeted age group, supported the Motor 
Development account as an explanation of the development of Figurative Representation and 
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Detail and the Behavioural Inhibition account as an explanation of the development of Visual 
realism, it has not been able to show whether Symbolic Understanding also plays a key role in 
any of those. 
Another possible future line of inquiry concerns the role of IQ. In Study 2 I included this as 
a control variable and interestingly it emerged with significant relationships with Fine Motor 
Control but not with Inhibitory Control or Gross Motor Control, in analyses where all these were 
included. This is intriguing and requires follow up investigation.  
With respect to Study 3, clearly more work needs to be done to confirm the partial U-shape 
which I found. In particular a study with more participants at the low end of the age scale and 
able to produce pictures with enough figurative representation to be scored for visual versus 
intellectual realism, are needed (as discussed in 5.3). It would also be valuable, however, to 
conduct such an study again with Inhibitory Control (and possibly also Symbolic Understanding) 
included as a variable, given that we have demonstrated its key role in explaining Visual Realism 
development through the Behavioural Inhibition account. Furthermore, in the light of my 
speculation concerning possible poverty of development of mental categories as an explanation 
for an early phase of drawing with visual realism, it would be informative to include a measure 
of mental category formation. Only then could we ascertain whether in fact the very early 
tendency (prior to age 4 years) to draw with somewhat greater visual realism is in fact due to 
inhibition for some reason of a pre-potent tendency to draw with intellectual realism or rather to 
a lack of the mental categories upon which drawing with intellectual realism depends.  
Looking now more broadly, my study is the first to show a link between Inhibitory 
Control, Fine Motor Control and drawing in typical preschool children. My data suggests that the 
mediation of Fine Motor Control provides an explanation of the relationship between inhibition 
and emergence of figurative drawing skills, while this mediation is not the case for visual realism 
of drawing. Future research needs to bring together data which illuminates the link between 
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inhibition and motor control in the performance of a variety of tasks (not just drawing) across 
both infancy and childhood, in order to establish a coherent theory. In particular, it needs to be 
established which tasks are influenced by inhibition only through the mediation of some aspect 
of motor control, and which are directly impacted upon by inhibition.  
Linked to that, an obvious additional broader extension of my work is that there is a need 
to look at the role of other aspects of the executive function than Inhibitory Control in relation to 
Fine and Gross Motor Control as they affect the drawing skill variables and indeed other tasks. 
In particular Working Memory stands out as a further very important component of the executive 
function whose role needs to be established. An example of its role is to be found in the ‘A not B 
task’, where the aim of the task is for the infant to find an object hidden at a new location after 
finding it before at another location. To be able to find the object at the new location, both 
Inhibitory Control and Working Memory need to work alongside the motor system (Thelen, 
Schöner, Scheier & Smith, 2001). The Dynamic Systems theory proposed by Smith and Thelen 
(2003) highlights the interactions between the executive and motor domains, whereby activity in 
one domain has cascading effects on the other. Such interactions between these domains are 
reflected in the close neural connections and co-activation of the brain regions associated with 
those domains (Diamond, 2000; Koziol et al, 2012).  
On top of all the above, I feel that there is a great need for longitudinal studies of child 
development. At the age of 1, infants usually begin to walk, hence maximizing the role of Gross 
Motor Control in relation to executive function. By the age of 2, infants are exploring their 
environment. Later on, Fine Motor Control is more prominent, allowing for the development of 
skills in preschoolers, such as drawing and dressing. These relationships can be studied in a more 
refined way, however, where individual differences between children are controlled, by using a 
within subjects rather than a between-subjects design. A more longitudinal approach should 
therefore be used in future research to aid better understanding of the inter-relations between 
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Inhibitory Control and Working Memory, and the two kinds of Motor Control, in their impact on 
tasks, and all these links may change at different ages. In my study, I included a longitudinal 
component in the third study but not in the first two, so this remains a gap. Longitudinal studies 
are, of course, less common in the literature because of the amount of time they take and 
difficulties associated with subject attrition.   
5.6 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, this study has explored the linked themes of the pattern of the young child’s 
drawing skills development, and the roles played in that by IC and motor control. The main 
findings are that IC has a direct impact on one kind of drawing skill (visual realism) while it 
impacts others (figurative representation and detail) via FMC (but not GMC). Along with that, 
the pattern of development with age and IC of the visual realism drawing skill is J shaped rather 
than linear. 
I look forward to the day when we possess a much more comprehensive theory to explain 
how specific components of executive function are linked to specific components of motor 
control in relation to a wide range of tasks all through child development. Although a great 
challenge, this would surely represent a major step forward in our understanding of cognitive 
development. 
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Appendix A. Sample Consent Form  
Study 1 
 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
 
Dear Parent/Guardian, 
 
For my PhD research I am studying young children. In this study I am interested in how 
children's ability to draw pictures changes over time and how that might be related to other 
abilities of the children. Your child will be asked to draw some pictures and to do some tasks to 
measure some of their other abilities. Those tasks will involve only everyday activities like 
pointing at pictures, placing blocks in a shape, and folding paper.  
 
We will ask your child’s permission before we begin the study, and they can stop at any point. 
 
 
The data will be collected in strict accordance with Essex University’s ethical standards, under 
the supervision of Dr Andrew Simpson (asimpson@essex.ec.uk). The results may be presented 
at conferences and in academic publications, however, we will only present results averaged over 
many participants, and your child’s individual scores will never be identifiable. The full data will 
only be available to the members of the research team, and will not be linked to any personal 
information that you supplied.  
 
I would like to emphasise that the project is not designed to assess any individual child’s 
performance in any way. Rather, the aim is to examine some abilities of children of different 
ages and how they are related. If you would like any more information about this study or its 
results, please feel free to contact me at rfsalr@essex.ac.uk. I’ll be glad to answer your questions 
at any time.  
 
Thank you in anticipation for your help. 
Reshaa Alruwaili 
Department of Psychology 
University of Essex 
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OPT IN FORM: How are IC and Fine Motor Control related to the development of preschool 
children’s Drawing Skills? 
 
 
I consent for my child...……………………………….. to take part in this study. 
 
 
 
_________________________________   _________________________________ 
Parent/Guardian’s Name (Printed)    Child’s name (Printed) 
 
 
 
_________________________________    
Parent/Guardian (Signature) 
  
 
 
 
In addition, we would like to use some of the drawings from this study to help our students learn 
about child development. If you are content for your child’s drawings to be shown to our 
students please sign below. 
 
_________________________________    
Parent/Guardian (Signature) 
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Appendix B. Sample Consent Form Study 2 
 
 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
 
Dear Parent/Guardian, 
 
For my PhD research I am studying young children. In this study I am interested in how certain 
abilities of children are related. Your child will be asked to do some tasks to measure the abilities 
I am interested in. Those tasks will involve only everyday activities like placing blocks in a 
shape, finger touching, catching a ball, and walking backwards. 
 
We will ask your child’s permission before we begin the study, and they can stop at any point.  
 
 
The data will be collected in strict accordance with Essex University’s ethical standards, under 
the supervision of Dr Andrew Simpson (asimpson@essex.ec.uk). The results may be presented 
at conferences and in academic publications, however, we will only present results averaged over 
many participants, and your child’s individual scores will never be identifiable. The full data will 
only be available to the members of the research team, and will not be linked to any personal 
information that you supplied.  
 
I would like to emphasise that the project is not designed to assess any individual child’s 
performance in any way. Rather, the aim is to examine some abilities of children of different 
ages and how they are related. If you would like any more information about this study or its 
results, please feel free to contact me at rfsalr@essex.ac.uk. I’ll be glad to answer your questions 
at any time.  
 
Thank you in anticipation for your help. 
Reshaa Alruwaili 
Department of Psychology 
University of Essex 
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OPT IN FORM: How are IC, Fine Motor Control, Gross Motor Control, and IQ associated in 
preschool development? 
 
 
I consent for my child...……………………………….. to take part in this study. 
 
 
 
_________________________________   _________________________________ 
Parent/Guardian’s Name (Printed)    Child’s name (Printed) 
 
 
 
_________________________________    
Parent/Guardian (Signature) 
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Appendix C.  Sample Consent Form Study 3 
 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
 
Dear Parent/Guardian, 
 
For my PhD research I am studying young children. In this study I am interested in exactly how 
children's ability to draw pictures changes over time. Your child will be asked to draw some 
pictures of objects presented to them. Then they will be shown pictures and asked which picture 
best represents objects which they see. I am hoping you will be able to help me with this on three 
occasions, six months apart. 
 
 
We will ask your child’s permission before we begin the study, and they can stop at any point.  
 
 
The data will be collected in strict accordance with Essex University’s ethical standards, under 
the supervision of Dr Andrew Simpson (asimpson@essex.ec.uk). The results may be presented 
at conferences and in academic publications, however, we will only present results averaged over 
many participants, and your child’s individual scores will never be identifiable. The full data will 
only be available to the members of the research team, and will not be linked to any personal 
information that you supplied.  
 
I would like to emphasise that the project is not designed to assess any individual child’s 
performance in any way. Rather, the aim is to examine drawing skills of children of different 
age. If you would like any more information about this study or its results, please feel free to 
contact me at rfsalr@essex.ac.uk. I’ll be glad to answer your questions at any time.  
 
 
Thank you in anticipation for your help. 
Reshaa Alruwaili 
Department of Psychology 
University of Essex 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
231 
 
 
 
OPT IN FORM: Is the development of visual realism in children's drawing linear or U-shaped? 
 
 
I consent for my child...……………………………….. to take part in this study. 
 
 
 
_________________________________   _________________________________ 
Parent/Guardian’s Name (Printed)    Child’s name (Printed) 
 
 
 
_________________________________    
Parent/Guardian (Signature) 
  
 
 
 
In addition, we would like to use some of the drawings from this study to help our students learn 
about child development. If you are content for your child’s drawings to be shown to our 
students please sign below. 
 
_________________________________    
Parent/Guardian (Signature) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
